[rad-green] Chemical Weapons Watchdog "an American Lap Dog" -- Scott Ritter, former chief weapons inspector in Iraq

*https://www.truthdig.com/articles/chemical-weapons-watchdog-is-just-an-american-lap-dog/
<https://www.truthdig.com/articles/chemical-weapons-watchdog-is-just-an-american-lap-dog/>*

*Truthdig          Dec 18, 2019*

Chemical Weapons Watchdog Is Just an American Lap Dog
By Scott Ritter <https://www.truthdig.com/author/scott_ritter/#author-bio>

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[image: Syrians in the Hague]*Syrians at The Hague, Netherlands, face the
media in a bid to discredit reports of a 2018 chemical weapons attack in
the Syrian town of Douma. (Peter Dejong / AP)*

A spate of leaks from within the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW <https://www.opcw.org/>), the international
inspectorate created for the purpose of implementing the Chemical Weapons
Convention, has raised serious questions about the institution’s integrity,
objectivity and credibility. The leaks address issues pertaining to the
OPCW investigation into allegations that the Syrian government used
chemical weapons to attack civilians in the Damascus suburb of Douma on
April 7, 2018. These allegations, which originated from such anti-Assad
organizations as the Syrian Civil Defense (the so-called White Helmets
<https://www.whitehelmets.org/en/>) and the Syrian American Medical Society
(SAMS <https://www.sams-usa.net/>), were immediately embraced as credible
by the OPCW, and were used by the United States, France and the United
Kingdom to justify punitive military strikes
<https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/trumps-rush-to-judgement-on-syria-chemical-attack/>
against
facilities inside Syria assessed by these nations as having been involved
in chemical weapons-related activities before the OPCW initiated any
on-site investigation.

The Douma incident was initially described by the White Helmets, SAMS and
the U.S., U.K. and French governments as involving both sarin nerve agent
and chlorine gas. However, this narrative was altered when OPCW inspectors
released, on July 6, 2018, interim findings of their investigation
<https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2018/en/s-1645-2018_e_.pdf>
that
found no evidence of the use of sarin. The focus of the investigation
quickly shifted to a pair of chlorine cylinders claimed by the White
Helmets to have been dropped onto apartment buildings in Douma by the
Syrian Air Force, resulting in the release of a cloud of chlorine gas that
killed dozens of Syrian civilians. In March, the OPCW released its final
report on the Douma incident
<https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/03/s-1731-2019%28e%29.pdf>,
noting that it had “reasonable grounds” to believe “that the use of a toxic
chemical as a weapon has taken place on 7 April 2018,” that “this toxic
chemical contained reactive chlorine” and that “the toxic chemical was
likely molecular chlorine.”

Much has been written about the OPCW inspection process in Syria, and
particularly the methodology used by the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), an
inspection body created by the OPCW in 2014 “to establish facts surrounding
allegations of the use of toxic chemicals, reportedly chlorine, for hostile
purposes in the Syrian Arab Republic.” The FFM was created under the
direction of Ahmet Üzümcü
<https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/programs/csw/ambassador-ahmet-uzumcu/>,
a career Turkish diplomat with extensive experience in multinational
organizations, including service as Turkey’s ambassador to NATO. Üzümcü was
the OPCW’s third director general, having been selected from a field of
seven candidates by its executive council to replace Argentine diplomat
Rogelio Pfirter. Pfirter had held the position since being nominated to
replace the OPCW’s first director general, José Maurício Bustani. Bustani’s
tenure was marred by controversy that saw the OPCW transition away from its
intended role as an independent implementor of the Chemical Weapons
Convention to that of a tool of unilateral U.S. policy, a role that
continues to mar the OPCW’s work in Syria today, especially when it comes
to its investigation of the alleged use by the Syrian government of
chemical weapons against civilians in Douma in April 2018.

Bustani was removed from his position in 2002, following an unprecedented
campaign
<https://theintercept.com/2018/03/29/john-bolton-trump-bush-bustani-kids-opcw/>
led
by John Bolton, who at the time was serving as the undersecretary of state
for Arms Control and International Security Affairs in the U.S. State
Department. What was Bustani’s crime? In 2001, he had dared to enter
negotiations with the government of Iraq to secure that nation’s entry into
the OPCW, thereby setting the stage for OPCW inspectors to visit Iraq and
bring its chemical weapons capability under OPCW control. As director
general, there was nothing untoward about Bustani’s action. But Iraq circa
2001 was not a typical recruitment target. In the aftermath of the Gulf War
in 1991, the U.N. Security Council had passed a resolution under Chapter
VII requiring Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including its
chemical weapons capability, to be “removed, destroyed or rendered
harmless” under the supervision of inspectors working on behalf of the
United Nations Special Commission, or UNSCOM.

The pursuit of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction led to a series of
confrontations with Iraq that culminated in inspectors being ordered out of
the country by the U.S. in 1998, prior to a 72-hour aerial attack—Operation
Desert Fox. Iraq refused to allow UNSCOM inspectors to return, rightfully
claiming that the U.S. had infiltrated the ranks of the inspectors and was
using the inspection process to spy on Iraqi leadership for the purposes of
facilitating regime change. The lack of inspectors in Iraq allowed the U.S.
and others to engage in wild speculation regarding Iraqi rearmament
activities, including in the field of chemical weapons. This speculation
was used to fuel a call for military action against Iraq, citing the threat
of a reconstituted WMD capability as the justification. Bustani sought to
defuse this situation by bringing Iraq into the OPCW, an act that, if
completed, would have derailed the U.S. case for military intervention in
Iraq. Bolton’s intervention
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/apr/23/foreignpolicy.usa> included
threats to Bustani and his family, as well as threats to withhold U.S. dues
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1944879.stm> to the OPCW accounting for
some 22% of that organization’s budget; had the latter threat been
implemented, it would have resulted in OPCW’s disbandment.

Bustani’s departure marked the end of the OPCW as an independent
organization. Pfirter, Bolton’s hand-picked replacement, vowed to keep the
OPCW out of Iraq. In an interview with U.S. media
<https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/26/world/argentine-to-head-group-seeking-to-ban-chemical-weapons.html>
shortly
after his appointment, Pfirter noted that while all nations should be
encouraged to join the OPCW, “We should be very aware that there are United
Nations resolutions in effect” that precluded Iraqi membership “at the
expense” of its obligations to the Security Council. Under the threat of
military action, Iraq allowed UNMOVIC inspectors to return in 2002; by
February 2003, no WMD had been found
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7777.doc.htm>, a result that did not
meet with U.S. satisfaction. In March 2003, UNMOVIC inspectors were
withdrawn from Iraq under orders of the U.S., paving the way for the
subsequent invasion and occupation of that nation that same month (the
CIA later
concluded
<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB234/SSCI_phaseI_excerpt.pdf> that
Iraq had been disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction by the summer of
1991).

Under Pfirter’s leadership, the OPCW became a compliant tool of U.S.
foreign policy objectives. By completely subordinating OPCW operations
through the constant threat of fiscal ruin, the U.S. engaged in a
continuous quid pro quo arrangement, trading the financial solvency of an
ostensible multilateral organization for complicity in operating as a de
facto extension of American unilateral policy. Bolton’s actions in 2002 put
the OPCW and its employees on notice: Cross the U.S., and you will pay a
terminal price.

When Üzümcü took over the OPCW’s reins in 2010, the organization was very
much the model of multinational consensus, which, in the case of any
multilateral organization in which the U.S. plays a critical role, meant
that nothing transpired without the express approval of the U.S. and its
European NATO allies, in particular the United Kingdom and France. Shortly
after he took office, Üzümcü was joined by Robert Fairweather
<https://www.gov.uk/government/people/robert-fairweather#biography>, a
career British diplomat who served as Üzümcü’s chief of Cabinet. (While
Üzümcü was the ostensible head of the OPCW, the daily task of managing the
functioning of the OPCW was that of the chief of Cabinet. In short, nothing
transpired within the OPCW without Fairweather’s knowledge and concurrence.)

Üzümcü and Fairweather’s tenure at the OPCW was dominated by Syria, where,
since 2011, the government of President Bashar Assad had been engaged in a
full-scale conflict with a foreign-funded and -equipped insurgency whose
purpose was regime change. By 2013, allegations emerged from both the
Syrian government and rebel forces concerning the use of chemical weapons
by the other side. In August 2013, the OPCW dispatched an inspection team
into Syria as part of a U.N.-led effort, which included specialists from
the World Health Organization (WHO) and the U.N. itself, to investigate
allegations that sarin had been used in attack on civilians in the town of
Ghouta. While the mission found conclusive evidence that sarin nerve agent
had been used <https://undocs.org/A/67/997>, it did not assign blame for
the attack.

Despite the lack of causality, the U.S. and its NATO allies quickly
assigned blame for the sarin attacks on the Syrian government. To forestall
U.S. military action against Syria, the Russian government helped broker a
deal
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/12/syria-chemical-weapons-un-us-russia>
whereby
the U.S. agreed to refrain from undertaking military action if the Syrian
government joined the OPCW and subjected the totality of its chemical
weapons stockpile to elimination. In October 2013, the OPCW-U.N. Joint
Mission <https://opcw.unmissions.org/mandate-and-timelines>, created under
the authority of U.N. Security Council resolution 2118 (2103), began the
process of identifying, cataloging, removing and destroying Syria’s
chemical weapons. This process was completed in September 2014 (in December
2013, the OPCW was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
<https://www.opcw.org/about-us/nobel-peace-prize> for its disarmament work
in Syria).

If the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons was an example of the OPCW
at its best, what followed was a case study of just the opposite. In May
2014, the OPCW created the Fact-Finding Mission, or FFM
<https://www.opcw.org/fact-finding-mission>, charged with establishing
“facts surrounding allegations of the use of toxic chemicals, reportedly
chlorine, for hostile purposes in the Syrian Arab Republic.” The FFM was
headed by Malik Ellahi <https://www.clingendael.org/person/malik-ellahi>,
who served as head of the OPCW’s government relations and political affairs
branch. The appointment of someone lacking both technical and operational
experience suggests that Ellahi’s primary role was political. Under his
leadership, the FFM established a close working relationship with the
anti-Assad Syrian opposition, including the White Helmets and SAMS.

In 2015, responsibility for coordinating the work of the FFM with the
anti-Assad opposition was transferred to a British inspector named Len
Phillips (another element of the FFM, led by a different inspector, was
responsible for coordinating with the Syrian government). Phillips
developed a close working relationship with the White Helmets and SAMS and
played a key role in OPCW’s investigation of the April 2017 chemical
incident in Khan Shaykhun. By April 2018, the FFM had undergone a
leadership transition, with Phillips replaced by a Tunisian inspector named
Sami Barrek
<http://syriapropagandamedia.org/briefing-notes-3/how-the-opcws-investigation-of-the-douma-incident-was-nobbled>.
It was Barrek who led the FFM into Syria in April 2018 to investigate
allegations of chemical weapons use at Douma. Like Phillips, Barrek
maintained a close working relationship with the White Helmets and SAMS.

Once the FFM wrapped up its investigation in Douma, however, it became
apparent to Fairweather that it had a problem. There were serious questions
about whether chlorine had, in fact, been used as a weapon. The solution,
brokered by Fairweather, was to release an interim report that ruled out
sarin altogether, but left the door open regarding chlorine. This report
was released on July 6, 2018. Later that month, both Üzümcü and Fairweather
were gone, replaced by a Spaniard named Fernando Arias
<https://www.opcw.org/about-us/technical-secretariat/leadership/director-general>
and
a French diplomat named Sébastien Braha
<https://www.linkedin.com/in/s%C3%A9bastien-braha-22a73328/?originalSubdomain=zw>.
It would be up to them to clean up the Douma situation.

The situation Braha inherited from Fairweather was unenviable. According to
an unnamed OPCW official
<https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/11/15/the-opcw-and-douma-chemical-weapons-watchdog-accused-of-evidence-tampering-by-its-own-inspectors/>
who
spoke with the media after the fact, two days prior to the publication of
the interim report, on July 4, 2018, Fairweather had been paid a visit by a
trio of U.S. officials, who indicated to Fairweather and the members of the
FFM responsible for writing the report that it was the U.S. position that
the chlorine cannisters in question had been used to dispense chlorine gas
at Douma, an assertion that could not be backed up by the evidence. Despite
this, the message that Fairweather left with the OPCW personnel was that
there had to be a “smoking gun.” It was now Braha’s job to manufacture one.

Braha did this by dispatching OPCW inspectors to Turkey in September 2018
to interview new witnesses identified by the White Helmets, and by
commissioning new engineering studies that better explained the presence of
the two chlorine cannisters found in Douma. By March, Braha had assembled
enough information to enable the technical directorate to issue its final
report. Almost immediately, dissent appeared in the ranks of the OPCW. An
engineering report that contradicted the findings published by Braha was
leaked
<http://syriapropagandamedia.org/working-papers/comments-on-official-response-to-the-release-of-the-engineering-assessment-of-the-douma-cylinders>,
setting off a firestorm of controversy derived from its conclusion that the
chlorine cannisters found in Douma had most likely been staged by the White
Helmets.

The OPCW, while eventually acknowledging that the leaked report was
genuine, explained its exclusion from the final report on the grounds that
it attributed blame, something the FFM was not mandated to do. According to
the OPCW
<https://medium.com/@Brian_Whit/opcw-chief-speaks-about-the-douma-leaked-document-f84782599bea>,
the engineering report in question had been submitted to the investigation
and identification team, a newly created body within the OPCW mandated to
make such determinations. Moreover, Director General Arias stood by the
report’s conclusion that it had “reasonable grounds” to believe “that the
use of a toxic chemical as a weapon has taken place on 7 April 2018.”

Arias’ explanation came under attack in November, when WikiLeaks published
an email <https://wikileaks.org/opcw-douma/document/Internal-OPCW-E-Mail/> sent
by a member of the FFM team that had participated in the Douma
investigation. In this email, which was sent on June 22, 2018, and
addressed to Robert Fairweather, the author noted that, when it came to the
Douma incident, “[p]urposely singling out chlorine gas as one of the
possibilities is disingenuous.” The author of the email, who had
participated in drafting the original interim report, noted that the
original text had emphasized that there was insufficient evidence to
support this conclusion, and that the new text represented “a major
deviation from the original report.” Moreover, the author took umbrage at
the new report’s conclusions, which claimed to be “based on the high levels
of various chlorinated organic derivatives detected in environmental
samples.” According to email’s author “They were, in most cases, present
only in parts per billion range, as low as 1-2 ppb, which is essentially
trace quantities.” In short, the OPCW had cooked the books, manufacturing
evidence from thin air that it then used to draw conclusions that sustained
the U.S. position that chlorine gas had been used by the Syrian government
at Douma.

Arias, while not addressing the specifics of the allegations set forth in
the leaked email, recently declared
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/25/chemical-weapons-watchdog-opcw-defends-syria-report-after-leaks>
that
it is “the nature of any thorough inquiry for individuals in a team to
express subjective views,” noting that “I stand by the independent,
professional conclusion” presented by the OPCW about the Douma incident.
This explanation, however, does not fly in the face of the evidence. The
OPCW’s credibility as an investigative body has been brought into question
through these leaks, as has its independent character. If an organization
like the OPCW can be used at will by the U.S., the United Kingdom and
France to trigger military attacks intended to support regime-change
activities in member states, then it no longer serves a useful purpose to
the international community it ostensibly serves. To survive as a credible
entity, the OPCW must open itself to a full-scale audit of its activities
in Syria by an independent authority with inspector general-like
investigatory powers. Anything short of this leaves the OPCW, an
organization that was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its contributions
to world peace, permanently stained by the reality that it is little more
than a lap dog of the United States, used to promote the very conflicts it
was designed to prevent.

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