Re: [WikiDiscuss] Re: BPFK gismu Section: Parenthetical Remarks in Brivla Definition

On 9/20/06, John E. Clifford <[email protected]> wrote:
> --- In [email protected], "Jorge Llamb=EDas" <jjllambias@...> wrote:
> >
> > The move in question, I take it, is from "Fa" to "ExFx".
> > That move is always valid, as far as I'm concerned.
>
> Actually, it is the more specialized one, in Lojban terms from {F lo
> broda} to {da poi broda zo'u F da} from "F a dog" to "there is a dog
> such that F it."

Always valid too.

> This works in extensional cases, not intensional
> ones. The idea is to get it to work in all cases (by making the
> places extesnional

For me, all places are always extensional in that sense.

> (though containing -- and thus quantifying on -- intensional objects).

Is the domain of discourse for you partitioned into intensional objects
and extensional objects? If yes, is this a metalinguistic or an object
language partition?

> > The move from "Fa" to "Ex(Zx&Fx)" (where Z is the predicate {zasti})
> > is not a move of logic, and does not always work.
>
> And, so far as I can tell, no one has said it does -- or even
> mentioned it except you.

It is you who keeps bringing up the "real world" domain. If the predicate
{zasti} is not to play some special role, then I don't see how the "real wo=
rld"
is relevant in any of this.

> > In the restricted domain where AxZx is true (the "real world" domain),
> > the move from "Fa" to "Ex(Zx&Fx)" will work. When using such a
> > restricted domain we won't be able to refer to things that don't exist,
> > obviously, since they won't be in the domain.
>
> But here even the simple generalization does not work from intensional
> contexts "I want a unicorn" does not permit "There is a unicorn I
> want" though the first can be true in the "real world" domain and the
> (let's suppose it's this real world" is not. Yet it appears to be of
> the Fa to ExFx pattern.

The generalization from {mi djica lo pavyseljirna} to {da poi pavyseljyrna
zo'u mi djica da} is quite acceptable in any discourse that takes place in
the real world (or in any other world). Uttering a true sentence {da poi
pavyseljirna zo'u ...} in the real world in no way requires {da zasti} to b=
e
true. For an utterance to be true in the real world, there is no need that
all the referents involved exist in the real world.

> > > Showing
> > > there is a domain in which it does not work (true premises, false
> > > conclusion) is enough to show that it is not valid.
> >
> > There is no domain in which the move does not work, as far as I can see=
.
>
> One just indicated.

If the domain does not contain unicorns as a member, it is not possible
to claim that unicorns are related to me by the relationship {se djica},
and so there is nothing to move from. If the domain does contain unicorns
as a member, then the move works fine. There is no problem with unicorns
being a member of the domain of a discourse that takes place in the real
world. So you have not indicated a domain where the move would fail.

> > Every referring term contributes its referent(s) to the domain of
> > discourse. If we fail to assign a referent to a referring term, we must
> > resort to the metalinguistic {ki'a}.
> > We must step out of the discourse, as it were, and clarify the language=
,
> > because the discourse is not working as it should.
>
> I think that this is where you get it screwed up. Every referring
> term *in primary occurrence* does indeed contribute its referent (I
> suppose we are doing something like discourse analysis where the
> domain is built up as we go along). But secondary occurrences do not.

I don't think there is a need to introduce secondary occurrences
with my interpretation, but in any case surely in {mi djica lo pavyseljirna=
},
{lo pavyseljirna} is in primary occurrence.

> Unfortunately,for most secondary occurrences, there are primary
> occurrences that look on the surface just like them. In terms of that
> article you pointed to, they have both a specific and a generic
> reading -- and the generic reading does certain not point to a
> particular item but also does not guarantee any such item at all.

The generic reading does not guarantee a particular referent, I agree.
In my view, particular referents do not play any role at all in the generic
reading.

>"A
> bear did not do this" would ordinarily be taken as simply a denail of
> "A bear did this" and thre denial takes out both any specificity there
> might be in "a bear" and also the existential import about bears. It
> is just ~Db (or ~Ex(Bx & Dx).

If you take "a bear" as {su'o da poi cribe}, yes. But that is not a referri=
ng
term. For me, all unquantified sumti are referring terms.

> There is also the specific reading (I
> don't actually like these terms but they come from the article which I
> assume you have read)which \x~Dx(b) or Ex(Bx & \y~Dy(x)), which in
> either reading says that there are bears and furthermore that some
> particular one of them did not do this (though another one may have --
> consider the grade-school riddle:"I have two coins that add up to 30
> cents and one of them is not a nickel.") There are similar cases for
> most secondary occurrences (the article gives some for intensional
> direct objects and some adjectives ("imaginary"). The point is that
> the secomdary occurrences of referring expressions need not refer to
> anything in the domain -- and so do not automatically add something
> when they first occur.

If you interpret descriptions a la Russell, I can follow all that. But I
don't find that interpretation of descriptions at all compelling. For me
{lo broda} are always referring terms.

> And what they need not add is not just a
> specific thing but even the whole predicate extension: "I want a
> unicorn" adds to the domain not only not a particular unicorn but not
> unicorns at all. To think that secondary occurrences add particular
> references or even generic ones (guarantee that a certain predicate
> has a non-null extension) generates one array of either paraadoxes or
> misconstruals of ordinary -- and ordinarily understood -- sentences.

I don't think generic terms add particular tokens to the domain, if that's
what you mean by particular references. I don't find any paradoxes in
requiring all (unquantified) terms to refer.

> It is, as you note, exceedingly difficult to have a primary
> occurrence of a referring expression that fails to refer. It can
> basically only happen when we have in mind a holistic model into which
> the developing situation is to be fitted to test for truth and that
> model does not contain anything to which the expression might refer.
> We havwe then either to scra[ that background model or reject the
> referring expression (Oh, we're talking about..., I was thinking of
> ..." or "But we're not talking about ...").

Right, stepping outside the discourse for a moment and making
some metalinguistic comment about the language being used.

> It is unfortunate that
> "primary occurrence" seems always to be defined negatively ("not in
> the scope of....") and that, as investigations proceed, the list of
> things in the diairesis gets longer and longer, but the distinction
> remains basic to semantics of natural languages for all of that.

In some theory.

> > > > > We say that two things are identical when we refer to the same
> object
> > > > > using expressions that have different sense.
> > > >
> > > > Why do you say "two things" then? Can two things be one and
> > > > the same object?
> > >
> > > We tend to say there are two things when we mean there are two
> > > denoting expressions. I think I said it carefully at least once, but
> > > that is tedious and hardly anyone who is a cooperative
> > > conversationalist misunderstands the other expression.
> >
> > I agree it's easy to understand. I'm not convinced that the theory that
> > says that this way of speaking is just sloppy usage is better than the
> > theory that says that this way of speaking is perfectly justifiable
> uage.
>
> I am afraid that I can't even figure out what a literal reading of the
> sentence would be; as you point out, there can't be two things that
> are identical in the same ways as there are two of them. They can be
> two in one sense, identical in another, but that is not the issue here
> (or, if it is, then there is no issue).

Two things can be the same F and different G's, that's the only
significance of relative identity.


> > > > Have you read
> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-relative/>?
> > > >
> > > Yeah. It didn't help since you seem to have reproduced its way of
> > > talking fairly accurately and it is that way of talking that does not
> > > make sense.
> >
> > To me it makes pretty good sense. It is in fact the only account of
> > the "paradoxes of identity" that I have found satisfying. Is there any
> > particular part that does not make sense to you?
>
> Well, the notion that there are two kinds of identity, rahter tha
> comparisons between two different things is a good starting point.
> This seems simply a misuse of language and to fly in the face of what
> we actually do.

That we actually do often say things like "two identical things" is, I hope=
,
patently true, so it certainly does not fly in the face of what we do.
That "two identical things" is a misuse of language requires a theory
that obviously results in lots of misuses of language in ordinary
speech.


> > so as to make clear to Superman/Clark that his "me" must be interpreted
> > in accordance with his current guise.
>
> Indeed so, And your point would be?

That there is no ultimate Superman/Clark token independent of context.

> We are now comparing Superman
> slices with Clark slices and finding them not identical, whereas, if
> we compare the wholes from which the slices are cut, they are
> identical. But there is only one sense of identity here.

Right. But then we have to be careful with the claim
{la superman du la klark kent}. It is very often false. And if we can
see that that claim is false, there is no failure of substitution of
co-referring terms since we don't have co-referring terms to begin
with.


> > There is
> > already the predicate {mintu} which is pretty much what relative
> > identity is.
>
> Well, then we need something for absolute identity.

{du} should be reserved for that.

> And, note, we
> need the stuff for sense-reference anyhow, in some form or other.
> And, if we do other things right, the "problems" that the
> two-identities theory is meant to solve won't arise.

I'm not convinced we need any grammatical marker for sense. So far,
all can be done with simple reference.

mu'o mi'e xorxes


=20
Yahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/jboske/

<*> Your email settings:
    Individual Email | Traditional

<*> To change settings online go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/jboske/join
    (Yahoo! ID required)

<*> To change settings via email:
    mailto:[email protected]=20
    mailto:[email protected]

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    [email protected]

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
=20