Re: Election methods scholarship
robert bristow-johnson via Election-Methods <[email protected]> Thu, 26 Mar 2026 17:53:12 -0400 (EDT)
| Newsgroups | gmane.politics.election-methods |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hay Joseph, Some corrections to https://web.york.cuny.edu/~malk/ranked-voting-math-club-2022.pdf : On p 28, you said: "ii. preference, ordinal, or ranked ballot List choices in preference order without ties. Sometimes one is limited as to the total number of candidates one can rank (five for NYC voting)" In fact, whether ties are allowed or not do not depend solely on whether is "preference" or "ordinal" or a ranked ballot. It depends on the method. Most Condorcet methods do not disallow equal rankings. IRV, Borda, or Condorcet methods that are modifications of IRV may disallow equal ranking. But straight-ahead Condorcet (with some appropriate completion method) or Ranked Pairs or Schulze or Minimax do not have a problem with equal rankings. On p 39, the methods you shown are *not* "cardinal ballots". They are ordinal ballots. Only Score (incl. STAR) and Approval are cardinal ballots. On p 41, there are *9* possible ways to mark your ballot with 3 candidates (or 10, if we count a blank ballots or "undervotes"). Not 6. Since you were asking for feedback... bestest, -- r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ [email protected] "Imagination is more important than knowledge." . . . ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info