Problem of evil (was Re: Culture Wars, Old and New (Was: [Bonobos] I Am Homophobic))

On Fri, 7 Dec 2001, Kendall Clark wrote:
[snip]
> Note, however, that, even though, yeah, Origen's idea was to peel off the
> evil attributions to God, the problem of evil arises not simply because of
> any evil actions attributed to *God*, but by the mere presence of evil in
> the world at all. (Well, actually, by the confluence of a few religious
> claims and a (broad pattern of) fact -- this is, near as I can recall it,
> John Mackie's version in his (amazing!) The Miracle of Theism: 

[still quoting, but reformated for legibility]
	1) God is infinitely powerful (God can do all that it is logically
	possible to do); 
	2) God is infinitely good or omnibeneficent, and 
	3) there is evil in the world.

> In general, there are three strategies to respond to problem of evil:

[see prior editorial comment; kendall's tab key must be broken]
 	a) qualify or relinquish (1) in order to preserve (2); 
	b) qualify or relinquish (2) to preserve (1); 
	c) qualify (or deny!) (3) to preserve (1) and (2).

> Historically, most responses have denied that the problem really poses a
> contradiction to theism by using some variant of (c); in the modern period,
> especially since about 1950, many religious thinkers offer a variant of (a),
> that is, they've argued that God isn't omnipotent, for a wide range of
> reasons, and does all God can do, which is consistent with (3).)

(Kendall's not the only one with a diss outstanding.) 


Hmm. The classic early modern philosophy response tends to be a bit
different.

Descartes goes for C, I think. The presence of various sorts of
(perceived) evil turn out to be limitations of our understanding of the
grand plan. Note that this is somewhat different from Leibniz's
utilitarian view (i.e., that God is suppose to choose the *best* OVERALL
world, and a world with some evil is better than a world of pure good).

On leibniz's view, thus, it's logically impossible for 1 and 2 to be true
*and* 3 to be false. I.e., it's logically impossible to be omnibeneficient
*and* create a world without evil (if one is omnipotent and
omniscient).

Note that Leibniz really does thing that the current world (with evil) is
*better* than some other worlds without evil. This is in contrast to a
view where a world without evil was *logically incoherent* (though it may
be closely related, if you go through the free will route; harder for
Leibniz due to his views on free will; hmm, maybe note).

Cheers,
Bijan.