Re: Rationalizing is something we *all* do

On Sat, Nov 3, 2012 at 6:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:02, Rami Rustom wrote:
>
>> On Nov 1, 2012 1:10 PM, "Bruno Marchal" <[email protected]> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On 31 Oct 2012, at 16:07, Rami Rustom wrote:
>> >
>> > > On Oct 28, 2012 2:43 PM, "Bruno Marchal" <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > > Why would it be off limits from being discovered?
>> > >
>> > There is no algorithm to decode what a program can do, from its code
>> > (Rice theorem). The set of programs doing a particular task is not
>> > recursive. With neural nets, it is worst, as the information can be
>> > distributed in tiny difference of excitation level of billions of
>> > neurons.
>>
>> When speaking of software, one does not need to speak of hardware. The
>> hardware doesn't affect the software, unless the hardware gets
>> damaged. Agreed?
>>
> Yes. But Rice theorem concerns both software, and possible hardware.

Are you saying someone can't *guess* what one's subconscious ideas are?


>
>
>>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > >
>> > > > This can be contradicted in the mechanist theory + classical
>> > > > theory of knowledge: it shows that the ideally arithmetically correct
>> > > > machine can never know "who she is", and in that theory the guts
>> > > > feeling originates from the "who" we are.
>> > >
>> > > I don't know what the "who somebody is" means nor how that is relevant
>> > > to this discussion.
>> > >
>> > If we are machine, we cannot know which machine we are. We can only
>> > bet on some level of description, in case we accept a digital brain
>> > prosthesis, for example. Even if the guess is correct, we still cannot
>> > recognize the genuine program which constitutes our identity. The
>> > relevance of this is that for the gut feelings, we might be unable to
>> > decide if some idea is a prejudice of the parents, or of the mammals,
>> > or of all universal machines. In the mater case, we can't change it
>> > without loosing consistency or soundness.
>>
>> I still don't know what that means nor why its relevant to our
>> discussion. Consistency of what? Soundness of what?
>>
> Of us, assuming we are machine. All machine looking inward discover
> that they have an irrational part, in the sense that their knowledge
> grows bigger than what they can prove.

That interesting. I never thought of that. As the mind is discovering
its subconscious ideas (making them conscious), his own subconscious
ideas are expanding (in number) faster than he can discover them. In
which case one cannot discover *all* his subconscious ideas.


> That is also why the will
> change, in a way that they cannot predict.

By will, I guess you mean wants. Wants are like psychological forces.
They result from one's values. One's values *causes* one's wants. So I
can predict, that if a person changes what he values, then his wants
will change. I can predict, that if a person values X, then he wants
X. I can predict, that if a person currently values X, and that if I
persuade him that X is bad, then he will no longer value X, and he'll
won't want X anymore.

Now this doesn't mean that a person who wants X, will do X. He could
have conflicting wants. He could want X and Y, while X and Y are
conflicting. So he might choose to do nothing for now. Or he might
choose X and thus coerce himself, or choose Y and thus coerce himself.


>
>
>
>>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > >
>> > > > Without going that far in
>> > > > the theory, I doubt we can be conscious of all the subconscious
>> > > > processing. A machine can refer to itself integrally, but not to its
>> > > > integral behavior.
>> > >
>> > > I don't understand your idea that some subconscious ideas are off
>> > > limits.
>> > >
>> > Intuitively it seems obvious, if only because our brain have plausibly
>> > a very long complex history, and nature does not make explicit
>> > programs with readable comment.
>>
>> You are using the theory of the mind that says that certain brain
>> parts cause certain mind parts. But that theory has been refuted by
>> DD. That refutes evolutionary biology (which is the field you're
>> referring to).
>>
> Where did I talk on brain parts? The conscious mind is not even
> related to the brain, which in fine is a construct of the mind.

So then you mean that we have hardcoded software and that the
hardcoding evolved over millions of years.


>
>>
>> What you're saying is that some of our software is hardcoded. And that
>> hardcoding evolved over millions of years. But, humans don't have any
>> hardcoding. Its all softcoded. All of it changes.
>>
> This does not make sense for me (despite comp implies non materialism,
> but only globally). At some level the brain changes itself, but
> through the material behavior of neurons. Then some part of the brain
> are more hardcoded than others, like the cerebral stem, the limbic
> system. But even the cortical system has an hard coded part, and the
> change of itself will be hard changes.

Why do you think any of the human brain parts that emerge from it the
mind, is hardcoded?


>
>
>
>
>>
>> > Then, although machine can represent
>> > itself entirely, it can't represent its behavior entirely, almost for
>> > reason akin to the reason that nobody can see directlmy his/her own
>> > back. there are blind spot in self-reference, for logical reasons.
>>
>> Do you agree that we can guess about them?
>>
> About some of them, yes. I doubt we can guess all of them.

We can guess all of them. It doesn't mean we'll guess right.


>
>
>>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > >
>> > > Consider this. Decades from now we create the first AGI. It programs
>> > > its own code. No?
>> > >
>> > This is ambiguous. Programs can easily modify, even completely their
>> > own code, but it cannot create one from nihilo.
>>
>> Whats nihilo?
>>
> Nothing. You need the program to start with, and some contexts.

I'm not saying that the human mind creates its code from nothing. I'm
saying that the human mind is inborn with some softcode, and zero
hardcoding.


>
>
>
>>
>> > There is always
>> > another universal program or reality needed, even if it is the
>> > arithmetical reality, or physical reality, which are highly
>> > undecidable set (probably in the first case, plausibly in the second
>> > case).
>> > It is like our wanting. We have few control about what we want,
>>
>> False. Our wants depend on our values. We have control over our
>> values. Our values are ideas. We guess ideas and criticism them.
>> Sometimes we're doing this with our value-type ideas. And when we make
>> changes to our values, we've changed our wants.
>>
> I have to pee now. Oh, I will change that, so I can continue the talk.

Or you could pee now and continue later.


> I want to be happy? Oh, I will change that, life will be so much
> simpler.

That is so vague that I think no one could change a value using that idea.


> I am afraid to die. Oh I will change that, so that I can kill myself
> in peace.

You'd have to address the reasons for your fear. That means
discovering one's subconscious ideas that are causing the emotion of
fear. Once those are discovered and refuted, the fear emotion will
cease.


> ...
> I am not sure that our values are only ideas. That seems a bit too
> much constructivist for my appreciation of the comp hypothesis.

What else could they be?


>
>
>>
>> > nor do
>> > we have control on the way events can hurt us.
>>
>> Physical hurt or mental hurt? We have a lot of control over mental
>> hurt.
>>
> Hurt is always mental. "physical hurt" is a manner of speaking, of
> mental hurt related to low level sensation coming from the periperical
> (hardcoded too) nervous system (including glial cells).
>
>
>
>> Mental hurt is TCS-coercion. TCS-coercion occurs when someone is
>> acting on a theory while another conflicting theory is active in his
>> mind. An example of TCS-coercion is someone gets offended when someone
>> else says a racial slur to him. So the one who gets hurt doesn't want
>> to be called by that racial slur but it happened. Do you think he has
>> no control over getting hurt by this?
>>
> Here he has control. But that's a special case. And then he has
> control but he need some education, so even if that is in principle
> controllable, most of the time in "real-life" he will not.

No. You're saying that he needs *ideas* in order to not feel bad. But
you're not talking about what caused the bad feeling.

I'm saying that he first learned bad ideas, which are causing him to
feel bad AND that he needs to refute those ideas in order to not feel
bad.

-- Rami Rustom
http://ramirustom.blogspot.com