[rad-green] Hizbullah’s Response to Lebanese Pr otests Influenced by its Support for Neo-Liberal Economics

https://consortiumnews.com/2019/11/20/the-angry-arab-hizbullahs-response-to-lebanese-protests-influenced-by-its-support-for-neo-liberal-economics/

*Consortium News          November 20, 2019 *

*Hizbullah’s Response to Lebanese Protests Influenced by its Support for
Neo-Liberal Economics*

*Hizbullah at first backed and then withdrew support for street protests in
Lebanon in part because of its support for neo-liberal economic policies
and its loyalty to the ‘Awn government.*

*Protesters in Beirut, Nov. 10, 2019. (Nicolas Garon, CC BY-SA 4.0,
Wikimedia Commons)*

*By As`ad AbuKhalil
<https://consortiumnews.com/tag/asad-abukhalil/> (a.k.a. The Angry Arab)*
*Special to Consortium News*

*Western media coverage of Lebanese protests had only one purpose: to prove
that the protesting masses were targeting Hizbullah — and Hizbullah alone,
just as Western media coverage of Iraq protests want to prove that the
Iraqi people don’t mind any foreign intervention in their country except
that of Iran. Western media still believe that natives find Western
occupation enjoyable and pleasurable.*

*The New York Times *in its first coverage of the protests in Lebanon,
actually fabricated a story that protesters stormed Hizbullah offices
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/world/middleeast/lebanon-protests.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share>
in
the southern suburbs in Beirut, which had not witnessed any protests. There
were no offices of Hizbullah MPs targeted. There were offices of the other
major Shi’ite group, Amal Movement, targeted in Nabatiyyah, but all the
anger against the dominance of Amal and its corrupt leadership was
automatically transformed in Western media — in all of them — as protests
against Hizbullah.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. (Wikimedia Commons)

In his first speech after the outbreak of the protests, Hizbullah leader
Hassan Nasrallah alienated many of his (corrupt) allies when he asserted
that those protests could not be blamed on foreign conspiracies or on
embassies, but are local indigenous protests motivated by socio-economic
grievances.

But Nasrallah seemed of two minds about the protests  in his two later
speeches: On the one hand Hizbullah sympathized with the protesters in
their rage against corruption and socio-economic injustices, but on the
other hand he disagreed with the demand to bring down the government and
administration of President Michel ` Awn.

Nasrallah seemed to give his enemies a reason to defy him by declaring red
lines for the protestors and anyone wishing to infiltrate them. By strongly
supporting the administration and cabinet (referring here to an Arabic word
inaccurately described as “government” in English-language media),
Nasrallah was expressing solidarity with his Christian ally ` Awn and his
Free Patriotic Movement.

In the most recent election last year, despite its very strong showing,
(with the largest number of nationwide votes, followed by its Christian
ally), Hizbullah sensed that people in its areas of dominance — South
Lebanon and the Biqa` valley — are fed up with corruption and the lack of
economic opportunities.

Furthermore, Hizbullah has struck a solid alliance, since at least 2005,
with the Amal Movement.  Amal (the movement headed by Parliament Speaker
Nabih Berri) has a terrible reputation for corruption and mismanagement.
Crowds all over south Lebanon in the first two days of the uprising chanted
obscene slogans against Berri and his wife because Amal cracked down on the
demonstrations with the tacit support later of Hizbullah.

Berri’s wife is accused of requiring all major businesses in the south of
awarding her a substantial share.  Berri, Jumblat, and Ja`ja` are three
warlords who profited immensely — first from the war and later (in the case
of Berri and Jumblat) from state budgets and projects.  Hizbullah had
declared its intention to fight corruption and assigned its MP, Hasan
Fadallah, to lead the charge.  But there have been no results of
Hizbullah’s fight against corruption whatsoever, and Fadlallah — when asked
about progress in his mission — says files have been transferred to the
justice system. But the justice system in Lebanon is notoriously corrupt,
and files invariably end up being frozen if they deal with corrupt
politicians or their cronies.

Hizbullah was since its inception in the mid-1980s aloof from government
services, and only joined the cabinet reluctantly after the 2005
assassination <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Rafic_Hariri> of
former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.  It has had ministers in cabinets
since, but their performances have not been remarkable at all.  While they
have not been accused of corruption, they have never fought within or
outside the government against corruption.

*Limited Critique of Capitalism*

Moreover, Hizbullah is not a progressive party when it comes to social
justice.  It identifies with the struggles of people in developing
countries, but it does not have a critique of capitalism beyond general
outlines.  Hizbullah’s minister, Muhammad Fneish, supported the
privatization of the electric company of Lebanon, when he held the energy
ministry.  In the current crisis, Hizbullah stood by the “reform paper”
which was presented by Sa`d  Hariri at the suggestion of the IMF.

Hizbullah does not object to privatization per se and speeches by Nasrallah
during the crisis have not revealed much appreciation for the severity of
the current economic crisis. In his last speech, Nasrallah spoke about
encouraging industrialization and agricultural development, but those are
long term goals and can’t be activated instantly to deal with the current
crisis.

Hizbullah’s agenda in Lebanese politics is political through and through:
their attention to economic matters has been scant. Their role in
discussion of budget priorities within Lebanese cabinets has been rather
minimal, often sticking to the position of their allies.  Hizbullah only
objects to excesses of neo-liberal policies, which the pro-Saudi/pro-U.S.
rulers impose, but not to neo-liberalism itself.  Hizbullah has been
willing to allow its partners in government (the pro-Saudi camp) to pursue
greedily capitalistic policies as long as its arms are not made to be an
object of political disagreement in the government.

Female protesters form a line between riot police and other protesters in
Riad el Solh, Beirut; Nov. 19, 2019. (Nadim Kobeissi, CC BY-SA 4.0,
Wikimedia Commons)

*Hizbullah’s Position Untenable*

This crisis has revealed that Hizbullah can’t maintain its position
anymore, in which it claims to fight corruption while maintaining its
alliance with the Amal Movement and `Awn’s Free Patriotic Movement. Its
Shi`ite ally has been notoriously corrupt, and helped itself to the state
coffers. Its Christian ally struck a deal with the now resigned Prime
Minister Sa`d Hariri at the expense of its earlier promise to root out
corruption, and to hold accountable those elements of past Hariri
administrations who mismanaged and/or embezzled public funds.

Hizbullah, being notoriously worried (and not always without reason) about
Western/Israeli plots against its arsenal — the only factor deterring
Israel from attacking Lebanon — prioritizes its alliances over its declared
goal of fighting corruption in Lebanon.

The mass base of Hizbullah was clearly sympathetic to the protests,
especially in the first two days.  Chants against Berri did not necessarily
offend supporters of Hizbullah because the party historically complained
about the corruption of the Amal Movement.  Nasrallah in his speeches did
not come to the defense of Berri; in the last three speeches, Nasrallah did
not even mention Berri. For that, Berri supporters on social media made
unambiguous criticisms of allies who betrayed their movement. Relations
between the two parties have become strained as a result.  Relations could
have deteriorated further (the two sides engaged in bitter armed clashes in
the 1990s) if it was not for Hizbullah deciding to withdraw its supporters
from among the protesters in the streets.

Hizbullah watched as Amal thugs beat up demonstrators in downtown Beirut
(typically, all Western media blamed Hizbullah, when the thugs were
identified by name and they all belonged to Amal).  In Nabatiyyah in south
Lebanon, the Amal-Hizbullah-dominated municipal council crushed the local
protests and Hizbullah supporters also participated in breaking up protests
groups.  Hizbullah in the south was willing to protect the corrupt
political order in order to avoid frictions with its Shi`ite ally.

Hizbullah became suspicious as the protests went on, partly because a
situation of total breakdown scares the party, and partly because enemies
of Hizbullah in Lebanon (the pro-Saudi elements, like the Lebanese Forces,
the party of Walid Jumblat, and the movement of Sa`d  Hariri) smartly
decided to (hypocritically) join the protests to steer them in a different
direction. They wanted to deflect from the leftist influence in the demand
to bring down the whole regime and bring about total socio-economic
transformation.

*Fragmented Protests*

What started as a galvanizing radical protest movement later developed into
different protests with radical, regional variations. For example, the
protests in Jal-Ad-Dib in East Beirut were sabotaged by a carnival for the
thugs of the Lebanese Forces, while the pro-Saudi goons of Ashraf Rifi
infiltrated the protests in Tripoli.

Hizbullah could have continued to support the protests instead of
withdrawing from the street, although Nasrallah feared sectarian
provocations, which the other side has been skilled at.  Nevertheless,
Hizbullah’s mass base has become fed up with massive corruption and
socio-economic injustices.  The base of Hizbullah is fully supportive of
the resistance movement of Hizbullah (and that is true of the entire Shiite
community) but won’t tolerate a preservation of the corrupt order.

Shi`ites know that Nasrallah lives an austere and ascetic life, and that he
has never been tainted with corruption.  But that deserved reputation of
incorruptibility does not apply to all politicians and cadres of
Hizbullah.  In the most recent speech, Nasrallah offered to turn over to
the court any person within Hizbullah who is accused of corruption.  But
that is not enough, because the justice system is the last place to address
corruption and to punish those who are guilty.

The protests in Lebanon don’t give any signs of waning, and the public rage
is real despite recent attempts by the ruling class to exploit and
infiltrate the protest movement.  But it was ironic that Hizbullah (the
party that is least accused of corruption and of embezzlement of public
funds) decided to stand in defense of the political order and in particular
a weakened President ` Awn.

*As’ad AbuKhalil is a Lebanese-American professor of political science at
California State University, Stanislaus. He is the author of the
“Historical Dictionary of Lebanon” (1998), “Bin Laden, Islam and America’s
New War on Terrorism (2002), and “The Battle for Saudi Arabia” (2004). He
tweets as* *@asadabukhalil.*
<https://twitter.com/search?q=%40asadabukhalil&src=typd>

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