Re: Solidity is degree of justification (was: Mirror neurons at autopsy)

On 26 Dec 2012, at 19:30, David Deutsch <david.deutsch-LR/[email protected]> wrote:

> On 26 Dec 2012, at 19:23, Alan Forrester <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
>> On 26 Dec 2012, at 13:42, David Deutsch <david.deutsch-LR/[email protected]> wrote:
>> 
>>> On 26 Dec 2012, at 04:08, therealjoshjordan <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> --- In [email protected], David Deutsch <david.deutsch@...> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> In [email protected], Elliot Temple <curi@> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2012, at 2:53 PM, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> (Well, I say we know this -- but that explanation is not nearly as solid as the ones above.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> This is justificationism.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I don't think it's a good idea to extend the meaning of the term 'justificationism' in this way, to include claims that more is known about one subject than another. 
>>>> 
>>>> In chapter 15 of Boi (p 352), David wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> "[...] rational thinking does not consist of weighing the justifications of rival theories, but of using conjecture and criticism to seek the best explanation [...]" 
>>>> 
>>>> Leaving aside for now the proper definition of the term "justificationism", how is judging theories by degrees of solidity any different from "weighing the justifications of rival theories"?
>>> 
>>> For instance, in the case where this 'judging' is about whether our best explanation about one issue is better than our best explanation about another issue, those two explanations are not rival theories, and hence the claim has nothing to do with weighing the justifications of rival theories.
>> 
>> No judgements of this kind are necessary.If two theories have no problems for which they both have implications then no comparison between them is necessary. If they do both have implications for the same problem then the comparison is done with respect to the issue for which they both have implications. This view of solidity still seems to be justificationist.
> 
> Can they be true or false? That is to say, do they have meanings?


The following situation could happen:

(1) Theory 1 could be compatible with explanation 1 of problem 1 and theory 2 could be compatible with explanation 2 of problem 2. 
(2) Theories 1 and 2 both have implications for problem 3 that makes comparison between theories 1 and 2 possible. 
(3) If theory 1 was refuted and theory 2 was not, then that would be a refutation of explanation 1 as well. 
(4) That refutation would be a result of refuting theory 1 with problem 3.

Do you have this in mind or something else?

Alan