Re: Solidity is degree of justification (was: Mirror neurons at autopsy)

On Sun, Dec 23, 2012 at 11:13 AM, David Deutsch <david.deutsch-LR/[email protected]> wrote:
> In [email protected], Elliot Temple <curi@...> wrote:
>
>> On Dec 18, 2012, at 2:53 PM, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@...> wrote:
>>
>>> (Well, I say we know this -- but that explanation is not nearly as solid as the ones above.
>>
>> This is justificationism.
>
> I don't think it's a good idea to extend the meaning of the term 'justificationism' in this way, to include claims that more is known about one subject than another. (A.k.a. that we have better explanations of one issue than another, a.k.a. that the best theories about one issue are harder to vary than those in another, a.k.a. more solid than those in another -- the metaphor being that the shape of a solid is harder to vary than that of a liquid.)
>
> The reason it isn't a good idea is that it would classify a whole class of true statements under the same heading as an important (and unrelated) philosophical error, the one that is currently called 'justificationism', namely that knowledge is that which can be justified as true, or likely to be true, etc.
>
> In the quoted post, the two issues about which I made that comparison were (1) whether there must be an inborn translation system in animals capable of copying but not of creativity; and (2) whether the 'mirror neurons' that have been discovered are part of that system. I was saying that I think the best explanations currently known of the respective issues imply that both answers are yes, but that the explanations of the former issue are better than those of the latter.



How do you determine which explanations are better than which?

My answer would be criticism and nothing else. (Non-refuted ideas are
better than refuted ideas.) But criticism does not give ideas
weightings of how good they are.

-- 
Elliot Temple
http://curi.us/