Re: Light logics vs. CoS
Alessio Guglielmi <Alessio.Guglielmi-r/[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.science.mathematics.frogs |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
> > Did you try the naive deep versions of these rules, i.e.:
>>
>> S[R,T] S[R]
>> -------- -----
>> S[?R,!T] S[!R]
>>
>
>They were my first guess. Unfortunately, they are definately more
>powerful than the non-deep ones. For example, consider the
>sequent |- a,!(a^\bot). It cannot be proved in LAL
>(nor in MELL?), but you can prove it using the second
>naive deep rule (correct me if I am wrong):
>
> 1
> -----------
> [a,[a^\bot]]
> -------------
> [a,[!(a^\bot)]]
What about
S{![R,T]}
----------- ,
S{![!R,?T]}
together with !1 = 1, of course?
I didn't check at all, but my guess is about having a CoS system that
proves !R iff LAL proves R.
>I have another question to all the Frogs here: did you
>try to formulate the approximation theorem for linear
>logic (see Troelstra's Lectures on Linear Logic) in
>the framework of CoS? Obviously, it continues to hold
>(it talks about provability). My guess, however, is
>the following: using cut atomicity, you can make it
>working on proofs rather than formulae...
I know the approximation theorem but still don't understand what you
mean. In approximation, you substitute modalities with certain
non-modal formulas, and the theorem tells you that you can always do
it. What has this to do with proofs, and why may atomic cuts be
relevant?
-Alessio