HAMAS Religious and Nationalist Fanaticism

  Obama has established 
conversations with HAMAS. This would be the first time the United States
has legitimated a recognized terrorist organization, like HAMAS. HAMAS has
vowed to destroy Israel and it has declared itself the enemy of the United
States.  It has declared its goals in the HAMAS Charter. Barack Obama has
also refused secret briefings by the Israelis. He is no different than the
Muslims he favors; he often says one thing and means the opposite. Barack
Hussein Obama is going to be a disaster for America and the Jews. HAMAS is
a religious organization whose primary objective is the spreading of Islam
worldwide and the destruction of western civilization. Their Charter
spells it out. (also see the following excerpts)  There is no negotiating
with HAMAS. They intend to kill us unless we kill them first.

   Hank Roth

----------------------------

[Excerpts from the book, Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modern Age,
edited by Matthew Hughes and Gaynor Johnson - Frank Cass (London 2004) -
The following is from Chapter 10, written by Meir Litvak]

Religious and Nationalist Fanaticism

The case of Hamas

Meir Litvak

The Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawama
al-Islamiyya), known by its acronym Hamas, is a clear case of ideological
fanaticism as far as its perception of the Middle Eastern conflict,
demonisation of the enemy, its aspired end-goal and the means to achieve
it are concerned. These are manifested in its commitment and advocacy
totally to destroy the state of Israel by armed struggle and in the
eschatological significance it gives to the eventual extermination of the
Jews in addition to the glorification of martyrdom among its own fighters.
Concurrently, due to political and military constraints under which it
operates, Hamas is occasionally obliged to follow a somewhat more
pragmatic policy, while making it clear that these tactical considerations
by no mean undermine its maximalist strategic goals.

Hamas was established in December 1987, at the beginning of the
Palestinian uprising (Intifada) against Israel, as the military wing of
the Muslim Brothers' (MB) movement in Gaza. Ever since their emergence in
Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brothers called for the revival and rejuvenation
of Islam, for return of the Muslim masses to Islam and for a more activist
and politicised version of religion. The means to achieve these goals were
religious propagation (da'wa) and the mobilisation of the Muslim masses
for religio-political activity through a network of social and welfare
institutions which the movement had set up. Thanks to this combination of
grass-roots activism and ideology, the Muslim Brothers have become the
most important popular religious movement in the modern Middle East with
branches in most Arab countries.

The Muslim Brothers had always advocated an uncompromising stance against
Zionism and the Jews. They solicited funds and aid to the 1936-9
Palestinian rebellion, and sent volunteers to help the Arab war effort in
1948. Following the 1948 Arab defeat by Israel, the Muslim Brothers viewed
the loss of Palestine as a major symptom of the broader malaise of the
Muslim world.  Consequently, while they advocated the eventual destruction
of Israel, they maintained that the spiritual preparation of the Muslim
masses through the return to Islam was the essential precondition for any
confrontation with Zionism. Once that was achieved, they were certain that
the Arabs and Muslims would defeat Israel and Zionism and regain all of
Palestine.

The move to military activism by the Palestinian Muslim Brothers, which
broke away from the past Muslim Brothers' approach, was largely in
response to pressures by younger, more radical activists, and of the fear
that unless the movement took part in the struggle against Israel, it
would be marginalised by the mainstream Palestine Liberation Organisation
(PLO) in the future Palestinian state that was believed to be in the
offing. Significantly, all other Muslim Brothers' movements in the Arab
world have accepted and given their blessing to this new policy. By
establishing Hamas as a distinct organisation, the Muslim Brothers hoped
to avoid possible Israeli retaliation against their network of social and
religious institutions employed for the propagation (da'wa) of their
Islamic message.  (For general studies on Hamas, see Abu Amr, 1994; J.F.
Legrain, 'The Islamic Movement and the Intifada', in Nasser and Heacock,
1990, 175-90; Ahmad, 1994)

Within a few months after its establishment, Hamas published its major
ideological and canonical text, the Hamas Charter (mithaq). In the
subsequent months and years a stream of other publications expanded the
movement's ideological message. With the passing of time, Hamas emerged as
a distinct core military and political wing that subordinated the
previously central da'wa apparatus of the Muslim Brothers. Unlike the MB
organisations in other Arab countries that were engaged in the propagation
of the Islamic religious message in their societies and in political
activity vis-à-vis Arab governments, Hamas was both a religious and
national movement fighting a foreign enemy and operating in competition
with other Palestinian nationalist organisations.  Whereas Hamas' views on
the need to reinstate Islamic law and morality were not original but part
and parcel of a broader Islamic resurgence in the Middle East, it was in
its capacity as a national movement - whose ideology was suffused with
religious symbols and values - that ideological fanaticism emerged. It is
when religion endows nationalism with a Manichaean view of the world and
with absolutist, or what is perceived to be divine, justification that
fanaticism can thrive. This fanaticism was probably enhanced by the
increasing frustration of Palestinians in general, and of the Islamists in
particular, that emerged from the ongoing clash with Israeli rule.

The religious idiom has always played an important role in the evolution
of Palestinian nationalism and in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In the
past, however, it was mostly the nationalist Palestinian élites - the
notables during the British Mandate and the Fatah movement since the early
1960s - that employed Islamic symbols and themes in order to mobilise
popular support for the national cause, whose aims were largely political
and secular. (For such uses, see Johnson, 1982. The case of Shaykh 'Izz
al-Din al-Qassam, the preacher from Haifa, who was the first to resort to
armed struggle against the Zionists and the British under the banner of a
holy war is closer to a millenarian religious movement than to a secular
movement using religion; see Johnson, Chapter two; Kupferschmidt, 1987,
187-9, 240-7; Porath, 1977, 265-7.)

Various Arab rulers have also used Islam as an instrument for their
policies in the conflict. The rise of political Islam in the Middle East
and particularly within the Palestinian national movement, presents a
change from past patterns, as Hamas is primarily a religious movement
whose nationalist world view is shaped by its religious ideology. In
addition, the religious perspective as articulated by Hamas contributes to
the perception of the conflict in uncompromising totally dichotomous
terms, and thereby provides the motivation for resorting to extreme
measures of struggle.

Another possible cause for extremism is the perceived threat to
Palestinian Muslim culture or social mores as a result of excessive
exposure to the more secular and Western-oriented Israeli society, or to
Western cultural influences in view of the greater presence and
involvement of Western organisations in that country. While foreigners may
marvel at the fact that the Palestinians were among the most Westernised
Arabs, for Hamas such developments seemed a threat rather than a blessing.
(See Charles Liebman's statement that it was precisely the breakdown of
Jewish society in the modern period due to growing secularisation that
weakened its capacity to check extremist impulses, 1983, 79.)

Consequently, there has been marked consistency in the ideology of Hamas
during its 15 years of existence in its perception of the conflict, in its
demonisation of the enemy, that is, Zionism, Israel and the Jews, in
glorification of holy war (jihad) and martyrdom (shahada), and in
advocating an extreme end-goal of the conflict. Furthermore, a clear
radicalisation is discernable in the resort to extreme measures of
warfare, culminating in suicide bombing against the civilian population.

Concurrently, as a political movement, which aspires to lead the
Palestinian people and eventually supplant the PLO and the Palestinian
Authority (PA) in the Palestinian territories, Hamas occasionally had to
prefer short-term political considerations over its long-term strategic
goals. (written before HAMAS achieved political power in GAZA) It avoided
a full-head confrontation with the PA forces fearing it would be crushed
militarily, and it was often attuned to popular moods and the level of
support for its military activities. Consequently, it was willing
temporarily to restrain its activities due to short-term political
considerations, while preparing itself for new rounds of struggle and
without conceding its long-term and maximalist strategy of eliminating
Israel and eventually the Jews. (For an analysis of Hamas' occasionally
pragmatic course of action, see Mishal and Sela, 2000)

The first pillar of Hamas' ideology is the emphasis on the 'Islamic
essence' of the Palestinian cause (Islamiyat al-qadiyya al-Filastiniyya)
and of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hamas, therefore, criticises the
PLO for portraying the conflict as one between Palestinian nationalism and
Zionism, as misconstruing the problem and the way to its solution. Like
other Islamic movements, Hamas traces the roots of the tragedies and
defeats that have befallen the Muslims in general and the Palestinians in
particular in the modern age to the abandonment of Islam and the turning
towards 'the idols' of westernisation. Reflecting this deep-seated
predicament, the Hamas charter states:

"The Islamic Resistance Movement found itself at a time when Islam has
disappeared from life. Thus rules shook, concepts were upset, values changed
and evil people took control, oppression and darkness prevailed, cowards became
like tigers: homelands were usurped, people were scattered and were caused to
wander all over the world, the state of justice disappeared and the state of
falsehood replaced it." (Hamas Charter, article 9;
http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/documents/charter.html)

The religious essence of the conflict means that it is first and foremost
a 'war of religion and faith', between Islam and Judaism and between
Muslims and Jews, rather than one between Palestinians and Israelis or
Zionists. The Jews 'made their religion their nation and state', Hamas
activists Mahmud al-Zahar explained, and they have 'declared war on
Islam'. As such, the struggle is portrayed as an unbridgeable dichotomy
between two absolutes. It is a historical, religious, cultural and
existential conflict between faith and unbelief, between 'truth and
falsehood', between the true religion which supersedes all previous
religions, i.e. Islam, and the abrogated superseded religion, Judaism.
It is a war between good personified by the Muslims who represent the
party of God (Hizballah) against 'evil incarnated Party of Satan' (hizb
al-shaytan)  represented by the Jews. Consequently, it is an 'existential
battle and not just a dispute over borders' (ma'rakat wujud wa-la hudud).
(Ibrahim Quqa to al-Anba' (Kuwayt), 8 October 1988; 'Hiwar shamil ma'a
qiyadat Hamas', 'Filastin al-Muslima (FM)' April 1990; 'Shi'arat harakat
al-muqawama al-Islamiyya Hamas', Ila Filastin, February 1990; 'Haqiqat
sira'ina ma'a al-yahud', Nida' al-Aqsa, January 1989)

In this view, the struggle revolves around the Islamic - rather than Arab
or merely Palestinian - identity of Palestine, something that the Jews
seek to obliterate. Likewise Israel, the Jews and the various
international organisations which serve as a cover for them, strive to
eliminate or at the least denigrate Islam. Thus, the charter claims that
the Jews seek to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site for
Muslims, and build in its place their 'so-called' temple. As proof of the
Jewish hostility and intentions against Islam, Hamas reminds all Muslims
that when the Israeli soldiers captured Temple Mount in Jerusalem during
the 1967 War, they supposedly declared: 'Muhammad is dead, and his
descendants are all women.'(Muhammad mat wa-khalafa banat), thereby
denigrating his manhood. (Hamas Charter, article 28; Hamas Handbill 65,
October 1990)
[...]

Unlike the non-Islamist Palestinian groups, Hamas makes no distinction
between Judaism and Zionism, and uses Zionists and Jews synonymously and
interchangeably. Judaism is a 'religion that stipulates racism and
hostility towards others in its books and incites to usurp unjustly
Palestine under the slogan of the Holy Land'. Zionism, according to this
view, simply transforms these Jewish ideas into reality. Only rarely does
Hamas distinguish those Jews that are actively opposed to the Jewish
occupation of any part of Palestine from the Zionists, but without sparing
them from the fate of all other Jews at the conclusion of the conflict.
Thus in pictures and caricatures describing Israelis or Zionists, Hamas
often shows ultra-orthodox Jews with their traditional East European dress
even though such ultra-Orthodox Jews originally had been non-Zionists,
thereby fusing both categories. The usage of such pictures also points to
the assimilation of European anti-Jewish stereotypes and their application
to Israelis. (FM, April 1990, 25-6)

Equally important, Hamas regards the struggle against Israel as part of a
broader religious war waged between Islam and Western civilisation: the
latest and most fateful phase of the relentless onslaught waged by Western
imperialism and culture against Islam since the time of the Crusades.
Because of their support for Zionism, both the capitalist West and the
Communist East were regarded as one entity in this context. Thus, Hamas
officials denounced the American attack on Afghanistan following the 11
September 2001 attack and the oppression of the Muslims in Kashmir as part
of an overall Western offensive against Islam carried out in the service
of Zionism, to finish the task that Zionism had failed to do.
(Al-Jazeera TV, Doha, 8 October 2001 - BBC-Summary of World Broadcast
(SWB); Palestinian Information Centre web site in Arabic, 15 November
2001)

In addition, Hamas publications portray the Jews as instruments of the
West or, alternatively, as the power that controls and manipulates the
West. The United States, for instance, was described as a servant of
Israel and as seeking to subjugate the Arabs according to the Jewish plan.
(Hamas Handbills 10, 24, 71, 72; 'al-bayan al-thani lil-harakat
al-islamiyya', FM, March 1991)

Every conflict involves justification of the self and the demonisation of
rivals and enemies, or in Hamas' case the Jews as the 'enemies of God and of
humanity'. Such an accusation, in the words of Bernard Lewis, applies to all
enemies of Islam since, if according to the Koran the fighters in the war for
Islam are fighting in a holy war 'in the path of God' and for God, then their
opponents are fighting against God and are, therefore, His enemies.
(Lewis, 1990, 47-60)

[...]

The portrayal of the Jews as powerful arch-enemies and conspirators
against Islam departs from traditional Islamic depictions of the Jews that
are associated with cowardice, degradation and wretchedness. It has become
a central element in Hamas' ideology and an important theme in the
writings of all Islamist movements in the Middle East as part of a broader
need to explain the current crisis of the Muslim world. It is particularly
difficult within this context to explain Jewish or Zionist success
vis-à-vis the Muslims since, according to Islamic tradition, the Jews were
destined to humiliation and subjugation to Muslims after they had rejected
the message of the Prophet. It is one thing for Muslims to be defeated by
a superpower such as the United States, or to be subjected to non-Muslim
rule in India, and a completely different situation to be defeated and
ruled by the Jews, who had been an inferior minority in the past under the
Muslim empire, and who are a small minority in the modern Middle East. The
only way to explain this cognitive dissonance is to magnify the power and
evil of the Jews, and thereby help to explain Muslim weakness.  (For the
spread of anti-Jewish sentiments in the Arab world, see Haim, 1955,
307-12; Lewis, 1986; Yadlin, 1989; Nettler, 1987)

The modern anti-Jewish animosity of Islamic movements goes much further
than Islamic tradition. Although Muslims have always viewed Islam as a
superior religion, superseding Judaism, they did not consider Judaism as a
heresy which required eradication as long as it did not challenge Islam's
rule.  Historically, Muslims regarded Christianity as a greater threat
than Judaism, and devoted greater attention to it in their polemical
literature. (Lewis, 1981, 33)

However, due to the conflict with Israel, Judaism rather than Christianity
has become the prime enemy for the Islamist organisations, drawing
inspiration from anti-Jewish utterances in the Koran and from modern
European anti-Semitism.  ('Abd al-Fattah al-'Uwaysi, Tasawwur al-ikhwan
al-muslimin li-qadiyat Filastin (Cairo, n.d.), 25)

A good example of this type of vilification is the Hamas Charter, which
provides a picture of the Jews and Judaism which is based on the notorious
anti-Semitic tract, the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion'. Article 22, for
instance, describes the Jews as controlling the world media with their
money and as having established secret organisations throughout the world
- such as the Freemasons and Rotary Club - 'for the destruction of
societies and the fulfilment of the goals of Zionism'. The Jews have
'caused revolutions all over the world', from France in 1789 to Russia in
1917 'in order to fulfil their goal'. Likewise, 'with their money, they
seized control of the imperialist powers and pushed them to subdue many
countries in order to squeeze their resources and spread their
corruption'. The Jews are also said to hold important positions all over
the world which they use to promote the Zionist cause. Thus, many Jewish
professors, it is argued, are working in Western universities in order to
dominate them. The same is true for the world of the media, which explains
why foreign books and newspapers are 'generally subservient to the Jewish
position'.  (Hamas Charter, article 22; FM, January, April 1990)

Almost every issue of the Hamas organ, Filastin al-Muslima (FM) contains
articles enumerating the evil deeds and character of the Jews based on an
analysis and exegetes of specific suras (chapters) from the Koran. Salah
al-Khalidi, who wrote many of these articles, interpreted Surat al-Baqara
(the Cow chapter), to cite one case, as seeking to 'explain the secret of
their perversion, to warn the Muslims against them', and to 'awaken the
Muslims to confront and fight' the Jews. (Salah al-Khalidi, 'Hadith surat
al-Baqara 'an al-yahud' I, FM, July 1995; idem., 'Kawashif Koraniyya
lil-ghawamid al-yahudiyya', I-II, FM, December 1993, January 1994)~

In many of its publications Hamas employs harsh derogatory descriptions of
the Jews, often taken from the Koran, such as 'blood suckers', 'brothers
of apes', 'killers of the prophets', 'human pigs', 'warmongers', 'the
descendants of treachery and deceit', 'butchers.' They are a 'cancer
expanding' in the land of Palestine, 'threatening the entire Islamic
world'. They are 'spreading corruption' in the land of Islam. 'Deceit and
usury are stamped in their nature', and they are all 'thieves,
monopolists, usurers'. The reason for their crimes is their attitude
towards the others as 'goyim' (gentiles) - i.e., as animals. (See
Handbills 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 14, 16, 30, 31, 32, 33, 65, 78, 87. The
handbills are found in Mishal and Aharoni, 1994; al-Sawa'id al-Ramiyya,
May 1990; 'Hadhihi akhlaqiyat bani Sahyun', Sawt al-Aqsa, 15 November
1990. By contrast, some scholars in al-Azhar, the leading Islamic
institution in the Middle East, recommended the terms pigs and monkeys
should not apply to present-day Jews, --- see
http://www.alwatan.com.sa/daily/2003-03-14"
cited http://www.memri.org

Hamas also accuses the Jews of fomenting wars: 'there is no war going on
anywhere, without them [the Jews] having their finger in it'. They 'were
behind World War II, through which they made huge financial gains by
trading in armaments, and paved the way for the establishment of their
state'. Indeed, it was the Jews, in this view, who instigated the
replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations and the
Security Council to enable them to rule the world through these
organisations. (Hamas Charter, article 22)

Of special significance are the wars which the Jews have waged against
Islam from the time of the Prophet. Accordingly, the Jews opposed the
Prophet from the moment he arrived in Medina, in a desperate effort to
prevent the spread of Islam, rejecting his generous offers and distorting
his message. They tried to harm the Islamic umma (nation) and dominate it,
because it was the 'new international force bringing an authentic
civilising and godly program to mankind'. (FM, 'Hiwar', April 1990)

These assertions are intended to show that the present conflict with
Israel is the direct continuation of these past struggles. Thus, according
to 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rantisi, Hamas' leader in Gaza killed by Israel in
April 2004, the Jews are practising today the same tactics they had used
against the Prophet Muhammad, unjustly shedding the blood of the
Palestinians, just as they had wrongfully shed the blood of the (Biblical)
prophets in the past.  (Rantisi, 'Idha malaka al-sahayina quwa qatalu
al-abriya li-tahqiq mukhattatihim al-khabith' in http://www.rantisi.net)

More recently, Hamas writers explain that when the Ottoman Sultan 'Abd
al-Hamid II (r. 1876-1908) rejected the Jewish offers to salvage his
country financially in return for permitting Zionist activity in
Palestine, the Jews instigated the 1908 revolution in the Ottoman Empire.
They carried it out through members of the Crypto-Jewish Dönme sect who
infiltrated the Committee of Union and Progress (Young Turks) movement
that toppled the Sultan, the last truly devout Muslim ruler.  ('Madkhal
ila al-qadiyya al-filastiniyya', in http://www.palestine-info.com. The
accusation relies on the fact that one of the CUP leaders, Tal'at Pasha,
apparently came from the Dönme sect, which had split from Judaism by the
seventeenth century. In addition, the CUP themselves opposed Zionism. The
story, however, elicited the conspiratorial imagination of others as well,
see Kedourie, 1971, 89-104)

Even worse, the Jews initiated the outbreak of the First World War, which
led to one of the greatest calamities that had befallen the Muslims in the
modern period: the destruction of the Ottoman empire, the last great
Muslim empire, and the abolition of the caliphate, the symbol of Islamic
political and religious unity. The war also enabled the Jews to secure the
Balfour declaration from the British government supporting a Jewish
national home in Palestine, while, at the same time, the breakdown of the
Ottoman Empire into mini-states (duwaylat) prevented the Muslims and Arabs
from confronting the Zionists. ('Abd al-Hafiz 'Alawi, 'Nazarat tahliliyya
fi al-waqi' al-'arabi al-islami, 1: mazahir al-du'f fi al-waqi' al-'arabi
al-islami wa-asbabiha', FM, July 1994.)

The accusations against the Jews contain a paradox: on the one hand, Hamas
claims that the Jews are not a people at all, as they lack any objective
attributes of nationhood. Rather, they are an amalgam of totally disparate
groups with nothing in common among them except their religion. On the other
hand, the movement contradicts itself by insisting that Jews throughout the
world share the same eternal characteristics and aspirations, and that they
strove to attain their goals throughout the centuries under a unified
leadership.

Among the most extreme accusations made by Hamas against the Jews and
Zionists are those equating them with the Nazis and the denial of the
Holocaust. Hamas argues that Israel's actions exceed those of the Nazis,
and that 'the Jews represent Nazism in its most criminal form'. (Hamas
Charter, articles 20, 31. Other such statements include: 'the Nazism of
the Jews encompasses all of them', 'the Nazi Jews', 'Jewish Nazism', 'Nazi
Zionism', see, for example, Handbills 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 25 and 65)

Yet, following the Stockholm conference on the Jewish Holocaust, held in
late January 2000, Hamas put out a statement on its official website
asserting that the conference had a clear Zionist goal, aimed at forging
history by hiding the truth about the so-called Holocaust, which is an
alleged and invented story with no basis.

The invention of these grand illusions of an alleged crime that never
occurred, ignoring the millions of dead European victims of Nazism during
the war, clearly reveals the racist Zionist face, which believes in the
superiority of the Jewish race over the rest of the nations.

This attempt to focus on an 'alleged story', Hamas charged, ignores the
suffering of Palestinians and disregards the massacres committed by the
Zionists against them. Hamas urged all 'the free scholars of the world' to
'expose the crimes of global Zionism' against the Palestinians and not to
fear 'the Jews and their ideological terrorism' through which 'they shut
mouths and prevent objective, unbiased scholars from revealing the Zionist
claims as lies'.  (Paz, 2000. The original article appeared in Arabic in
Hamas official website, http://www.Palestine-info.org, and was not
translated to English, presumably because the editors realised it could
harm Hamas' reputation among non-Arabs)

Rantisi went further by denying the Holocaust, while accusing the Zionists
of collusion with the Nazis and describing them as worse than the Nazis.
He praised various 'thinkers and historians' such as Roger Garaudy, Gerd
Honsik and David Irving - all accused of being Holocaust deniers - who had
'exposed the fallacy' of the Holocaust and who were duly persecuted by the
Zionists.  Concurrently, he maintained that 'the Zionists were behind the
Nazis' murder of many Jews, ' with the aim of intimidating and forcing
them to immigrate to Palestine. But afterwards, they 'organized great
propaganda campaigns, to cash in on their blood'. Furthermore, he claimed
that the Nazis 'received tremendous financial aid from the Zionist banks
and monopolies', prior to their seizure of power and that 'this great
financial aid helped the Nazis build the military and economic force it
needed to destroy Europe and annihilate millions'. 'When we compare the
Zionists to the Nazis', Rantisi concluded, 'we insult the Nazis - despite
the abhorrent terror they carried out, which we cannot but condemn.  For
Hamas, the crimes perpetrated by the Nazis against humanity pale into
insignificance when compared to the Zionists' terror against the
Palestinian people'. (Hamas' weekly al-Risala (Gaza), 21 August 2003)

[...]

The combination of this concept with the belief in an unbridgeable
religious struggle leads to the inevitable conclusion that any negotiation
with the enemy is a 'concession of principle, and granting recognition to
murderers and usurpers on rights which are not theirs over land in which
they had not been born'. Neither the Palestinians nor the Arabs, neither
the present generation nor any generation in the future, Hamas claims,
have the right to give up even an inch of land or to accept an alien
entity in Palestine, since that would mean giving up part of their
religion. Recognising the 'false Jewish entity', a 'document for history'
addressed to the Fatah movement stated, is tantamount to a 'betrayal of
God, his messenger and of the faith'. All 'so-called peaceful solutions',
it adds, are illusions and a waste of time, and are merely an additional
way for the infidels to impose themselves over the believers.  (Hamas
Charter, articles 11, 13; 'Wathiqa lil-ta'rikh', in FM, September 1989;
Harakat al-muqawama al-Islamiyya Hamas: hadha huwa mawqifuna min
al-taswiyya', FM, July 1991; Handbills 8, 28, 30)
[...]

Hamas condemned the United States' attack on Afghanistan as an unjustified
offensive against Islam and the Muslims as a whole, warning the United
States that it would have to confront the wrath of Hamas and all Muslims.
Yasin interpreted President Bush's phrase of a 'crusade' against terror as
truly reflecting America's basic hostility towards the Muslim peoples and
its desire to impose its rule over them. Pointing to the crash of the
United States space shuttle Columbia on 1 February 2003, Rantisi concluded
that the United States would be destroyed like all the empires that had
preceded it, as revenge by God.  (Yasin to ABC (Madrid), 18 September 2001
(DR); Rantisi to Al-Jazeera TV, 8 October 2001 (SWB) and to FM, October;
Palestine-info.com, 8, 11 October;  Christian Science Monitor, 12 October;
and FM, November 2001 which was mostly dedicated to condemnations of US
policy; Rantisi, 'Ya layta Amrika ta'tabir wama azunnuha fa'ilah', 2
February 2003 in
http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/palestoday/readers/articles/rantese/
2003/2-2-03.htm)

The Hamas-affiliated Society of Palestine Clerics (Rabitat 'Ulama'
Filastin)  issued a religious ruling describing American actions in
Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Middle East as a war on Islam disguised
as a war on terrorism.  Being a war against God, the ruling stated, it was
destined for defeat. The ruling declared the United States a terrorist
state in view of its support for Israel, and prohibited any alliance or
co-operation with it against any Muslim state being 'one of the gravest
crimes against God, and a betrayal of God and his Messenger'.
(FM, October 2001)

Although Hamas denied any link with bin Laden's al-Qa'ida organisation, it
showed increasing understanding, with the passage of time, of al-Qa'ida's
animosity towards the United States, and even appreciation of its
audacity.  Thus FM did not publish articles openly condoning the attack on
the United States, but increasingly showed sympathetic pictures of
solidarity demonstrations with bin Laden all over the Muslim world.
Likewise, when told that Israel equated him with bin Laden, Rantisi
replied that it was 'great honour for him'. In a somewhat different vein,
'Atallah Abu al-Subh, a columnist for the Hamas weekly al-Risala, wrote a
'public letter' to 'Anthrax' following the deadly attack of anthrax
letters in the United States during October 2001, expressing his
admiration to Anthrax that 'despite your wretchedness, you have sown
horror in the heart of the lady of arrogance, of tyranny, of
boastfulness', the United States. (Al-Majalla (London), 23-29 December; FM
issues from November 2001 onward. Rantisi to al-Sinara (Nazareth), 13 June
2003; al-Risala, 1 November 2001)

Thus, while Hamas apparently did not have operational links with
al-Qa'ida, it certainly did not have any moral or ideological reservations
from its actions or from the use of biological warfare against the enemies
of Islam.

The idea of jihad and martyrdom for Islam has always been highly regarded
by the Muslim Brethren. The major difference between the brethren and
their political rivals was the relative importance of the various kinds of
jihad - spiritual, social or military - as well as the right time and
authority to declare one. As mentioned above, the shift toward military
jihad, which was taken only after the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada
against Israel in 1987 represented a major departure from the traditional
position of the Muslim Brethren. (On the Muslim Brethren's concept of
jihad, see Mitchell, 1969, 215-16;  on the Palestinian Muslim Brethren
position on jihad, see Cohen, 1982, 205)

The most effective form of jihad, which Hamas practiced since 1994, was
suicidal bomb attacks on (mostly) civilian targets in Israel. Such attacks
were first employed in the Middle East by the Shiite Hezbollah
organisation in Lebanon following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon,
and were later adopted by Palestinian and other Middle Eastern
organisations. (During the years 1994-6 Hamas activists carried out
several suicide attacks which led to the death of 107 Israeli citizens and
the injury of dozens of others, see Litvak and Rekhess 1996, 146-9. During
the more recent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation in 2000-3 more than 850
Israelis were killed in suicide attacks.)

Scholars disagree as to the direct cause that prompted Hamas to launch
suicide operations. Some, including Hamas spokespeople, point to the
massacre of 29 Palestinians in Hebron on 25 February 1994 by a Jewish
settler, Baruch Goldstein, as the trigger. On the other hand, as early as
1992 a Hamas publication extolled suicide attacks, promising that they
would be carried out once the technical capability was achieved. Moreover,
the first suicide attack, albeit against a military target, took place on
16 April 1993, prior to the Oslo Accords and to the Hebron massacre. In
other words, the ideological motivation had been built up for a long time
through religious justification. It was given the push towards realisation
as a result of political event, outside the movement's control, the
increasing sense of threat to the movement and its chances to pursue its
ideological strategic goals from a successful implementation of the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. What it needed was the acquisition of
the operational capabilities and the trigger, the Hebron massacre, which
would make such attacks popular in Palestinian public opinion.
(Kurz and Tal, 1997)

Hamas' publications continuously extolled suicide attacks acts as the
epitome of martyrdom (shahada'). Citing passages from the Koran, the
hadith (Traditions of the Prophet), and from Muslim jurists, Hamas writers
differentiated between ordinary suicides (intihar) and the martyrs (shahid
pl. shuhada') who died for the sake of God in the war against the
infidels, stressing God's love for them.  Elaborate eulogies on each
suicide bomber appeared in Hamas' written and electronic publications,
describing the operation in which the martyr was killed and the casualties
he inflicted upon the enemy. Each eulogy cited the Koranic passages that
those who sacrifice themselves for God are not really dead, but remain
alive in heaven. More significantly, perhaps, Hamas' children's magazine,
al-Fatih, carries in each issue the story of the life and death of such a
shahid, and the will that he signed before his death. In most of these
wills, the martyrs called upon their families and friends to rejoice at
their coming martyrdom and for them to follow their example. Mothers of
martyrs were quoted as expressing pride and joy at their son's deeds.
Pictures of the suicide bombers were distributed as posters, often with
the passage that the act of martyrdom was actually the betrothal marriage
of the martyr with the land of Palestine. Likewise, participants in Hamas
rallies occasionally dressed their children in suicide bombers' attire
with simulated explosive belts strapped to their bodies, to demonstrate
their readiness to sacrifice them for the struggle's sake. (For a few
among the many such articles, see Ibrahim al-'Ali, 'Learning from the
Correct Tradition', parts 1-3, FM, October-December 1995, October-November
2002. See eulogies in Hamas official website, www.palestine-info.com, as
well as in al-Fatih 1 (September 2002) to 13 (September 2003). For the
pictures, see FM 2000-2003))

[...]

Prior to the 2003 American-led war in Iraq, Rantisi called upon the Iraqi
people to establish an army of suicide fighters to fight the coming invasion.
He explained that the battle in Iraq was a test of wills between Muslims and
their enemies. 'In order to defend the homeland from the terrorist Crusader
attack', he claimed, there was a need to recruit people who 'yearn for
Paradise, and the shortest way to Paradise' and God through death. 'The enemies
of Allah and the enemies of this people are cowards', he stated, as they 'crave
life'. Moreover, martyrdom operations will terrify and demoralise them, thereby
contributing to their defeat. We should see the 'joyful and satisfied faces' of
the mothers in Iraq when they 'part from the fruit of their loins, who go off
to the realms of honor, the realms of martyrdom', he concluded.
(http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/palestoday/readers/
articles/rantese/30-12-02.htm,
30 December 2002; www.Memri.org Special Dispatch 457, 9 January 2003. It
is ironic that several Hamas leaders sent their own sons abroad during the
2000-3 confrontation, apparently to avoid sending them on suicide
operations. The refusal of Rantisi's wife to have her son recruited to
such attacks, aroused indignation in Palestinian public opinion, see
Ha'aretz, Itim, 1 August 2002;  al-Hayat (London), 1 October, 2002;
www.Memri.org: Special Dispatch 426, 8 October 2002)

Expressing these sentiments from the receiving end, the mother of one
Hamas martyr stated in a newspaper interview:

  "I am a compassionate mother to my children, and they are compassionate
towards me and take care of me. Because I love my son, I encouraged him to
die a martyr's death for the sake of Allah^Å Jihad is a religious
obligation incumbent upon us, and we must carry it out. I sacrificed
Muhammad as part of my obligation.'" (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 5 June 2002. It
is totally irrelevant whether or not the mother truly believed in her
statement or was forced to pronounce it. What matters is the message that
Hamas wanted to convey,)

The Palestinian jihad, according to Hamas, had wider political and
religious ramifications besides the liberation of the homeland, which
would influence the entire Muslim world. The failure of the Muslim nation
to assist its brethren in Bosnia, Chechnya and other places all over the
world, the Hamas author Mukhlis Barzaq warns, stems from its failure to
regain Jerusalem and its defeat by 'those destined to degradation and
misery'. The nation will not be able to rise up and resolve any Islamic
problem, he concluded, until it was able to 'eliminate the cancer planted
in its heart, Palestine'. Ending the jihad would demoralise the Muslim
masses and would enhance the domination of the corrupt leaders over the
oppressed people under the illusion of peace. Continuing the jihad, on the
other hand, will encourage the Muslims to change the political status quo
in their countries. In addition, based on past Muslims victories, the
Hamas jihad would develop and enhance the military capabilities of the
entire Muslim nation in its other struggles as well. Just as the Jews
acquired modern weapons, so should the Muslims do the same and 'thereby
become masters of the world' (emphasis added). (M. Barzaq, Al-wa'd min
khaybar ila al-quds' (n.p., 2000) in Hamas' official website
http://www.palestine-info.com; I. Muqadima, 'Na'm min al-bahr ila
al-nahr', in http://www.rantisi.net)

More importantly, Hamas endowed the jihad against Israel with religious
and spiritual qualities, declaring that it is fighting in order to defend
the Muslim person, Islamic culture and Muslim holy sites, first and
foremost among them al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. It seeks to establish the
'state of Islam, ' and 'hoist Allah's flag' over all of Palestine.
(Al-Qadiyya al-filastiniyya bayna mithaqayn: al-mithaq al-watani
al-filastini wamithaq harakat al-muqawama al-islamiyya Hamas (Kuwait,
1990);  Hamas Charter, articles 6, 9, 15 and 33; 'Wathiqa lil-ta'rikh',
FM, September 1989; Handbill 25)

The struggle against the Jews serves as a crucible and as a spiritual
revolution that would restore the Palestinian people back to their Islamic
identity. For Hamas, history, from the times of the Crusades, has shown
that the Islamic nation unites only around Palestine. The loss of
Palestine was the beginning of the nation's collapse and disintegration,
and the liberation of Palestine is a necessary precondition for its
cultural revival and progress. Moreover, humanity everywhere, oppressed by
American imperialism and Zionism, looks forward to the defeat of these
forces as the first step toward its liberation. There is no future for
this nation and this region, one Hamas writer concluded, except by
liberating Palestine and by removing the Zionist state which constitutes
the obstacle to Arab and Islamic revival. ('Abd al-Hafiz 'Alawi, 'Filastin
al-Thawabit', FM, March 1995; Handbill 82)

Moreover, Hamas has endowed the jihad against the Jews with eschatological
significance. The messianic element is relegated to secondary importance
in the ideology of modern-day Sunni movements, as they are much more
interested in establishing Islamic states here and now. However, because
Hamas' main pre-occupation is fighting a national-religious enemy, and
possibly as a means to stave off calls for a compromise among the
Palestinian masses, it resorts to messianic symbolism. Thus, the jihad
against the Jews is a prerequisite for fulfilling God's promise to
establish His rule over the earth. Citing the tradition (hadith) of the
Salt-bush, the Hamas Charter states that the final hour will not come
until the day when the Muslims will fight the Jews and kill them.  (Hamas
Charter, articles 13, 9 and 7; Handbill, 82. According to Islamic
tradition the Jews will flee from the Muslims on that day and when the Jew
will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O
Moslems, O 'Abdullah (slave of God), there is a Jew behind me, come and
kill him. Only the Gharkad tree (saltbush) would not do that because it is
one of the trees of the Jews.)
[...]

Consequently, on various occasions since the 1993 signing of the
Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (the Oslo Accords), Hamas
leaders made a distinction between full-fledged peace (sulh) with the
Jews, which they regarded as a crime, and a temporary armistice (hudna).
It is lawful for the Muslims, they explained, to accept such an armistice
if the enemy is powerful while the Muslims are weak and need time to
prepare and recover their strength.  Most jurists, Ahmad Yasin said,
believe that such an armistice should not exceed 10 years, the period
which the Prophet accepted in his agreement with the people of Mecca at
Hudaybiya in CE 628. They were willing to accept such an armistice
provided that Israel withdrew unconditionally back to the 1967 borders and
gave the Palestinians absolute freedom to determine their fate and future.
Yet they insisted that such a truce would not mean giving up Palestinian
claim and rights for all of Palestine. A Palestinian state on part of
Palestine was acceptable provided that it advanced the strategic goal of
liberating all of Palestine. (Al-Wasat, 1 November 1993; Yasin to FM,
March 1995; Yasin to al-Hayat al-Jadida, 4 January; Khalid Mash'al to
al-Majd, 15 January; Zahar to al-Dustur, 19 February; Yasin to al-Dustur,
29 September 2001)

Hamas expressed confidence that, while the struggle against Israel might
be difficult and prolonged, the Muslims' victory was preordained by God.
Thus, Imam (prayer leader) Khalid Tafish, a senior Hamas activist from
Gaza, concluded that it was 'written in the Koran, with no possibility of
mistaking the interpretation', that the 'Jews must be destroyed twice in
terrible wars'.  The first one took place in ancient Babylon during
Nebuchadnezzar's war in 587 BCE, while the second was about to take place.
(La Stampa (Turin), 14 October 2000 (DR))

In a chapter of his book, God's Promise from Khaybar to Jerusalem,
unambiguously entitled 'The Jews Are Our Servants and Slaves and their
Land Belongs to the Muslims', Barzaq recounts the story of Muhammad's
victory over the Jews of the Khaybar oasis in Arabia as a lesson for
present-day Muslims.  Following his victory, the Prophet decreed that the
Jews - men, women and children - as well as their possessions would became
the property of the Muslims, who could dispose of them in whatever way
they wanted. If such was the historical case, he explained, that a
territory which had belonged to the Jews and for which they had fought had
become Muslim, then it is even more obvious as far as the holy Islamic
land of Palestine is concerned. It should serve as a lesson, he warns,
never to allow the Jews to overturn God's words and to rule over Muslims.
Therefore, he assured his readers that victory over the Jews was a divine
pledge to the Muslims, and its outcome will be 'the total end of their
existence'. (M. Barzaq, al-Wa'd min al-Khaybar, Chapter 2 at
http://www.Palestineinfo.com. The 'supplications' to God to exterminate
the Jews and Christians are shared by many present-day Islamist spokesmen
in the Middle East, so much so that the Kuwaiti minister of religious
endowments, Ahmad Baqir, and deputy Saudi minister for religious affairs,
'Abd al-'Aziz al-'Ammar, urged their cessation on
http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/news 30 April and 15 May 2002; al-Sharq
al-Awsat, 29 December 2002.)

Yasin himself expressed his confidence that Israel would disappear by the
year 2027 with the passage of two-generational cycles since 1947, the UN
partition of Palestine and in 1987 the outbreak of the Islamic Intifada.
Mahmud al-Zahhar, another Hamas leader in Gaza, explained in September
2001 that the divine dictum would be achieved by temporal means, since
within 30 years the Palestinians would become the majority in the land.
Equally important, by that time the Arabs and Muslims would acquire
weapons of mass destructions, such as chemical, biological and nuclear
capabilities, which would undoubtedly be used against Israel once the
Muslim world would reassert itself and join the struggle.  (Rekhess and M.
Litvak, 1999, 203; Zahhar to FM, September 2001)

The main argument of this paper is that the ideology and measures employed
by Hamas do indeed place it within the category of fanaticism. The roots
of this fanaticism stem from the conflation of ethnic nationalism and
religious radicalism, which are reinforced by harsh political
circumstances.

This fanaticism is evident in Hamas' articulation of the conflict in
absolutist terms as a religious war between the parties of God and Satan,
in its advocacy of an extremist solution - i.e., the destruction of the
state of Israel - and in the glorification of suicide bombing or martyrdom
operations as religious acts endowed with deep spiritual meaning. More
importantly, there can be no other way to describe a movement which 60
years after the Second World War advocates repeatedly and in unequivocal
terms the physical elimination of an entire people.

These expressions of fanaticism by Hamas' leadership and in the movement's
publications should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric, as they serve to
inculcate a state of mind among the movement's activists and followers as
well as socialise a younger generation of Palestinians. And even if they
were pure rhetoric, the willingness of young Palestinians to carry out
suicide attacks is a significant indicator of the effect of this
discourse. The horrors of the twentieth century have proved that too often
fanaticism of the word leads to fanaticism of the deed.
[...]

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