[rad-green] Reuters Shields OAS Over False Claims That Sparked Bolivia Coup

*https://fair.org/home/reuters-shields-oas-over-false-claims-that-sparked-bolivia-coup/
<https://fair.org/home/reuters-shields-oas-over-false-claims-that-sparked-bolivia-coup/>*

*FAIR          DECEMBER 17, 2019*
Reuters Shields OAS Over False Claims That Sparked Bolivia Coup
*BY JOE EMERSBERGER*
[image: Reuters Shields OAS Over False Claims That Sparked Bolivia Coup]
<https://fair.org/home/reuters-shields-oas-over-false-claims-that-sparked-bolivia-coup/>

*b**y Joe Emersberger*
[image: Reuters: Bolivia election rigging in favor of Morales was
'overwhelming': OAS final report]

*Reuters (12/4/19
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-election-oas/bolivia-election-rigging-in-favor-of-morales-was-overwhelming-oas-final-report-idUSKBN1Y9063>)
highlights the findings of the Organization of American States—while
omitting the criticism of those findings.*

Organization of American States (OAS) election monitors  published a “final
report” on December 4—22 days later
<https://twitter.com/kevinmcashman/status/1202086996384079880> than
promised—on Bolivia’s October 20 presidential election, won by President
Evo Morales. The tardy release of the final report contrasted sharply with
the way the OAS rushed to impugn the election the day after
<https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-085/19> it
took place.

Only three days after the election, the OAS published a preliminary report
<http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Preliminary-Report-EOM-Bolivia-23-10-19.pdf>
that
reiterated its negative assessment. On November 10, it then issued a press
release
<https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-099/19> saying
the election should be annulled. In these statements, the OAS claimed that
the change in Morales’ lead in the last 16% of the vote count was
“drastic,” “inexplicable” and “hard to explain.”

By November 11, mutinous generals and police (combined with armed
opposition vigilantes) had driven Morales into exile in Mexico. He and his
vice president barely escaped
<http://cepr.net/blogs/the-americas-blog/evo-s-odyssey-how-mexico-got-morales-out-of-bolivia>
with
their lives. Morales’ house was ransacked
<https://www.news18.com/news/buzz/angry-protesters-ransack-former-bolivian-presidents-house-after-his-resignation-2382605.html>.
Since then, the security forces that refused to protect the democratically
elected government have killed some 32 people
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/bolivia-interim-gov-proposes-election-bill-death-toll-mounts-191120222432439.html>
to
prop up the coup-installed dictatorship.

When the final OAS report on the election was belatedly released on
December 4, a *Reuters* article (12/4/19
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-election-oas/bolivia-election-rigging-in-favor-of-morales-was-overwhelming-oas-final-report-idUSKBN1Y9063>)
about it ran with the headline “Bolivia Election Rigging in Favor of
Morales Was ‘Overwhelming’: OAS Final Report.” The only critic of the OAS
report mentioned in the article was Morales himself.

But the OAS had come under heavy fire from US-based economists and
statisticians ever since it began impugning the election on October 21.
It’s impossible to learn that fact in 114 *Reuters* articles
<https://zcomm.org/zblogs/112-reuters-articles-on-bolivia-since-october-20-2019-election-with-no-mention-of-expert-criticism-of-oas-audit/>
about
Bolivia since the October 20 election. None even mentions the extensive
technical criticism the OAS has received. The criticism should have
received much more than a discrete mention in an article or two, but in
over 100 articles, the London-based wire service didn’t even provide that.
On December 12, I sent an email to several *Reuters* journalists and
editors who have produced articles on Bolivia since October 20. I asked why
that criticism has been completely ignored. None have replied.

On October 23, the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR)
issued a press
release
<http://cepr.net/press-center/press-releases/oas-should-retract-its-press-release-on-bolivian-election-cepr-co-director-says>
asking
that the OAS retract its comments about the election. On November 8, the
think tank published a paper rebutting
<http://cepr.net/publications/reports/bolivia-elections-2019-11> the OAS.
Mark Weisbrot, co-founder of CEPR, followed up with an op-ed in
*MarketWatch* (11/19/19
<https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-oas-lied-to-the-public-about-the-bolivian-election-and-coup-2019-11-19?>)
that said the OAS “lied at least three times: in the first press release
<https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-085/19>,
the preliminary report
<https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=S-019/19> and
the preliminary audit
<https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-099/19>.”

On November 25, four members of the US Congress asked
<https://schakowsky.house.gov/uploads/OAS%20Boliva_Final.pdf> the OAS to
respond to very specific questions raised by CEPR. On December 2, the
* Guardian* published a letter
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/dec/02/the-oas-has-to-answer-for-its-role-in-the-bolivian-coup>
signed
by 98 economists and statisticians asking the OAS to “to retract its
misleading statements about the election, which have contributed to the
political conflict and served as one of the most-used ‘justifications’ for
the military coup.” Did *Reuters* really miss all of this?

*Not ‘hard to explain’*

The graph below substantiates much of CEPR’s case against the OAS. It also
exposes common deceptions in *Reuters* reporting.

*Chart: CEPR (11/19
<http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/bolivia-elections-2019-11.pdf?v=3>)*

The light blue dots are a plot of Evo Morales’ lead over his nearest rival
against the percentage of the vote counted by the unofficial “quick count.”
The dark blue dots do the same for Morales’ political party (MAS) in
legislative elections. Following OAS recommendations
<http://www.oas.org/EOMDatabase/moeRecomm.aspx?Lang=en&id=765&fc1=CBOL&fc2=N49,3,4,1&fc3=N2019,2018,2017,2016,2015,2014,2013,2012,2011,2010,2009,2008,2007,2006,2005,2004,2003,2002,2001,2000,1999,1998,1997,1996,1995,1994,1993,1992,1991,1990,1989,1987,1985,1984,1982,1980,1978,1972,1970,1968,1966,1963,1962&fc4=N2>,
Bolivia has a “quick count” (TREP) that keeps the public updated, and a
slower, legally binding count (the *computo*). The legally binding count
was never interrupted. The TREP stopped being published at 84% of the
count, but the electoral authorities never committed
<https://www.la-razon.com/nacional/animal_electoral/elecciones-bolivia-tse-trep-votacion-votacion-resultados-80_0_3236076395.html>
to
publishing it past the 80% mark.

Morales’ lead increased steadily as votes from the more pro-MAS areas came
in. When the TREP was stopped at 84%, his lead was 7.9 points. By the time
all the votes were counted, the official tally had him just over 10 points
ahead. The 10-point margin was crucial because to avoid a second round,
Morales needed at least 40% of the vote and a 10-point lead over his
nearest rival. Morales received 47% of the vote, which was in line with
what pre-election polls
<https://www.as-coa.org/articles/poll-tracker-bolivias-2019-presidential-race>
 predicted.

The two-point lead increase in the last 16% of the vote count was not
“drastic”: It was consistent with a gradual increase in his lead throughout
the election. It was also not “hard to explain”; CEPR’s precinct-level
analysis <http://cepr.net/publications/reports/bolivia-elections-2019-11> of
where the final votes were coming from showed it was quite predictable.

Parroting the OAS line, *Reuters* articles were deceptive. One article (
11/6/19
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-election/bolivias-morales-defies-calls-to-resign-as-opposition-plans-new-march-idUSKBN1XF1B7>)
stated the vote was “marred by a near 24-hour halt in the count, which,
when resumed, showed a sharp and unexplained shift in Morales’ favor.”
Others (11/4/19
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-election-protests/bolivian-opposition-leader-calls-for-radical-strike-action-blockades-idUSKBN1XE1V7>
, 11/6/19
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-election-siri/bolivias-morales-a-dictator-apples-siri-says-so-idUSKBN1XG2MJ>
, 11/6/19
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-election-protests/slingshots-and-dynamite-as-bolivians-clash-over-election-idUSKBN1XG22F>
, 11/8/19
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-dayofskulls/bolivians-turn-to-day-of-skulls-for-hope-as-protests-rage-idUSKBN1XI2AI>
, 11/8/19
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-election/bolivian-police-seen-joining-scattered-anti-morales-protests-idUSKBN1XI20M>
, 11/10/19
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-election-explainer/how-did-bolivia-end-up-in-democratic-crisis-idUSKBN1XK0EC>)
used very similar language describing a “halt” or “pause” to “the
count”—thereby obscuring that there were two counts, and that the legally
binding one was never halted.
[image: Reuters: How did Bolivia end up in democratic crisis?]

*“How Did Bolivia End Up in Democratic Crisis?” (Reuters, 11/10/19): Could
it have something to do with influential news outlets uncritically
spreading dubious charges?*

Another deception in many articles was neglecting to tell readers that
Morales already had a 7.9 point lead when the quick count was stopped. For
example, one *Reuters* article (11/10/19
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-election-explainer/how-did-bolivia-end-up-in-democratic-crisis-idUSKBN1XK0EC>)
ran with the headline “How Did Bolivia End Up in Democratic Crisis?” It
vaguely stated that the election seemed to be “heading to a second round”
but after an (imaginary) “pause in the count,” Morales had a “10-point-plus
lead.”

Notice how it’s left to the reader to imagine by how much Morales’ lead
increased after the quick count was stopped. And *Reuters* also conveyed
nothing about the trend. See the graph above. Morales did not have a
constant 7.9 point lead for much of the election that suddenly jumped at
the end. Nor was his lead declining when the quick count was stopped. The
lead had been steadily increasing through almost the entire vote count.

The trend in the last 16% of the count was also extremely similar
<https://twitter.com/JakobJohnston/status/1205571686692720640> to what took
place in a 2016 referendum on term limits that Morales narrowly lost—an
election result viewed as sacrosanct by Morales’ opponents. In that
election, there was also about a 2-point increase in the share of the vote
for Morales in the last 16% of the vote.
*Ducking debate*

The Mexican government had agreed to let Jake Johnston
<https://fair.org/home/international-actors-in-haiti-have-been-guarantors-of-the-status-quo/>
of
CEPR respond to the OAS final report at the permanent council meeting on
December 12. The OAS refused
<https://twitter.com/JakobJohnston/status/1205265019421839361> to allow it.
Johnston would have presented CEPR’s preliminary response
<http://cepr.net/publications/briefings/testimony/preliminary-analysis-of-the-findings-of-the-final-report-on-the-oas-audit>
to
the 100-page final report. *Reuters* has thus far said nothing about the
OAS ducking its main critics. Of course, to do that, *Reuters* would have
to break its silence on the entire debate.

Among other things, CEPR observed
<http://cepr.net/publications/briefings/testimony/preliminary-analysis-of-the-findings-of-the-final-report-on-the-oas-audit>
that
the OAS final report doubled down on its false claim of a “drastic” and
“inexplicable” change in Morales’ lead; that the report focused on a
“hidden server” and other “vulnerabilities” in the electoral system, but
“conceals or fails to provide information” showing that those
vulnerabilities impacted the results; that 226 tally sheets the report
claimed prove “deliberate manipulation” overwhelmingly point to a
“well-known phenomenon: In rural areas and smaller voting centers, it is
not uncommon for one person to fill in the tally sheet, and then have the
individuals each sign it.” The OAS final report also shifted to claiming
that manipulation occurred in the last 5% of the count, but Morales
received a smaller share of the votes cast in the last 5% of the count
compared to the previous 5%. Additionally, CEPR argued, his share of the
vote in the last 5% was also “entirely predictable based on the prior
trends seen in the geographic areas from where these final votes came.”

Incidentally, David Rosnick, also with CEPR, very recently refuted
<http://cepr.net/publications/reports/unnatural-claims-in-a-natural-experiment-escobari-and-hoover-on-the-2019-bolivian-elections>
a
separate statistical analysis that apologists for the coup have been
citing—mainly on social media, since in outlets like *Reuters*, there is no
debate to be followed at all.

*OAS’s unmentionables*

The bureaucracy of the OAS is based in Washington and is about 60% funded
<http://www.oas.org/saf/DFAMS/2018/02/RF_TABLE_QUOT_20180228_ENSP.pdf> by
the US government. In 114 articles
<https://zcomm.org/zblogs/112-reuters-articles-on-bolivia-since-october-20-2019-election-with-no-mention-of-expert-criticism-of-oas-audit/>
, *Reuters* never mentioned this either. If the OAS were based in Caracas
and 60% funded by Venezuela, do you think that would have been mentioned a
few times? OAS “monitoring” of elections in Haiti in 2000, and again in
2011, was used to help Washington disgracefully overrule
<http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/the-trump-administration-is-undercutting-democracy-in-bolivia>
Haitian
voters. The current OAS general secretary, Luis Almagro
<https://inthesetimes.com/article/22181/oas-bolivia-coup-venezuela-maduro-trump-luis-almagro>
, recently blamed
<https://www.voanoticias.com/a/luisalmagro-oea-venezuela-cuba-latinoamerica/5140013.html>
Cuba
and cash-strapped Venezuela for huge protests against neoliberal policies
in US-allied states: Colombia, Chile and Ecuador.

Morales, a close ally of Venezuela and Cuba, was gambling when he agreed to
let the OAS monitor the election—especially given that the member states of
the OAS have shifted towards right-wing, pro-US governments, giving much
less of a counterweight to Washington’s influence within the OAS
bureaucracy than in previous years. But not allowing OAS monitors would
also have been dangerous, providing a different pretext for Washington and
compliant outlets like *Reuters* to impugn the election. That could easily
have resulted in the US imposing crippling economic sanctions—whose impact
*Reuters* could also be relied on to bury (*FAIR*, 6/14/19
<https://fair.org/home/study-linking-us-sanctions-to-venezuelan-deaths-buried-by-reuters-for-over-a-month/>
).

It’s far more likely that Bolivia’s election was clean, and that the OAS
audit was dirty, than the other way around. Unprincipled journalism from
one of the world’s major news agencies has hidden that from a lot of people.

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