Re: Questions about Majority-Beat vs Plurality-Beat Condorcet
Joshua Boehme via Election-Methods <[email protected]> Sun, 5 Apr 2026 21:24:54 -0400
| Newsgroups | gmane.politics.election-methods |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Here's what I get: #1: 7/15 A, 5/15 B, 3/15 D #2: D #3: B #4: A #5: 5/13 A, 7/13 B, 1/13 C #6: C #7: B The following are cases where adding votes with candidate X at the top of the ballot causes X to go from a positive probability of winning to a zero probability: #1 -> #2 #1 -> #4 #5 -> #6 #5 -> #7 The general pattern here is that a lottery over the additional voters' first, second, and third choices switches to a definitive win by their second choice. Without knowing the underlying utilities of the voters, whether or not they prefer that resulting outcome is impossible to determine. [1] [1] Once you go down that rabbit hole, it gets harder to stand by Condorcet / Smith as a strict requirement. Indeed, it's easy to construct examples of elections -- not necessarily in these particular cases -- where *every voter* prefers, say, a random ballot lottery to a Condorcet winner On 4/5/26 6:20 PM, Kevin Venzke via Election-Methods wrote: > Hi Toby, > > I think it must not be the same criterion. > > It doesn't seem like Moulin's incompatibility proof assumes determinism. > > I see on the Talk page Markus has helpfully linked it, or his interpretation of it: > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-October/011042.html > > I don't know how to compute the Maximal Lotteries method to try the proof, though. > > Kevin > votingmethods.net > > > > Le dimanche 5 avril 2026 à 08:29:27 UTC−5, Toby Pereira <[email protected]> a écrit : >> >> My understanding was that Maximal Lotteries (a non-deterministic Condorcet method) did pass participation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximal_lotteries >> >> Toby >> >> On Saturday, 4 April 2026 at 01:16:10 BST, Kevin Venzke via Election-Methods <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Definitely not. Very few methods satisfy Participation, certainly not ones that >>> resemble Condorcet. The most complicated Participation methods are DAC and DSC. >>> >>> >>> Kevin >>> votingmethods.net > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info