The Law of Force
Kendall Clark <kendall-4GNy1lrxftmrG/[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.politics.leftists.monkeyfist |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
This time with paragraph breaks. I'm looking for comments on this before I publish it. Especially like to hear from Mike Zara, resident legal expert. : The Law of Force By Kendall Clark "I say, bomb the hell out of them. If there's collateral damage, so be it. They certainly found our civilians to be expendable" -- Sen. Zell Miller. "We will not do it in such a way that if the United States feels a need to act alone by itself, we will not be constrained by the fact that we're working with others as well" Secretary of State Powell. "I say to our enemies, 'We are coming. God may show you mercy. We will not'" -- Sen. John McCain. Congressional Authorization of Force The Congress has authorized President Bush to use force to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September. The bill of authorization was introduced and passed into law before all but a very few Americans were able to read it, and before even fewer Americans were able to consider carefully whether it should have been passed at all. The Congressional resolution is very broad, authorizing the President to "determine" the "nations, organizations, or persons" which "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the terrorist attacks "or harbored such organizatiosn or persons". The President alone may determine the targets of U.S. military force. He is authorized to use force against any entity that "harbored" the terrorists, although the resolution fails to explain what "harbor" means. The President is authorized to use force "in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States". And the resolution, again, offers neither a definite meaning of nor limit upon "international terrorism" or "future acts". The International Use of Force Where does the U.S. stand legally? To international use force legally, Washington must obtain a United Nations Security Council resolution, which it should expect to obtain successfully only after meeting the relevant conditions. One condition is to attempt a peaceful resolution to the dispute. Before it can use force against Afghanistan, even if the Taliban is actively shielding bin Laden, Washington must comply with Articles 2(3) and 33 of the UN Charter: All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice (emphasis added). Washington must, therefore, as a matter of law, attempt to resolve the dispute (with Afghanistan or with other States) peacefully, without resorting to force. That obligation applies equally to the so-called "harboring countries", ones against which, whatever the nature of its dispute with bin Laden or al Qaeda, Washington has no legitimate self-defense claims. The issue of so-called harboring countries could be brought before [1]International Court of Justice, for example, if diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute are unsuccessful. If Washington has sufficient evidence, it should seek a formal bill of indictment against any States that aided the terrorist attacks. The ICJ's [2]Court docket is full of relevant and similar cases. Washington's obligation under Articles 2(3) and Article 33 must be understood in light of the fact that the present international dispute is mixed: some parties to the dispute are States, and members of the UN, other parties are likely private organizations and groups. The UN Charter creates an international security regime between and among its Members, between and among States. The relation of a State, such as the U.S., and a terrorist organization, such as bin Laden's, is more properly understood as the relation between a State and persons suspected of international crime. Washington owes obligations of one kind to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other States; it owes obligations of a different kind to al Qaeda, to bin Laden himself. Some of these obligations overlap, others do not. This perfectly ordinary feature of international law is presently unclear because of Washington's of disdaining the valid and lawful distinction between bin Laden's organization and States that "aided" or "harbored" bin Laden. That position, no matter how often or strongly it's asserted, cannot overturn Washington's obligations under the UN Charter. Nor can it blur the distinction between obligations that a State owes to other States -- expressed by the UN Charter and international law -- and the obligations a State owes to persons suspect of committing crimes against it -- expressed in various places, one of which is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Washington is not obligated to resolve its dispute with bin Laden or al Qaeda according to Articles 2(3) and 33; rather, it owes the same obligations to bin Laden as it owes to any criminal not presently residing within reach of its sovereignty. The ordinary procedure in cases like this is to extradite bin Laden to stand trial for his crimes. But extradition is not, according to international law, obligatory in the absence of an explicit treaty or agreement. The U.S. may not legally use force to compel Afghanistan -- nor any other State, no matter how just its cause against bin Laden may be -- to extradite bin Laden. To refuse extradition is an abuse of Afghanistan's State power -- though, perhaps an understandable abuse, given Washington's illegal cruise missile attack against Afghanistan -- but it cannot, without explicit authorization from the Security Council, warrant lawful use of force by the U.S. Failure to extradite does not constitute an armed attack against the U.S. The Limits of Self-defense Assuming that peaceful means fail, Washington must seek UN authorization for the use of international force. Washington is legally constrained by Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, which together constitute a comprehensive legal limit the use of international force, no less so than by its own War Powers Act (1973) or Constitution. As Rosalyn Higgins has said, in her Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, the "UN Charter is intended to provide for a watertight scheme for the contemporary reality on the use of force. Article 2(4) explains what is prohibited, Article 51 what is permitted." Article 2(4) of the UN Charter says that All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Thus, without explicit authorization from the UN, the United States may neither legally threaten to use force nor use it. The only exception granted by the UN Charter occurs in Article 51: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Had it been able to repel the 11 September attacks directly by using force, the United States would have been within its "inherent right" to do so as expressed in Article 51. Washington could legally have ordered the interception and destruction of an inbound international airliner in neutral airspace if, in so doing, it was defending the U.S. against an armed attack. If Washington were able to make a legitimate self-defense case for the attacks which it's promising, it's safe to assume we'd be hearing such a case put in precisely those terms. But that's not what we've been hearing at all. That the United States may now legally use force internationally, as Washington has threated repeatedly to do, under the rubric of self-defense is not self-evident. The Congressional resolution seems to offer a self-defense justification when it says that "such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad". Further the President's [3] National Emergency Proclamation claims as one of its grounds "the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States". Anticipatory Self-defense? Setting aside the, for Washington, inconvenient fact that there is no generally recognized self-defense right to use force to protect citizens abroad, can it justify the uses of force its promised as self-defensive? The kinds of use of force Bush has been promising are clearly not purely self-defensive in nature; they are likely to occur in other countries, neither in direct response to an armed attack, nor with the intention of repelling such an attack. Instead, if there is any self-defense justification whatever to these promised uses of force against, for example, Afghanistan, Washington must make the case, rather than simply asserting it, that they are in response to the immediate threat of an armed attack. In international law there is a contested and limited right of anticipatory self-defense, that is, using force against the threat of an imminent, armed attack, before it has actually occurred. The classic expression of the that right comes from Daniel Webster's diplomatic notes to Britian in the Caroline case. In order for an anticipatory use of force to be legitimate self-defense, there must, Webster wrote, be a "necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation"; the force used must not be "unreasonable or excessive"; it must be "limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it". The case for anticipatory self-defense which the U.S. and the Bush Administration has most often made publicly since 12 September is actually a version of 19th century arguments about national interest. Recall that Bush said as early as his election campaign that he would use force internationally when vital U.S. interests were threatened. But that view, which claims the right to use force without an actual attack or the imminent threat of one, is generally discredited among international law experts. The entire UN security apparatus was created in order to forestall just such unilateral action. When its not offering an anticipatory self-defense or vital interests justification, Washington offers a kind of indefinite plan of armed reprisals. For example, no other legal category but armed reprisal fits Bush's promise that "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." Likewise consider Bush's claim that "our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes." That is, our response includes retaliatory strikes, i.e., armed reprisals, but it will include other things as well. Under international law, a reprisal is an act that would be illegal except as a response to a prior illegal act. For example, economic sanctions are generally illegal, but when they are undertaken as a reprisal, as a response to a prior illegal act, they may be legally permissible. However, reprisals that use force, or armed reprisals, which includes Bush's "war on terror" which "will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated" are illegal under international law. The right of self-defense does not include the right of armed reprisal. Conclusion The legally permissible courses of action for Washington are clear. It may do any or all of the following. First, treat bin Laden, al Qaeda, and any other non-governmental organization involved in terrorist attacks as international criminals, and pursue them accordingly, within the bounds of international law. Second, resolve peacefully any dispute with any State that may have harbored or aided such terrorist organizations, including pursuing a case against any such State at the International Court of Justice. Finally, use international force only upon obtaining explicit authorization by the UN Security Council to do so; or, in the case of actual future or direly imminent armed attacks, in self-defense to defend U.S. territory and citizenry. In the immediate aftermath of the 11 September attacks, many current and former high-ranking officials expressed what can only be called disdain for the bounds of international law. Such expressions might be reasonably thought merely the overwrought, stressful reactions, except that they seem to be part of the pattern of Washington's rejectionist stance. While calmer heads may now be prevailing, it remains to be seen in the weeks and months to come whether Washington has seen fit to accept the bounds of international law or whether the old rejectionist pattern will be reasserted. References: 1. http://www.icj-cij.org/ 2. http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket.htm 3. http://news.lycos.com/news/forms/printstory.asp?section=Breaking&storyId=243528&topic=national+emergencies+act -- Posted on Monkeyfist at http://monkeyfist.com/articles/786