Re: Marxism and War: The Origins and History of Revolutionary Defeatism

Comrade Mark and Tony misunderstand me when I emphasise that the problem 
in 1941 was the chauvinist consciousness of the majority of American 
worker. I do not doubt that this consciousness was objective reality. 
Likewise, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was objective reality. 
But this does not change the fact that the majority of American workers 
reacted to this event in a patriotic, i.e. chauvinist way. This is not 
surprising and it happened in many other countries involved in 
imperialist conflicts (e.g. in Europe in WWI and WWII, including in 
Austria).

Lenin emphasized that such a reaction and the subsequent isolation of 
revolutionaries – at least in the first period of the war – is nearly 
inevitable in such a situation.

“/We must take special pains to explain that the question of “defence of 
the fatherland” will inevitably arise, and that the overwhelming 
majority of the working people will inevitably decide it in favour of 
their bourgeoisie. Therefore, first, it is necessary to explain what 
“defence of the fatherland” means. Second, in connection with this, it 
is necessary to explain what “defeatism” means. Lastly, we must explain 
that the only possible method of combating war is to preserve existing, 
and to form new, illegal organisations in which all revolutionaries 
taking part in a war carry on prolonged anti-war activities—all this 
must be brought into the forefront./” (V. I. Lenin: Notes on Tasks of 
Our Delegation at The Hague, in: LCW Vol. 33, pp. 447-448)

However, the reaction to such isolation must not be adaption to 
social-chauvinism or preservation of legal existence of party and media 
at any costs but political and organizational preparation for such a 
situation (preparing for underground or semi-legal existence, some 
leaders going abroad, illegal printing shops, etc.). In other words, the 
task is “to swim against the stream” and not to swim with the masses who 
are temporarily affected by chauvinism. It is no accident that Lenin’s 
and Zinoviev’s compilation of writings during WWI was called “Against 
the Stream” and not “Swimming with the Stream”.

I did say that Canon and the SWP failed to take a consistent defeatist 
position (and I provided quotes with exact source for it, contrary to 
Mark’s claims). However, this does not mean that they capitulated like 
the SPD did in 1914. These exist not only black and white, but also 
shades in between.

By the way, I can not fail to point out that in the above-mentioned 
quotes from December 1922, Lenin points to “defeatism” – contrary to 
Draper’s and Tony’s wrong claim that he would have “moved away” from 
this concept after 1915.

I don’t know why Mark introduces the “Anschluß” in the discussion. In 
any case, this was a conflict between two imperialist states and the 
German and Austrian Trotskyists refused to support either side.


Am 07.07.2026 um 00:54 schrieb Anthony Teso via groups.io:
>
>
>   Reply to Mark and Michael on Cannon, the SWP, and 1941
>
> Mark wants Michael to provide proof of the SWP’s wartime opportunism 
> and suggests looking in the Militant archive. That’s a fair request. 
> The answer is simple: the evidence exists and is published, but it is 
> not where either of you expect it to be.
> First, here’s where Michael is correct. Mark’s defense of the SWP uses 
> a common argument: since repression is real and people are furious, 
> the party should soften its position. This logic isn’t about the 
> details. It was used by the SPD in August 1914, when arrest lists were 
> ready, and the army wanted to use them. The SFIO used it during a real 
> German invasion, which the U.S. never experienced. This way of 
> thinking fits any leadership that prioritizes survival over clarity. 
> Michael is right that leaders of the Second International used this 
> same reasoning to justify giving in, and Mark hasn’t responded. Asking 
> again and again what 1914 has to do with this misses the point. The 
> analogy is important. If the SWP acted on principle, that principle 
> should be stated in a way that wouldn’t also justify what Ebert did. 
> Mark hasn’t done that.
> Second, here’s where Mark is right. Michael claims people were scared 
> and angry only because of American media propaganda, not real events. 
> But that just reverses the same mistake. There were 2,400 deaths, four 
> battleships sunk, and many people feared the West Coast could be 
> attacked next. That was a real situation. At the time, workers didn’t 
> see a difference between the U.S. Navy and the country itself, and we 
> shouldn’t try to separate them now. Michael criticizes Mark for 
> explaining people’s thinking by simply referring to it, but then he 
> does the same by blaming the media. Neither view is materialist. In 
> December 1941, real events shaped people’s views. The real question is 
> whether the party’s position changed because of these events.
> Third, I don’t agree with how both of you are framing this issue. You 
> both use revolutionary defeatism as the main test of principle, then 
> argue about whether the SWP met that standard or had a reason not to. 
> Michael wants the party press to sound more radical, while Mark argues 
> for an exception because of repression. Hal Draper pointed out seventy 
> years ago that the defeat slogan from 1914 and 1915 was confusing, and 
> even Lenin moved away from it. What really matters is refusing to give 
> political support to the imperialist war; hoping for military defeat 
> and counting how many risky statements appear in the paper are 
> distractions. If you focus on that, the real historical question about 
> the SWP becomes clear, and those involved openly debated it at the time.
> Mark asks for evidence, so here it is. Grandizo Munis wrote a detailed 
> critique of the leadership’s actions at the Minneapolis trial. He 
> argued that Cannon’s testimony downplayed the party’s revolutionary 
> positions, described expropriation as a compensated purchase, and 
> explained the party’s opposition to the war in a way meant to reassure 
> rather than educate. Cannon replied at length in “Defense Policy in 
> the Minneapolis Trial.” Pioneer Publishers printed both sides of the 
> exchange in 1942, showing the party took the disagreement seriously. 
> This fact alone disproves the idea that the charge of adaptation was 
> invented later or is just a smear. Cannon treated Munis as a comrade 
> with a real concern, not as someone spreading lies. Whether Cannon’s 
> answer is sufficiently adequate enough is the real debate, and it’s 
> about testimony and political stance, not about how quickly the 
> Militant published a statement. Michael repeats the weaker version of 
> the critique, which lets Mark point to the archive with confidence. 
> The stronger version was written in 1942 by a Trotskyist who supported 
> the defense and read the transcript.
> The second piece of evidence is the Proletarian Military Policy. Here, 
> Mark’s mention of Trotsky actually works against him. Trotsky was 
> killed in August 1940, sixteen months before Pearl Harbor, so he never 
> saw how things played out during the war or read the trial testimony. 
> He can’t be used as a witness for either side. What Trotsky did leave 
> was the PMP, which the SWP adopted in September 1940 because he pushed 
> for it. If the SWP adjusted to the antifascist mood of American 
> workers, that change didn’t start with the indictment or with cautious 
> editing. It started with a policy calling for trade union control of 
> military training during the state’s war mobilization, implemented 
> before Pearl Harbor. That’s the real issue, and it involves Trotsky as 
> much as Cannon. Bringing up Trotsky doesn’t settle the SWP’s war 
> policy debate; it actually raises more questions.
> I won’t discuss the Anschluss comparison because it doesn’t add 
> anything here. I also agree with Mark that we should discuss the topic 
> of Gaza somewhere else.
> The real issue isn’t whether Cannon repeated slogans that could have 
> gotten him indicted while he was already under indictment. No one 
> expects a leader to volunteer for prison. The real question is whether 
> the political line, the PMP before the war, and the way the trial was 
> handled maintained a clear refusal to support the imperialist war, or 
> if that position was softened to align with workers’ views. That’s the 
> main point, and there are actual texts by Munis and Cannon on this 
> issue. I’d rather see this thread focus on reading those texts instead 
> of debating when newspaper statements were made.
> Tony
> 


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