Re: Preliminary Droop-fit proportionality results
Kristofer Munsterhjelm via Election-Methods <[email protected]> Tue, 9 Jun 2026 23:30:57 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.politics.election-methods |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 2026-06-02 23:11, Toby Pereira wrote: > I see yes, thanks. In that case, Schulze STV seems to do pretty > terribly, not just a bit worse than other STV methods. And looking at > your whole list, considerably worse than things like (Bloc) Borda! It's > definitely not broken in your simulation? It's hard to tell because the method is so complex; I don't have any other implementations than Schulze's own and my interface with my own code. At least Schulze provides some example elections in his papers, so I could code up those and check if I get the right results. More broadly, it would be nice to have test vectors for a number of methods, particularly exercising their edge cases... but gathering a comprehensive library of them would be a significant undertaking in itself, I think. I agree that Schulze STV seems unreasonably bad here, but the really strange part is that they're not "obviously broken" bad. For instance, I extended my simulator to find the level of proportionality that best fit the method (in the sense of giving the best VSE assuming this level of proportionality) for two-seat elections. For STV and Schulze STV, I got the following results with two seats, ten candidates: Name Prop. quantile Goodness-of-fit VSE STV 0.3404 0.7946 Meek/Warren 0.3397 0.7945 Schulze STV 0.393 0.5141 while obviously ill-fitting methods have more extreme values: Name Prop. quantile Goodness-of-fit VSE LPV0+ 0.0004 -0.4447 Bloc Borda 0.5 0.9331 Plurality loser 0 -0.1641 Here, exact Droop proportionality corresponds to a quantile value of 1/3; lower than this is more factional, higher is more majoritarian. "Plurality loser" elects the candidates with the fewest first preferences. I'll give more results in another post, but for Schulze STV in particular, its best-fit proportionality level doesn't seem too far off Droop, and it seems strange that it should be that close by chance. Further adding to the weirdness is that when I wrote a coalitional manipulability simulator for n-1-seat n-candidate elections, Schulze STV had a very low manipulability value - which is what you'd expect for a method explicitly designed to be resistant to strategy, and not what a broken version of it would produce. So maybe it is broken in some complex way or my proportionality simulator in particular is exposing some bug that the other simulators don't. I should implement the test elections and see what I get, and until then just say "something might be wrong, but if so, whatever is causing the error is subtle, not obvious". -km ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info