Re: Problem of evil (was Re: Culture Wars, Old and New (Was: [Bonobos] I Am Homophobic))

On Fri, Dec 07, 2001 at 03:26:20PM -0500, Bijan Parsia wrote:
> On Fri, 7 Dec 2001, Kendall Clark wrote:
> [snip]
> > Note, however, that, even though, yeah, Origen's idea was to peel off the
> > evil attributions to God, the problem of evil arises not simply because of
> > any evil actions attributed to *God*, but by the mere presence of evil in
> > the world at all. (Well, actually, by the confluence of a few religious
> > claims and a (broad pattern of) fact -- this is, near as I can recall it,
> > John Mackie's version in his (amazing!) The Miracle of Theism: 
> 
> [still quoting, but reformated for legibility]
> 	1) God is infinitely powerful (God can do all that it is logically
> 	possible to do); 
> 	2) God is infinitely good or omnibeneficent, and 
> 	3) there is evil in the world.
> 
> > In general, there are three strategies to respond to problem of evil:
> 
> [see prior editorial comment; kendall's tab key must be broken]
>  	a) qualify or relinquish (1) in order to preserve (2); 
> 	b) qualify or relinquish (2) to preserve (1); 
> 	c) qualify (or deny!) (3) to preserve (1) and (2).
> 
> > Historically, most responses have denied that the problem really poses a
> > contradiction to theism by using some variant of (c); in the modern period,
> > especially since about 1950, many religious thinkers offer a variant of (a),
> > that is, they've argued that God isn't omnipotent, for a wide range of
> > reasons, and does all God can do, which is consistent with (3).)

Sorry about bad formatting...

Note, what I meant (and should have said) by "most responses" above is "most
explicitly theological responses". Bij adds some good stuff below.

> (Kendall's not the only one with a diss outstanding.) 

I think technically mine's not even "outstanding" any more. Or, at least, it
is so only in the most minimal sense that every unfinished diss is.

> Hmm. The classic early modern philosophy response tends to be a bit
> different.
> 
> Descartes goes for C, I think. The presence of various sorts of
> (perceived) evil turn out to be limitations of our understanding of the
> grand plan. Note that this is somewhat different from Leibniz's
> utilitarian view (i.e., that God is suppose to choose the *best* OVERALL
> world, and a world with some evil is better than a world of pure good).

Yes, as I tried to say (c) is probably the most common theological response
(in the West) since the Reformation.

That Cartesian version is very familiar, actually, and quite orthodox
(though I would suspect with different explicit warrants offered).

> On leibniz's view, thus, it's logically impossible for 1 and 2 to be true
> *and* 3 to be false. I.e., it's logically impossible to be omnibeneficient
> *and* create a world without evil (if one is omnipotent and
> omniscient).

Interesting. This is similar to some themes of response in Augustine
(working out his neoplatonic (well, neo-plotinian, more accurately, I think)
synthesis with Christianity). Though of course it isn't really a logical
argument about what is possible but a moral or social argument about what is
best for humans, all things considered. (Which may end up being more similar
than they seem presentationally.)

> Note that Leibniz really does thing that the current world (with evil) is
> *better* than some other worlds without evil. This is in contrast to a
> view where a world without evil was *logically incoherent* (though it may
> be closely related, if you go through the free will route; harder for
> Leibniz due to his views on free will; hmm, maybe note).

What's Leibniz's view of free will (which was an important factor in
Augustine's view)?

Kendall