Fwd: 1942 Tribune story implied Americans cracked Japanese code

1942 Tribune story implied Americans cracked Japanese code. Documents =
show why reporter not indicted

The Chicago Tribune's front page of June 7, 1942, was led by a report on =
the Battle of Midway that made evident the U.S. had cracked the Japanese =
naval code.

October 25, 2017
Katherine Rosenberg-Douglas
Chicago Tribune

For 74 years, only members of a Chicago grand jury could definitively =
say why they declined to indict a reporter responsible for a 1942 front =
page article that implied American cryptanalysts had cracked the =
Japanese military code.

Documents from the case were unsealed for a group of petitioners in late =
2016 after a three-year court battle. On Wednesday, a number of =
carefully selected documents will be publicly available online for the =
first time on the National Security Archive=E2=80=99s website, said John =
Prados, editor of the postings.

The timing =E2=80=94 just 10 days after the publication of =E2=80=9CStanle=
y Johnston=E2=80=99s Blunder,=E2=80=9D a novel by former journalist and =
historian Elliot Carlson =E2=80=94 was merely coincidental, both men =
said.

Carlson sued for the release of the grand jury documents with the help =
of the Reporter=E2=80=99s Committee for Freedom of the Press, and Prados =
testified as an expert.

Yet whether you dive into the documents in the comparatively short =
online post or consume all 242 pages of Carlson=E2=80=99s labor of love, =
you=E2=80=99re likely to come away with the same sense: The grand jury =
declined to indict Tribune war correspondent Stanley Johnston and the =
Tribune=E2=80=99s then-managing editor, J. Loy Maloney, because Adm. =
Ernest J. King, who Carlson called =E2=80=9Cthe adult in the room,=E2=80=9D=
 didn=E2=80=99t want to risk even more media attention and the chance =
that Japanese leaders would change the code from the one the Americans =
had already cracked.

=E2=80=9CIf this had gone on to a public trial, there=E2=80=99s no =
telling how much publicity it would=E2=80=99ve received or how much =
chaos it would=E2=80=99ve caused,=E2=80=9D Carlson said from his =
Maryland home Tuesday. =E2=80=9CIt was already turning into a media =
circus, and Adm. King didn=E2=80=99t want to risk it hitting the =
airwaves. They didn=E2=80=99t so much fear Japanese agents in America, =
but that somehow all the publicity of the trial would come to the =
attention of the Japanese and they would change the codes.=E2=80=9D

Not such a spoiler alert: If you know your history, or if you make it to =
Page 242 of Carlson=E2=80=99s book, you=E2=80=99ll learn that the fear =
that drove the government to take the Espionage Act of 1917 further than =
it had in its history was unfounded. The Imperial Japanese Navy never =
dramatically changed its code, Carlson wrote. It started World War II =
using code JN-25(d). By the end of the war, though numerous changes were =
made, the Japanese never greatly strayed from the code, ending with =
JN-25(p).

=E2=80=9CDid any of these shifts flow from, or have any connection with, =
the Chicago Tribune scandal of June-August 1942? They did not. IJN =
leaders never realized their code had been broken. If they had, they =
would certainly have replaced JN-25 with a totally different system. =
They would have had no other choice, but they never did,=E2=80=9D =
Carlson concluded in the book.

On the phone, he said the Japanese navy did change parts of the code =
every few months, and each time the Japanese did, it would take a few =
weeks before Americans learned what all the changes meant.

=E2=80=9CThis game went on the entire war, but they never changed their =
basic code,=E2=80=9D Carlson said.

In Prados=E2=80=99 words, =E2=80=9CThe continued utility of these =
penetrations depended on Japan not discovering the leaks, and not =
changing their codes. This made the Chicago Tribune affair a high-stakes =
national security matter from the beginning.=E2=80=9D

As the Tribune Editorial Board pointed out in a September 2016 piece =
written when Carlson was still pursuing the sealed documents, World War =
II=E2=80=99s Battle of Midway involved cryptanalysts who worked =
tirelessly to break the codes used by the Japanese navy as the Japanese =
planned to seize Midway Island and use it as a steppingstone to seize =
the Hawaiian Islands.

Johnston, a war correspondent for the Tribune who was credentialed and =
vetted by the FBI, was working aboard a ship with U.S. Pacific Fleet =
commander Adm. Chester W. Nimitz. =E2=80=9CThe Navy and the Franklin D. =
Roosevelt administration privately knew, the details the Tribune had =
corresponded to a top secret dispatch=E2=80=9D from Washington to =
Nimitz, Prados wrote.

Carlson said Nimitz was =E2=80=9Cvery, very sloppy and careless=E2=80=9D =
with his information and had even invited Johnston to stay in his =
personal suite aboard the ship.

=E2=80=9CHe had his own rules, which he himself then violated,=E2=80=9D =
Carlson said of Nimitz. =E2=80=9CThe information from Washington should =
have been seen only by department heads, but when they came to his suite =
to get coffee and to socialize, he couldn=E2=80=99t resist reading parts =
of these messages.=E2=80=9D

The 2016 editorial also addressed how Johnston may have gotten the =
information from Cmdr. Morton Seligman, who was even closer with =
Johnston than was Nimitz.

=E2=80=9CMany historians think Morton Seligman, a U.S. Navy commander, =
intentionally or inadvertently leaked the info. A month earlier, during =
the Battle of the Coral Sea, Johnston had raced below deck to rescue =
badly burned sailors on Seligman's sinking carrier, the USS Lexington. =
On June 7, as the Navy's angry commander in chief Adm. Ernest King =
absorbed the Tribune's Midway report, he had on his desk a draft =
citation honoring Johnston for his heroism aboard the Lexington,=E2=80=9D =
according to the editorial.

Prados and Carlson agree that Johnston likely should have known the =
censorship agreements made when stationed in a war zone =E2=80=94 which =
the Pacific was at that time =E2=80=94 meant the article should=E2=80=99ve=
 been sent to Washington for approval. Carlson, in particular, feels =
Managing Editor Maloney skipped that step, in part because it was about =
midnight and they were going to print, and in part because they knew the =
government would likely kill the whole article.

=E2=80=9CThere was, as you say, a lot of blame to go around,=E2=80=9D =
Carlson said.

Although naval officials should never have discussed such sensitive =
information in front of a reporter, Carlson feels Johnston probably =
should=E2=80=99ve restrained himself in gathering the information and =
then worked harder to reel in editors who added a Washington dateline to =
the piece and a line stating the information came from officials in =
Washington.

=E2=80=9CIt was very, very sensitive information =E2=80=94 yet he copied =
it all down, went back to his hotel room and later showed his boss. And =
Maloney said, =E2=80=98This is just wonderful, fantastic stuff, write it =
up!=E2=80=99=E2=80=9D Carlson said.

Carlson explained the agreement dictated that all copy written from a =
war zone meant that before publication, Tribune employees should=E2=80=99v=
e sent it to the naval censorship office to review and approve.

=E2=80=9CIt=E2=80=99s true that the Tribune was one of the more =
responsible publications, and they showed a high degree of concern about =
their stories, but in this one instance, they didn=E2=80=99t do it,=E2=80=9D=
 he said. =E2=80=9CThey knew that they could never get an answer in time =
for deadline, and if they waited a day, it no longer would be timely, =
and I think Maloney rationalized that the story wasn=E2=80=99t covered =
by the guidelines. He called the Washington bureau, and they assured him =
he was making the right call.=E2=80=9D

Carlson said there was some gray area because the rules were about U.S. =
intelligence, not foreign intelligence.

=E2=80=9CThe Tribune editors and writers were breaking faith with their =
readers, and Johnston, I think, had already broken faith with the =
Navy,=E2=80=9D he said.

Prados, who has spent decades as a proponent of open government =
documents and believes in the public=E2=80=99s right to access =
information through declassification and the Freedom of Information Act, =
was critical of the declassification process.

=E2=80=9CThe secrecy of this was needlessly protected for some time =E2=80=
=94 for decades. It=E2=80=99s another example of the creakiness of =
security classification that seriously needs to be revamped,=E2=80=9D he =
said.

Carlson said the first four days of grand jury testimony were =
essentially scene-setting details and the plan was for cryptanalysis =
officials from the Navy to arrive on the fifth day and present the meat =
of the argument: how Johnston=E2=80=99s actions could negatively affect =
the code breakers and what it could mean to the U.S. if they no longer =
could decipher the code because of a news article.

=E2=80=9C(Adm.) King pulled a fast one on everybody by refusing to let =
his code breakers go to Chicago,=E2=80=9D Carlson said. =E2=80=9CHe =
pulled them back, and that came as a shock to everyone. When they failed =
to show, the grand jury was astounded that they were being asked to =
indict people for charges which they didn=E2=80=99t understand the =
nature of. So once the jury didn=E2=80=99t have witnesses to tell them =
what the indictment was to be about, they threw up their hands and said, =
=E2=80=98We see nothing we can do.=E2=80=99=E2=80=9D

Prados echoed those sentiments, using the naval term =E2=80=9Ctorpedoed=E2=
=80=9D to describe what King did to the proceedings. The government =
didn=E2=80=99t really have the option to attack Johnston or the Tribune =
after that, he said.

Prados=E2=80=99 piece, including all the now-public documents, can be =
found here.

[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>


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