Re: How to use `deep inference'?
Alessio Guglielmi <Alessio.Guglielmi-r/[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.science.mathematics.frogs |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <p06100507bcb3d8409708@[62.227.186.50]> |
At 11:06 AM +0200 4/27/04, Lutz Strassburger wrote:
>On Monday 26 April 2004 18:16, Alessio Guglielmi wrote:
>>I agree only to a very, very limited extent, let's say I disagree:
>>for example, in the full system of linear logic, including
>>exponentials, there is only one rule that escapes unified
>>understanding, z_, all the others fit the one-rule-for-all scheme.
>
>But this is exactly the rule that deals with the exponentials. The
>others that have exponentials in it are in fact rules for the
>additives (they take care of the additive contraction).
Ha!, like in Cronenberg's `ExistenZ': this exponential only exists on
the most pathetic level of reality.
I mean, you're right from your point of view, but your point of view
is morally wrong!
You're considering linear logic as its *presentation* in the sequent
calculus, and so you say: `in order to cope with *the way sequent
calculus operates on additive contexts* (aka sort of a contraction)
then I use exponentials, but I am just doing the additive
context/contraction'.
My point of view is that linear logic exists independently of its
badly flawed sequent calculus presentation, and that your
presentation of it independently does the trick of deducing for it by
using its connectives and modalities. I don't even want to know any
more what is `additive', `multiplicative', etc., and if I see an
exponential in an inference rule, well, for me that's just an
exponential.
In other words, suppose you show me your system and a semantics for
linear logic, and nothing else. You can easily convince me that you
do have linear logic, but how much work will you need for convincing
me that, for example, the rule
`[?R,?T]'
---------
?`[R,T]'
is about a contraction?? (Without installing a bioport in my spine, I mean.)
>>In predicate logic, only instantiation, n_, falls outside of the
>>scheme, but then, this is the minimum that has to be expected.
>
>Well, it is the only rule that actually does something to the
>quantifiers. The others are either core rules or take care of
>contraction. This is what I meant. We have a unified scheme for the
>core and for the "taking-care-of-contraction-and-weakening"-non-core.
Same as above (with the difference that the sequent calculus
presentation of classical logic is not badly flawed). Is
[Ex.R,Ex.T]
-----------
Ex.[R,T]
about a contraction??
>Of course we have this regularity in the shape of the rules,
>unifying all these different logics. But we still do not know where
>this "method in the madness" comes from. I believe that there is a
>deep reason for this, which is waiting for its discovery.
I might agree. Certainly, the subatomic thing will not tell us the
reason. The only thing it will tell us, if I ever manage to make it
work, is that in order to observe this total regularity one has to
resort to a mysterious non-commutative world. It looks more like a
puzzle than an explanation to me, but I would still be very happy if
it worked just at the `phenomenological' level.
-Alessio