Re: How to use `deep inference'?
Alessio Guglielmi <Alessio.Guglielmi-r/[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.science.mathematics.frogs |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <p06100504bcb2c52ae90f@[193.158.165.86]> |
Lutz, I agree with all the rest, but I think I disagree when you say that we still have to understand the `clever way' in which CoS rules are formed. I don't think there's still much to be understood (and anyway it wouldn't necessarily be our job to do so), because all what will come next will be non-core, meaning: proper axioms of mathematical theories, induction, etc. In other words, the non-core will mostly remain wild, because it depends on nature more than on the language we use for speaking of nature, which is instead very civilised. We are just providing a syntactic formalism: this, by itself, cannot take into account and make possible to `understand' the infinite variety of possible inference rules. There's no way we can find a unified treatment for all the axioms used in the various mathematical theories. I think the right perspective of what we are doing is as follows. There is a common source of tens of logics used today, which basically is boolean algebra. (By the way, this is also true for linear logic.) It happened that the deductive systems designed for it depended excessively on the syntax adopted for representing formulas, which is made of trees. In principle, there should be no relation between `working with a boolean algebra' and `making inductions on trees', but in practice one such connection was found, because of convenience, historical accidents, etc. So we have natural deduction and the sequent calculus. Now we got more sophisticated and we see that these formalisms have severe shortcomings, and what we are doing (in my opinion, ca va sans dire) is nothing else than using a much better syntax in order to do justice to the boolean logical core we are dealing with. The regularities we are observing are, in my opinion, generated by the common origin of all the logics. The unique rule of subatomic proof theory will never be able to take care of induction, for example, just of the purely logical component of the various logics. All that said, I do think that `deep inference' is a very good short description of what we are doing. It's true that other formalisms (different than CoS, `A' and `B') have some flavour of deep inference, but they only have just a bit, because ultimately they still work by cutting branches out of trees. Some of them, like the display calculus, first cut branches and then glue them back in, but still... -Alessio