[rad-green] The ‘Whistleblower’ and the Politicization of Intelligence -- Scott Ritter

*https://consortiumnews.com/2019/11/27/scott-ritter-the-whistleblower-and-the-politicization-of-intelligence/
<https://consortiumnews.com/2019/11/27/scott-ritter-the-whistleblower-and-the-politicization-of-intelligence/>*


*Consortium News          November 27, 2019 *

The ‘Whistleblower’ and the Politicization of Intelligence


*The whistleblower complaint has opened a window into the politicization of
the intelligence community, and the corresponding weaponization of the
national security establishment.*

*By Scott Ritter*
*Special to Consortium News*

The whistleblower. A figure of great controversy, whose actions, manifested
in an *11-page report
<https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/09/politics/whistleblower-complaint-annotated/>*
 submitted to the *Intelligence Community Inspector General (ICIG)
<https://www.ignet.gov/content/office-inspector-general-intelligence-community>*
 on August 12 alleging wrongdoing on the part of the president of the
United States, jump-started an ongoing impeachment process targeting Donald
Trump that has divided the American body politic as no other issue in
contemporary time.

His identity has been cloaked in a shroud of anonymity which has proven
farcical, given that his name is common knowledge throughout the
Washington-based national security establishment in whose ranks he
continues to serve. While Trump *publicly calls for the identity of the
<https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/463687-trump-white-house-trying-to-find-out-whistleblowers-identity>*
whistleblower *to be revealed
<https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/463687-trump-white-house-trying-to-find-out-whistleblowers-identity>*,
the mainstream media has played along with the charade of confidentiality,
and Congress continues to pretend his persona is a legitimate national
security secret, even as several *on-line publications have printed it
<https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2019/10/30/whistleblower_exposed_close_to_biden_brennan_dnc_oppo_researcher_120996.html>*,
along with an extensive document trail sufficient to corroborate that the
named man is, in fact, the elusive whistleblower.

There is no legitimate reason for the whistleblower’s identity to remain a
secret. The Democratic chairman of the House Intelligence Committee,
Representative *Adam Schiff <https://schiff.house.gov/>*, (D-CA) has cited
statutory protections that simply do not exist while using his authority as
chairman to prohibit any probe by his Republican colleagues designed to
elicit information about the whistleblower’s identity. “The whistleblower
has a right, a statutory right, to anonymity,” Schiff recently opined
during recent impeachment-related testimony. And yet *The Washington Post*,
no friend of Trump, was compelled to assign Schiff’s statement *three
“Pinocchios”
<https://thehill.com/homenews/media/471256-wapo-gives-schiff-three-pinocchois-on-whistleblower-anonymity-claim>*
, out of a scale of four, in rejecting the claim as baseless.

The myth of statutory protection for the whistleblower’s identity has been
aggressively pursued by his legal counsel, *Andrew Bakaj
<https://compassrosepllc.com/bakaj/>*, the managing partner of the Compass
Rose Legal Group, which has taken on the whistleblower’s case pro bono. *In
a letter
<https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/07/politics/read-whistleblower-lawyer-letter-to-trump/index.html>*
to
the president’s legal counsel, Pat Cippolone, Bakaj demanded that Trump
“cease and desist in calling for my client’s identity”, claiming that the
president’s actions, undertaken via Twitter and in press briefings,
constituted violations of federal statutes prohibiting, among other things,
tampering with a witness, obstruction of proceedings, and retaliating
against as witness.
<https://consortiumnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Schiff.jpg>

Schiff: Wrong to shield whistleblower. (Flickr)

All of Bakaj’s claims are contingent upon the viability of the
whistleblower’s status as a legitimate witness whose testimony can,
therefore, be tampered, obstructed or retaliated against. The legal
foundation of the whistleblower’s claims are based upon the so-called
Intelligence Community whistleblower *statute
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3033>*, 50 USC § 3033(k)(5),
which stipulates the processes required to report and sustain an allegation
of so-called “urgent concern” to the U.S. intelligence community. An
“urgent concern” is defined, in relevant part, as: “A serious or flagrant
problem, abuse, violation of the law or Executive order, or deficiency
relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence
activity within the responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence involving classified information, but does not
include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters.”

*The Call*

At issue was a telephone call made between President Trump and the newly
elected President of Ukraine, *Volodymyr Zelensky
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Volodymyr-Zelensky>*, on July 25 of
this year. According to the whistleblower’s report to the ICIG, “Multiple
White House officials with direct knowledge of the call informed me that,
after an initial exchange of pleasantries, the President used the remainder
of the call to advance his personal interests.” President Trump, the
whistleblower alleged, “sought to pressure the Ukrainian leader to take
actions to help the President’s 2020 reelection bid,” an act which the
whistleblower claimed presidential abuse of his office “for personal gain.”

Upon review of the whistleblower’s report, which consisted of a nine-page
unclassified letter and a separate two-page classified annex, Michael K.
Atkinson, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, initiated an
investigation of the complaint as required by the whistleblower statute.
This investigation must be completed within a 14-day period mandated by the
statute, during which time the ICIG “shall determine whether the complaint
or information appears credible.”

While the statute is silent on the methodology to be used by the ICIG in
making this determination, *Atkinson had testified
<https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aphq-matkinson-011718.PDF>*
 during his Senate confirmation hearing that, when it came to any
investigation of a whistleblower complaint, “I will work to ensure that
ICIG personnel conduct investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews in
accordance with Quality Standards promulgated by CIGIE (Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency) to keep those activities
free from personal, external, and organizational impairments.” The *CIGIE
standard in question
<https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/invprg1211appi.pdf>* requires
that, “Evidence must be gathered and reported in an unbiased and
independent manner in an effort to determine the validity of an allegation
or to resolve an issue.”

In a *letter transmitting the
<https://www.dni.gov/files/ICIG/Documents/News/ICIG%20News/2019/September%2030%20-%20Statement%20on%20Processing%20of%20Whistleblower%20Complaints/ICIG%20Statement%20on%20Processing%20of%20Whistleblower%20Complaints.pdf>*
whistleblower *complaint
<https://www.dni.gov/files/ICIG/Documents/News/ICIG%20News/2019/September%2030%20-%20Statement%20on%20Processing%20of%20Whistleblower%20Complaints/ICIG%20Statement%20on%20Processing%20of%20Whistleblower%20Complaints.pdf>*
to
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Atkinson stated that he had
“determined that the Complainant (i.e., whistleblower) had official and
authorized access to the information and sources referenced in the
Complainant’s Letter and Classified Appendix, including direct knowledge of
certain alleged conduct, and that the Complainant has subject matter
expertise related to much of the material information provided in the
Complainant’s Letter and Classified Appendix.”

However, when it came to assessing whether or not the whistleblower, in
reporting the second-hand information provided to him by White House
persons familiar with the July 25 Trump-Zelensky phone call, had done so
accurately, Atkinson did not review the actual records of the telephone
call, noting that he “decided that access to records of the telephone call
was not necessary to make my determination that the complaint relating to
the urgent concern ‘appears credible.’”

Atkinson declared that “it would be highly unlikely for the ICIG to obtain
those records within the limited remaining time allowed by statute,” and
opted to perform an investigation in violation of the very CIGIE standard
he had promise to adhere to in his Senate testimony. In short, no evidence
was gathered by the ICIG to determine the validity of the whistleblower’s
allegation, and yet Atkinson decided to forward the complaint to the DNI,
certifying it as “credible.”

The whistleblower statute allows the DNI seven days to review the complaint
before forwarding it to the House Committee on Intelligence, with comments
if deemed appropriate. However, in reviewing the actual complaint, Joseph
McGuire, the acting DNI who took over from Dan Coats, who was fired by
President Trump in early August, had questions about whether or not the
matters it alleged fell within the remit of the whistleblower statute, and
rather than forwarding it to the House Intelligence Committee, instead sent
it to the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel for legal review.

The Office of Legal Council, on September 3, *issued a legal opinion
<https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1205711/download>* rejecting the
ICIG’s certification of the whistleblower complaint as constituting an
“urgent concern” under the law. “The complaint,” the opinion read,

“does not arise in connection with the operation of any U.S. government
intelligence activity, and the alleged misconduct does not involve any
member of the intelligence community. Rather, the complaint arises out of a
confidential diplomatic communication between the President and a foreign
leader that the intelligence-community complainant received secondhand. The
question is whether such a complaint falls within the statutory definition
of ‘urgent concern’ that the law requires the DNI to forward to the
intelligence committees. We conclude that it does not. The alleged
misconduct is not an ‘urgent concern’ within the meaning of the statute.”


*DOJ Rejected Complaint as Urgent*

As related in the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion, the Justice Department
did, however, refer the matter to the Criminal Division of the Department
of Justice for appropriate review. After considering the whistleblower’s
complaint and classified annex, the Criminal Division opted not to pursue
charges, in effect determining that no crime had been committed.

Under normal circumstances, this would have concluded the matter of Trump’s
phone call with Zelensky, and the second-hand concerns unnamed White House
officials had reported to the whistleblower. But this was not a normal
circumstance. Far from diffusing an improperly predicated complaint, the
failure of the acting DNI to forward the whistleblower complaint to the
House Intelligence Committee, and the concurrent legal opinion of the
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel rejecting the “urgent concern”
certification of the ICIG, opened the door for the whistleblower, through
legal counsel, to reach out to the House Intelligence Committee directly.

The whistleblower followed procedures set forth in the whistleblower
statute detailing procedures for a complaint, which had not been certified
as an “urgent concern,” to be forwarded to Congress. The issue is that the
matter was being treated by the ICIG, Congress and the whistleblower’s
attorney’s as an “urgent concern”, a status that it did not legally qualify
for.

On September 24, Bakaj sent a “*Notice of Intent to Contact
<https://compassrosepllc.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/01-2019_0924_-Correspondence-to-DNI-FINAL.pdf>*
Congressional
Intelligence Committees” to acting DNI McGuire providing “formal notice of
our intent to contact the congressional intelligence committees directly”
on behalf of the whistleblower, identified only as “a member of the
Intelligence Community.” Almost immediately, Schiff *announced via Twitter
<https://twitter.com/RepAdamSchiff/status/1176564220407767042>* that “We
have been informed by the whistleblower’s counsel that their client would
like to speak to our committee and has requested guidance from the Acting
DNI as to how to do so. We‘re in touch with counsel and look forward to the
whistleblower’s testimony as soon as this week.”
<https://consortiumnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Bakaj.jpg>

Andrew Bakaj, whistleblower attorney. (Twitter)

Thus was set in motion events which would culminate in impeachment
proceedings against President Trump. On the surface, the events described
represent a prima facia case for the efficacy of statutory procedures
concerning the processing of a whistleblower complaint. But there were
warning signs that all was not right regarding both the whistleblower
himself, and the processes involved leading to the whistleblower’s
complaint being presented to Congress.

*Political Bias?*

Far from an exemplar in bureaucratic efficiency, the whistleblower
complaint has opened a window into the politicization of the intelligence
community, and the corresponding weaponization of the national security
establishment, against a sitting president.

As I shall show, such actions are treasonous on their face, and the extent
to which this conduct has permeated the intelligence community and its
peripheral functions of government, including the National Security Council
and Congress itself, will only be known if and when an investigation is
conducted into what, in retrospect, is nothing less than a grand conspiracy
by those ostensibly tasked with securing the nation to instead reverse the
will of the American people regarding who serves as the nation’s chief
executive.

The key to this narrative is the whistleblower himself. Understanding who
he is, and what role he has played in the events surrounding the fateful
July 25 telephone conversation, are essential to unravelling the various
threads of this conspiracy.

Much has been made about the political affiliation of the whistleblower,
namely the fact that he is *a registered Democrat
<https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/03/politics/whistleblower-registered-democrat/index.html>*
 who supports
<https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/alleged-whistleblower-eric-ciaramella-was-biden-guest-at-state-department-banquet>
 Joe Biden as the Democratic candidate for the 2020 presidential election.
On the surface this information is not dispositive—the intelligence
community is populated by thousands of professionals of diverse political
leanings and affiliations, all of whom have been trained to check their
personal politics at the door when it comes to implementing the policies
promulgated by the duly elected national leadership.

Indeed, Inspector General Atkinson, while acknowledging in his assessment
of the whistleblower’s complaint an indication of possible political bias
on the part of the whistleblower in favor of a rival political candidate,
noted that “such evidence did not change my determination that the
complaint relating to the urgent concern ‘appears credible’”. But when one
reverse engineers the whistleblower’s career, it becomes clear that there
in fact existed a nexus between the whistleblower’s political advocacy and
professional actions that both influenced and motivated his decision to
file the complaint against the president.

*A Rising Star*

Like most CIA analysts, *the
<https://heavy.com/news/2019/10/eric-ciaramella/>* whistleblower *possessed
a keen intellect born of stringent academic preparation
<https://heavy.com/news/2019/10/eric-ciaramella/>*, which in the
whistleblower’s case included graduating from Yale University in 2008 with
a degree in Russian and East European studies, post-graduate study at
Harvard, and work experience with the World Bank.

Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a contemporary colleague of the whistleblower, has
provided an apt account for what is expected of a CIA analyst. “The CIA is
an intensely apolitical organization,” *Kendall-Taylor wrote
<https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.usatoday.com/amp/4184670002>*. “As
intelligence analysts, we are trained to check our politics at the door.
Our job is to produce objective analysis that the country’s leaders can use
to make difficult decisions. We undergo rigorous training on how to analyze
our own assumptions and overcome biases that might cloud our judgement.”

The training program Kendall-Taylor referred to is known as the *Career
Analyst Program (CAP)
<https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/training-resources.html>*,
a four-month basic training program run out of the CIA’s in-house
University, the Sherman Kent School
<https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/training-resources.html>,
which “introduces all new employees to the basic thinking, writing, and
briefing skills needed for a successful career. Segments include analytic
tools, counterintelligence issues, denial and deception analysis, and
warning skills.”

By the time the whistleblower completed his application process with the
CIA, which requires a detailed background check, several rounds of
interviews, and final security and psychological evaluation before an
actual offer of employment can be made, and by the time he finished his
basic analytical training, the U.S. had undergone a political and social
revolution of sorts with the election of Barack Obama as the 44th president
of the United States.The *standards
<https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20203%20Analytic%20Standards%20pdf-unclassified.pdf>*
to
which aspiring analysts such as the whistleblower were trained to meet were
exacting, and included a requirement to be “independent of political
considerations,” meaning the product produced should consist of objective
assessments “informed by available information that are not distorted or
altered with the intent of supporting or advocating a particular policy,
political viewpoint, or audience.” As an analyst, the whistleblower would
have chosen a specific specialization, which in his case was as a “*Political
Analyst <https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/analytical/>*”, charged
with examining “political, social, cultural, and historical information to
provide assessments about foreign political systems and developments.”

The whistleblower was assigned to the Office of Russian and Eurasian
Analysis (OREA), within the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, at a time
when U.S.-Russian policy was undergoing a radical transformation.

Under the guidance of Michael McFaul, President Obama’s special advisor on
Russia and the senior director of Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the
National Security Council, the Obama administration was seeking to take
advantage of the opportunity afforded by the election of Dmitri Medvedev as
Russia’s president in 2008. Medvedev had succeeded Vladimir Putin, who went
on to serve as prime minister. Medvedev was a more liberal alternative to
Putin’s autocratic conservatism, and McFaul envisioned a policy “reset”
designed to move relations between the U.S. and Russia in a more positive
trajectory.

As a junior analyst, the whistleblower worked alongside colleagues such as
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, who joined OREA about the same time after graduating
from UCLA in 2008 with a PhD is Slavic and Eurasian studies. A prolific
writer, Kendall-Taylor *wrote extensively on autocratic leaders and Putin
in particular
<http://sites.psu.edu/wright/files/2017/04/TWQ_Spring2017_KTFW-yniq1v.pdf>*.
Her
work was in high demand at both the CIA and NSC, which under the Obama
administration had undergone a massive expansion intended to better
facilitate policy coordination among the various departments that comprised
the NSC.

The whistleblower had a front-row seat on the rollercoaster ride that was
U.S.-Russian policy during this time, witnessing the collapse of McFaul’s
Russian “reset,” Putin’s return to power in 2012, and the U.S.-backed coup
in Ukraine that led to the annexation of Crimea and Russian support for
rebels in the Donbas region.

During his tenure at OREA, the whistleblower obviously impressed his
superiors, receiving several promotions
<https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/alleged-whistleblower-eric-ciaramella-was-biden-guest-at-state-department-banquet>
and,
in July 2015, he detailed to the NSC staff at the Obama White House as the
Director for Ukrainian Affairs. According to a former CIA officer, any
high-performing analyst who aspires to be promoted into the ranks of the
Senior Intelligence Service must, prior to that time, do a rotation as part
of the overall policy community, which includes the NSC or another
department, such as Defense or State, as well as a tour within another
directorate of the CIA.

NSC positions were originally intended for senior CIA analysts, at the
GS-15 level, but waivers could be made for qualified GS-14 or “very strong”
GS-13’s (the whistleblower was a GS-13 at the time of his assignment at the
NSC, a reflection of both his qualification and the regard to which he was
held by the CIA.) NSC assignments do not coincide with the political
calendar—detailees (as career civil servants who are detailed to the NSC
are referred) are expected to serve in their position regardless of what
political party controls the White House. When an opening becomes available
(usually when another detailee’s assignment has finished), prospective
candidates apply, and are interviewed by their senior management, who
forward qualified candidates to another board for a final decision.

Assignments to the NSC are considered highly sought after, and while the
process for application must be followed, the selection process is highly
political, with decisions being signed off by the director of the CIA. In
the case of the whistleblower, his candidacy would have been approved by
both *Peter Clement
<https://sipa.columbia.edu/faculty-research/faculty-directory/peter-clement>*,
the director of OREA, and *John Brennan
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Brennan>*, the CIA director.

*Into the Lion’s Den*

By the time the whistleblower arrived at the NSC, the NSC staff had grown
into a well-oiled policy machine managing the entire spectrum of Obama
administration national security policy-making and implementation. The NSC
staff operated in accordance with *Presidential Policy Memorandum (PPM) 1
<https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf>*, “Organization of the National
Security Council System”, which outlined the procedures governing the
management of the development and implementation of national security
policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government.

<https://consortiumnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/brennan-obama.jpg>

Brennan briefing Obama May 3, 2010. He approved whistleblower. (Official
White House Photo by Pete Souza)

The vehicle for accomplishing this mission was the NSC Interagency Policy
Committee (NSC/IPC). The NSC/IPCs were the main day-to-day fora for
interagency coordination of national security policy. They provided policy
analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system
and ensured timely responses to decisions made by the president. NSC/IPCs
were established at the direction of the NSC Deputies Committee and were
chaired by the relevant division chief within the NSC staff.

The whistleblowers job was to develop, coordinate and execute plans and
policies to manage the full range of diplomatic, informational, military
and economic national security issues for the countries in his portfolio,
which included Ukraine. The whistleblower coordinated with his interagency
partners to produce internal memoranda, talking points and other materials
for the National Security Advisor and senior staff.

The whistleblower reported directly to *Charles Kupchan
<https://heavy.com/news/2019/11/charles-kupchan/>*, the Senior Director for
European Affairs on the NSC. Kupchan, a State Department veteran who had
previously served on the NSC staff of President Bill Clinton before turning
to academia, in turn reported directly to Susan Rice, President Obama’s
national security adviser.

When the whistleblower first arrived at the NSC, he volunteered for the
Ukraine portfolio. Kupchan was impressed by the whistleblower’s work ethic
and performance, and soon expanded his portfolio to include the fight
against the Islamic State. The whistleblower was aided by another
organizational connection—his colleague and mentor at OREA, Andrea
Kendall-Taylor, had been selected to serve in the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence as the d*eputy n
<https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/jobs/HH058.pdf>**ational i
<https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/jobs/HH058.pdf>**ntelligence o
<https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/jobs/HH058.pdf>**fficer
<https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/jobs/HH058.pdf>* for Russia and
Eurasia. Among Kendall-Taylor’s responsibilities was to closely coordinate
with the NSC staff on critical issues pertaining to Russia and Ukraine.

The whistleblower’s arrival at the NSC staff also coincided with the start
of Trump’s improbable candidacy for the presidency of the United States. As
2015 transitioned into 2016, and it became apparent that Trump was the
presumptive nominee for the Republican Party, allegations about the Trump
campaign colluding with Russia began to circulate within the interagency.
Trump’s electoral victory in November 2016, *shocked the whistleblower,
like everyone else on the NSC staff.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6qhyXSaQLI>*

*Alarmed By Trump on Russia*

The line between policy and politics began to blur, and then disappeared
altogether. National Security Advisor Rice was becoming increasingly
alarmed by the activities of the Trump transition team, especially when it
came to issues pertaining to Russia. *According to The Washington Post
<https://grondamorin.com/2017/04/05/washington-post-fact-checked-republicans-version-of-susan-rices-actions/>*
, “Rice apparently was closely monitoring the high-profile investigation
into Russian interference.”

The President-elect had, during the campaign, openly advocated for better
relations between the U.S. and Russia and had even suggested that the
Russian annexation of Crimea could eventually be accepted by the U.S. This
stance was anathema to the policies that had been massaged into place by
the NSC in general, and the whistleblower in particular. According to
multiple sources familiar with the whistleblower during this time, his
animus against Trump was palpable.

In December 2016, Rice was involved in the unmasking of the identities of
several members of the Trump transition team. Various sensitive
intelligence reports were circulating within the NSC regarding the
interaction of unnamed U.S. citizens with foreign targets of intelligence
interest. In order to better understand the significance of such a
report, *Rice
<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/apr/3/susan-rice-ordered-unmasking-trump-team-intel-bloo/>**has
acknowledged
<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/apr/3/susan-rice-ordered-unmasking-trump-team-intel-bloo/>*
that,
on several occasions, she requested that the identity of the U.S. persons
involved be “unmasked.”

The U.S. intelligence community is prohibited by law from collecting
information about U.S. citizens. As such, when a conversation undertaken by
a foreign national of intelligence interest was captured, and it turned out
the person or persons whom the target was speaking to was a U.S. citizen,
the analysts preparing the report for wider dissemination would “mask”, or
hide, the identities of the U.S. citizens involved. Under relevant laws
governing the collection of intelligence, up to 20 officials within the
Obama administration had the authority to unmask the identities of U.S.
citizens. One of those was Rice.

In late December 2016, the crown prince of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh
Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, arrived in New York for a meeting with
several top Trump transition officials, including Michael Flynn, Trump’s
son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and the President-elect’s top strategist Steve
Bannon. Intelligence reports had been circulating about the UAE
coordinating a backchannel for the Trump transition team and Russia.

Zayed’s arrival, which was unannounced and had not been coordinated with
the U.S. government, caused great concern among the NSC staff especially
given the context of allegations of collusion between Trump and Russia to
influence the outcome of the 2016 election.

The principle NSC staffers who would logically been advising Rice on this
matter were Kupchan, the whistleblower, and *Sean Misko
<https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/adam-schiffs-staff-includes-2-aides-who-worked-with-whistleblower-at-white-house>*
, a State Department detailee who served as the director for the Gulf Arab
States. (According the NSC staffers who worked in the White House at the
time, Misko and the whistleblower were said to be close friends, frequently
socializing with one another after hours, and possessing a common dislike
for Trump.) *Rice requested
<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/susan-rice-says-unmasking-of-names-wasnt-for-political-purposes/>*
that the intelligence reports pertaining to Zayed’s visit be subjected to
unmasking procedures.

While the *subsequent reporting
<https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/13/politics/susan-rice-house-investigators-unmasked-trump-officials/index.html>*
about
the three-hour meeting between Zayed and the Trump transition team failed
to uncover any evidence of a secret communications channel with Russia,
Rice (who would logically have been assisted by Kupchan and the
whistleblower) facilitated the near continuous unmasking of intelligence
reports involving Flynn, who was in contact with Russian officials,
including Sergei Kislyak, the Russian ambassador to the U.S.

*The Greatest Sin*

* <https://consortiumnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/rice-obama.jpg>*

Susan Rice, center, with Obama, March 10, 2009. (White House photo)

As a professional intelligence analyst detailed to the NSC, the
whistleblower was committed to a two-year assignment, extendable to three
years upon the agreement of all parties. President Obama’s departure from
the White House did not change this commitment. According to NSC staffers
who served in the White House at the time, the whistleblower, like many of
his fellow detailees, had grown attached to the policies of the Obama
administration which they had fought hard to formulate, coordinate and
implement. They viewed these policies to be sacrosanct, regardless of who
followed in the White House.

In doing so, they had committed the greatest sin that an intelligence
professional could commit short of espionage—they had become political.

In December 2016, the whistleblower was, based upon his role as a leading
Russian analysts advising Rice directly, more than likely helping unmask
Flynn’s communications with Russians; a month later, he was working for
Flynn, someone he  had likely actively helped conspire against, using the
unfettered power of the intelligence community.

The Trump administration had inherited a national security decision-making
apparatus that was bloated, and which fostered White House micromanagement
via the NSC. While the Obama NSC had proven able to generate a prolific
amount of “policy”, it did so by relying on a staff that had expanded to
the largest in the history of the NSC, and at the expense of the various
departments of government that were supposed to be the originators of
policy.

As the new national security adviser, Flynn let it be known from day one
that there would be changes. One of his first actions was to *hire four new
deputies
<https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-national-security-234526>* who
centralized much of the responsibilities normally tasked to regional
directors such as the whistleblower. Flynn was putting in place a new level
of bureaucracy that shielded professional detailees from top level decision
makers.

Moreover, it recognized that the NSC, while staffed with professionals who
are supposed to be apolitical, was viewed by the White House as a partisan
policy body whose work not only furthered the interests of the United
States, but also the political interests of the president. When Trump
included his top political advisor, Bannon, on the list of people who would
comprise the National Security Council (normally limited to cabinet-level
officials), it sent shockwaves through the national security establishment,
which accused Trump of politicizing what they claimed was an apolitical
process.

But the reality was that the NSC had always functioned as a partisan
decision-making body. Its previous occupants may have tried to temper the
level to which domestic politics intruded on national security
decision-making, but its presence was an unspoken reality. All Trump did by
seeking to insert Bannon into the mix was to be open about it.

Like the other professional detailees who comprised 90 percent of the NSC
staff and were expected to remain at their posts as part of a Trump
administration, the whistleblower was dismayed by the changes. *Some
accounts of the early days
<https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2019/10/30/whistleblower_exposed_close_to_biden_brennan_dnc_oppo_researcher_120996.html>*
 of the Trump NSC indicate that the whistleblower was defensive of the
Ukraine policies he had helped craft during his tenure at the NSC.

When his immediate superior, Kupchan (a political appointee) departed the
NSC, the whistleblower was temporarily elevated to the position of senior
director for Russia and Eurasia until a new replacement could be found.
(Flynn had *reached out to Fiona Hill
<http://johnhelmer.net/fiona-hill-to-take-over-president-trumps-russia-desk-2/>*,
a former national intelligence officer for Russia under the administration
of George W. Bush, to take this job; Hill had accepted, but would not be
available until April.)

The whistleblower was a known quantity within the NSC, as were his
decidedly pro-Obama political leanings. As such, he was not trusted by the
incoming Trump officials, *and his access to the decision-making process
was limited
<https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/saw-everything-alleged-whistleblower-eric-ciaramella-had-extensive-access-in-trumps-white-house>*
.

According to persons familiar with his work at the NSC during the Trump
administration, the whistleblower’s frustration and anger soon led to acts
of resistance designed to expose, and undermine public confidence in
President Trump.

*Cut Out of Call to Putin*

In late January 2017 Trump made several introductory telephone calls to
world leaders, including President Putin. Normally the NSC director
responsible for Russia would help prepare the president for such a call by
drafting talking points and supporting memoranda, and then monitor the call
directly, either from within the Oval Office or from the White House
situation room.

According to sources familiar with the incident, Flynn did not coordinate
Trump’s call with NSC staff, and as such the whistleblower, who was acting
as the director for Russia and European Affairs at the time, would have
been cut out of the process altogether. When the whistleblower tried to
access the read out of the phone call afterwards, he found that no verbatim
record existed, only a *short summary released by the White House
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/readout-presidents-call-russian-president-vladimir-putin/>*
, presumably prepared by Flynn.

More frustrating was the fact that the official *readout of the call
released by the Kremlin
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53787>* contained
much more information, putting Russia in the driver’s seat in terms of
defining U.S.-Russian policy priorities—the very policy blunder the NSC was
supposed to prevent from happening. While searching for the non-existent
records of the Putin-Trump conversation, however, the whistleblower came
across detailed verbatim transcripts of two other calls made by Trump that
day—one with Mexico, and one with Australia.

Within days the *details of these calls were leaked to the media
<https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/why-leaking-transcripts-of-trumps-calls-is-so-dangerous/535809/>*
, resulting in a series of unflattering articles being published by the
mainstream media. While no direct evidence has emerged about who was
responsible for leaking these calls, NSC staffers who worked in the White
House at the time suspected the whistleblower. (One of the byproducts of
this incident was the decision by *NSC lawyers to move the records of
Presidential phone calls to a more secure server
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/us/politics/nsc-ukraine-call.html>*,
significantly
limiting access by NSC staff.)

On February 13, 2017, *Flynn resigned
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/13/us/politics/donald-trump-national-security-adviser-michael-flynn.html>*
from
his position as President Trump’s national security adviser. The reason
given was Flynn’s having misrepresented his conversations with Russian
Ambassador Kislyak when questioned by Vice President Mike Pence. For the
whistleblower, whose previous work in the Obama NSC appeared to help Rice’s
efforts to unmask the very conversations Flynn was being held accountable
for, this had to have been a satisfying moment. He had to have been even
more pleased by *Trump’s choice to replace Flynn
<https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/02/new-national-security-adviser-h-r-mcmaster-is-the-armys-smartest-officer.html>*—Lieutenant
General H. R. McMaster, a decorated combat veteran known for his
intelligence and willingness to challenge the establishment.

In the little more than a month that transpired between McMaster coming on
board and the arrival of Hill as the new director for Russia and Europe,
the whistleblower would have had the opportunity to meet his new boss and
work with him on *repairing what they both viewed as the flawed changes
undertaken by Flynn at the NSC
<https://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/mcmaster-national-security-council-staff-changes-235579>*
.

McMaster rewrote the presidential guidance regarding the functioning of the
NSC, replacing the original Presidential Policy Memorandum 1 with a new
version, *PPM 4
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/national-security-presidential-memorandum-4/>*,
which removed Bannon from the NSC and restored much of the policy
coordinating functions that characterized the NSC under Obama.

Moreover, *McMaster stuck up for the professional detailees
<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/30/mcmaster-and-commander>*,
such as the whistleblower. When Hill arrived in April 2017 to assume her
responsibilities as the NSC director for Russia and Europe, the
whistleblower found himself without a job.

But instead of being returned to the CIA, McMaster, who had come to know
the whistleblower during his first month as national security adviser,
*appointed
him
<https://www.cernovich.com/2017-cernovich-article-meet-eric-ciaramella-h-r-mcmaster-appoints-susan-rice-ally-to-be-his-personal-aide/>to
serve as his personal assistant
<https://www.cernovich.com/2017-cernovich-article-meet-eric-ciaramella-h-r-mcmaster-appoints-susan-rice-ally-to-be-his-personal-aide/>*
. The whistleblower moved from his desk next door in the Executive Office
Building, where most NSC staffer work, to the West Wing of the White House,
a move which gave him direct access to every issue that crossed McMaster’s
desk.

*Oval Office Leak*

The new job, however, did nothing to diminish the disdain the whistleblower
had for Trump. Indeed, the proximity to the seat of power may have served
to increase the concern the whistleblower had about Trump’s stewardship. On
May 10, President Trump played host to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov and Russian Ambassador Kislyak. During the now-infamous meeting,
Trump spoke about the firing of former FBI Director Jim Comey; a sensitive
Israeli intelligence source related to the ongoing fight against ISIS in
Syria; and alleged Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.

As McMasters’ assistant, the whistleblower was privy to the readout of the
meeting, and was so alarmed by what he had seen that *he sent an email to
John Kelly <https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf>*, who at that time
was serving as director of the Department of Homeland Security, detailing
the president’s actions and words. All materials relating to this meeting *were
collected and secured in the NSC’s top secret codeword server
<https://www.emptywheel.net/2019/09/27/hidden-trump-admitted-2016-russian-interference/>*
; the only unsecured data was that contained in the whistleblower’s email.
When the media subsequently reported on the details of Trump’s meeting with
the Russians, the White House condemned the “leaking of private and highly
classified information” which undermined “our national security.”

<https://consortiumnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/President_Trump_Meets_with_Russian_Foreign_Minister_Sergey_Lavrov_34597652845.jpg>

Trump meets with Lavrov on May 10, 2017. (TASS/Wikipedia)

According to a NSC staffer who worked in the White House at the time, an
internal investigation pointed to the whistleblower’s email as the likely
source of the leak, and while the whistleblower was not directly implicated
in actually transmitting classified information to the press, he was
criticized for what amounted to unauthorized communication with an outside
agency, in this case the Department of Homeland Security. When his initial
two-year assignment terminated in July 2017, the White House refused to
authorize a one-year extension (a courtesy offered to the vast majority of
detailees).

The whistleblower had become a liability, *publicly smeared by right-wing
bloggers
<https://www.cernovich.com/2017-cernovich-article-meet-eric-ciaramella-h-r-mcmaster-appoints-susan-rice-ally-to-be-his-personal-aide/>*
and
subjected to death threats. He was released from the NSC and returned to
the CIA, where he resumed his role as a Eurasian analyst. Shortly after the
whistleblower left the NSC, the full transcripts of President Trump’s
January 28, 2017 conversations with the leaders of Mexico and Australia
were leaked to the press. While several colleagues in the NSC believed that
the whistleblower was behind the leaks, McMaster refused to authorize a
formal investigation which, if evidence had been found that implicated the
whistleblower, would have effectively terminated his career at the CIA.

It is at this juncture the saga of the whistleblower should have ended,
avoiding the turn of events which ended up labeling him with the now famous
(or infamous) appellation. However, in June 2018 the whistleblower’s
colleague, Kendall-Taylor, ended her assignment as the deputy national
intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia. *An announcement was made to
fill the vacancy <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/jobs/16111.pdf>*, and
the whistleblower applied.

Despite having left the NSC under a cloud of suspicion regarding the
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information, and even though his
anti-Trump sentiment was common knowledge among his colleagues and
superiors, the whistleblower was picked for a position that would put him
at the center of policy formulation regarding Russia and Ukraine, and the
sensitive intelligence that influenced such. His appointment would have
been approved by Director of National Intelligence Dan Coates.

*Enter Vindman*

The whistleblower was well versed in the collaborative functions of the
deputy national intelligence officer position, having worked with
Kendall-Taylor during his time at the NSC. He began to develop professional
relationships with a number of individuals, including the new director of
Ukraine at the NSC, Army Lieutenant Colonel *Alexander Vindman
<https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/alexander-vindman-army-officer-defying-white-house-testify/story?id=66610499>*
. Vindman had extensive experience regarding Ukraine and had been detailed
to the NSC from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The two soon appeared to share a
mutual concern over President Trump’s worldview of both Russia and Ukraine,
which deviated from the formal policy formulations promulgated by the
interagency processes that both Vindman and the whistleblower were involved
in.
<https://consortiumnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Alexander_Vindman_on_May_20_2019.jpg>

Kiev-born Vindman. (Wikipedia)

The whistleblower’s concerns about President Trump and Ukraine predated the
July 25, 2019 telephone call, and mirrored those expressed by Lieutenant
Colonel Vindman, both in chronology and content, *provided during his
testimony before the House Intelligence Committee
<https://consortiumnews.com/2019/11/27/scott-ritter-the-whistleblower-and-the-politicization-of-intelligence/#fullscreen&from_embed>*
. While Vindman was critical of President Trump’s deviation and/or failure
to conform with policy that had been vetted through proper channels (i.e.,
in conformity with PDD 4), he noted that, as president, “It’s his
prerogative to handle the call whichever way he wants.”

Vindman took umbrage at the non-national security topics brought up by the
president, such as investigating former Vice President Joe Biden and his
son, Hunter, regarding their relationship with a Ukrainian energy
company, *Burisma Holdings
<https://thefederalist.com/2019/09/29/timeline-of-the-burisma-investigation-doesnt-exculpate-hunter-biden-it-just-leads-to-more-questions/>*
,  and other references to the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

According to Vindman, it was this aspect of the telephone call Vindman
believed to be alarming, and which he subsequently related to an authorized
contact within the intelligence community. While Vindman remained
circumspect about the identity of the intelligence community official he
communicated with about his concerns over Trump’s Ukraine policy, the fact
that the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee refused to allow any
discussion of this person’s identity strongly suggests that it was the
whistleblower who, as the deputy national intelligence officer for Russia
and Ukraine, would be a logical, and fully legitimate, interlocuter.

According to *an account published in **T*
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/how-a-cia-analyst-alarmed-by-trumps-shadow-foreign-policy-triggered-an-impeachment-inquiry/2019/11/15/042684a8-03c3-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html>*he
Washington Post
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/how-a-cia-analyst-alarmed-by-trumps-shadow-foreign-policy-triggered-an-impeachment-inquiry/2019/11/15/042684a8-03c3-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html>*
*,* sometime after being informed by Vindman of the July 25 Trump-Zelensky
telephone call, the whistleblower began preparing notes and assembling
information related to what he believed was untoward activity vis-à-vis
Ukraine on the part of President Trump and associates who were not part of
the formal Ukraine policy making process. He made numerous telephone calls
to U.S. government officials whom he knew from his official work as the
deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia. Because much
of the information he was using was derived from classified sources, or was
itself classified in nature, the whistleblower worked from his office,
using a computer system approved for handling classified data.

*Off Limits*

From the perspective of security, the whistleblower’s work was flawless.
There was one problem, however; investigating the actions of the president
of the United States and officials outside the intelligence community who
were carrying out the instructions of the president was not part of the
whistleblower’s official responsibilities.

Indeed, anything that whiffed of interference in domestic American politics
was, in and of itself, off limits to members of the intelligence community.

Robert Gates, a long-time CIA analyst and former CIA director, had warned
about this possibility *in a speech he delivered to the CIA
<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/volume-36-number-1/html/v36i1a01p_0001.htm>*
 in March 1992 on the issue of the politicization of intelligence.
“National intelligence officers”, Gates noted, “are engaged in analysis
and—given their frequent contact with high-level policymakers—their work is
also vulnerable to distortion.”

There was no greater example of politicized distortion than the rabbit hole
the whistleblower had allowed himself to fall into.  From Gates’
perspective, the whistleblower had committed the ultimate sin of any
intelligence analyst—he had allowed his expertise to become tarnished by
political considerations.

Worse, the whistleblower had crossed the threshold from advocating a
politicized point of view to becoming political—that is, to intervene in
the domestic political affairs of the United States in a manner which
influenced the political future of a sitting president of the United States.

Once he had assembled his notes, he sought out staffers on the House
Intelligence Committee for guidance on how to proceed. Schiff, the chairman
of the House Intelligence Committee, had hired two former members of the
Trump NSC staff who had served at the same time as the whistleblower.

One, Abigail Grace, had worked at the NSC from 2016-2018, covering
U.S.-Chinese relations. Grace was hired by Schiff in February 2019 for the
express purpose of investigating
<https://apnews.com/210e8f09f1df49e88a02a4b84fd40070> the Trump White
House. A second NSC veteran was hired
<https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/adam-schiffs-staff-includes-2-aides-who-worked-with-whistleblower-at-white-house>
 in August 2019, around the same time that the whistleblower was preparing
his complaint. That staffer was none other than Sean Misko, the
whistleblowers friend and fellow anti-Trump collaborator.

Both Misko and the whistleblower departed the NSC in 2017 under a cloud.
Misko went on to work for the *Center for New American Security
<https://www.cnas.org/>*, a self-described bipartisan think tank set up by
two former Obama administration officials, Michèle Flournoy and Kurt M.
Campbell, before being recruited by Schiff. It is not known if Misko was
one of the House Intelligence staffers the whistleblower approached, or if
there had been any collaboration between the whistleblower and Misko about
the nature of the complaint prior to Misko being recruited by Schiff.

After conferencing with the House Intelligence Committee staffers, the
whistleblower sought legal counsel. He reached out to a lawyer affiliated
with *Whistleblower Aid <https://whistlebloweraid.org/>*, a group of
national security lawyers who came together in September 2017—eight months
after the inauguration of President Trump—to *encourage w
<https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/white-house/ukraine-whistleblowers-lawyers-work-for-group-that-offers-to-pay-officials-who-leak-against-trump>histleblowers
within the
<https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/white-house/ukraine-whistleblowers-lawyers-work-for-group-that-offers-to-pay-officials-who-leak-against-trump>*
U.S.* g*overnment to come out against Trump, and provide legal and
financial assistance to anyone that chose to do so. One of Whistleblower
Aid’s founding members was a lawyer named Mark Zaid.

<https://consortiumnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/zaid-tweet.png>
In the days following Trump’s swearing in as president, Zaid turned to
Twitter to send out messages supportive of a “coup” against Trump that
would lead to the president’s eventual impeachment. The identity of the
lawyer who met with the whistleblower is not known. However, this lawyer
referred the whistleblower to Bakaj, a fellow member of Whistleblower Aid,
who took on the case and provided procedural guidance regarding the
preparation of the complaint. Bakaj later brought on Zaid and another
lawyer, Charles McCullough, with close ties to Senator Chuck Schumer and
Hillary Clinton, to assist in the case.

On August 12, the whistleblower completed his complaint, and forwarded it
to the intelligence community inspector general, thereby setting in motion
events that produced weeks of hearings before the House Intelligence
Committee that will very likely result in Trump’s impeachment.

*Shielded from Questions*

While the whistleblower, through counsel, had expressed a desire to testify
before the House Intelligence Committee about the issues set forth in his
complaint, he was never called to do so, even in closed-door session. The
ostensible reason behind this failure to testify was the need to protect
his anonymity, a protection that is not contained within the relevant
statutes governing whistleblower activities within the intelligence
community.

Later, as witnesses were identified from the content of the whistleblower’s
complaint and subpoenaed to testify before the House Intelligence
Committee, both Schiff and Bakaj indicated that the whistleblower’s
testimony was no longer needed, since the specific issues and events
covered in his complaint had been more than adequately covered by the
testimony of others.

But the apparent reason Schiff and Bakaj refused to allow the whistleblower
to testify, or to be identified, was to avoid legitimate questions likely
to be asked by Republican committee members.

Namely, what was a deputy national intelligence officer of the U.S.
intelligence community doing investigating activities of a sitting
president? Who, if anyone, authorized this intervention in U.S. domestic
political affairs by a CIA official? How did the whistleblower, who had a
history of documented animosity with the Trump administration that included
credible allegations of leaking sensitive material to the press for the
express purpose of undermining the credibility of the president, get
selected to serve as a deputy national intelligence officer? Who signed off
on this assignment? What was the precise role played by the whistleblower
in unmasking the identities of U.S. citizens in 2016, during the Trump
transition?

Did the whistleblower maintain his friendship with Misko after leaving the
NSC in July 2017? Did the whistleblower collaborate with Misko to get the
House Intelligence Committee to investigate the issues of concern to the
whistleblower before his complaint was transmitted to the ICIG? Who did the
whistleblower meet on the House Intelligence staff? What did they discuss?
Who was the lawyer the whistleblower first met regarding his intent to file
a complaint? Did the whistleblower have any contact with Whistleblower Aid
prior to this meeting?

Answers to these questions, and more, would have been useful in
understanding not only the motives of the whistleblower in filing his
complaint—was he simply a concerned citizen and patriot, or was he part of
a larger conspiracy to undermine the political viability of a sitting
president? There is no doubt that Congress has a constitutional right and
obligation to conduct proper oversight of the operations of the executive
branch, and to hold the president of the United States accountable if his
conduct and actions are deemed unworthy of his office. Whether or not the
facts surrounding the July 25, 2019 telephone call between Trump and
Zelensky constitute grounds for impeachment is a political question for
Congress to decide.

*Intervening in Domestic Affairs*

There is, however, the major issue looming in the background of this
impeachment frenzy: the intervention by elements of the intelligence
community in the domestic political affairs of the United States. There is
no question that the whistleblower’s complaint served as the genesis of the
ongoing impeachment proceedings.

The American people should be deeply concerned that an inquiry which could
result in the removal of a duly elected president from office was initiated
in secrecy by a member of the intelligence community acting outside the
four corners of his legal responsibilities. The legitimacy of the
underlying issues being investigated by the House Intelligence Committee is
not at issue here; the legitimacy of the process by which these proceedings
were initiated is.

To find out what happened, the whistleblower should not only be identified,
called before the House Intelligence Committee, and other relevant
Congressional committees, and be compelled to answer for his actions.

Impeachment is a constitutional remedy afforded to the U.S. Congress to
deal with the political issues surrounding the conduct of a sitting
president. If this constitutional remedy can be triggered by the
intelligence community in a manner which obviates laws prohibiting the
intrusion of intelligence agencies into the domestic political affairs of
the United States, and done so in a manner where the identities of the
persons and organizations involved, along with their possible motives, are
shielded from both American people and those whom they elect to represent
them in Congress, then a precedent will have been set for future
interventions of this nature which undermine the very foundation of
American democracy.

The political weaponization of intelligence represents a significant threat
to the viability of the American constitutional republic that cannot be
ignored.

*Scott Ritter is a former Marine Corps intelligence officer who served in
the former Soviet Union implementing arms control treaties, in the Persian
Gulf during Operation Desert Storm, and in Iraq overseeing the disarmament
of WMD.*

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