Justificationism

I don't understand this debate about Deutsch being a justificationist.
Doesn't Deutsch openly declare himself in favor of justificationism in
The Fabric of Reality? Here are some quotes:

> Most contemporary philosophers are crypto-inductivists. What makes matters worse is that (like many scientists) they grossly underrate the role of explanation in the scientific process. So do most Popperian anti-inductivists, who are thereby led to deny that there is any such thing as justification (even tentative justification). This opens up a new explanatory gap in their scheme of things.

In this passage, Deutsch says rejecting all justification creates an
explanatory gap in the thinking of Popperian anti-inductivists.

> I believe that we can justify our expectation that the Floater would be killed. The justification (always tentative, of course) comes from the explanations provided by the relevant scientific theories. To the extent that those explanations are good, it is rationally justified to rely on the predictions of corresponding theories.

An additional point in this passage is that it mixes up the difference
between justifying an idea and justifying a course of action. First it
talks about "justify our expectation". Then "the justification". But
then "it is rationally justified to rely on". An expectation is an
idea, that first sentence is about justifying an idea. Relying is an
action, the third sentence is about justifying an action. The middle
sentence doesn't specify either way.

The Popperian anti-inductivists who reject all justification reject
all justification *of ideas*, but this does not necessarily apply to
other meanings of the word. Their position on justification is about
epistemology, not actions.

> CRYPTO-INDUCTIVIST: Very interesting. I now understand the role of a theory's refuted rivals in the justification of its predictions.

This one is justification of ideas (predictions).

> DAVID: No. Our justification does not depend on whether a particular anomaly happens in the past. It has to do with whether there is an explanation for the existence of that anomaly.

and

> But if I were wrong about that, indeed even if we were entirely unable to explain this remarkable property of reality, that would not detract one jot from the justification of any scientific theory. For it would not make the explanations in such a theory one jot worse.

In The Fabric of Reality, Deutsch proposed explanation as the new
criterion of justification. It's his replacement for induction.

> An analogous gap exists in Popperian epistemology. Its critics wonder why the scientific method works, or what justifies our reliance on the best scientific theories. [...] For Popperians to reply that there is no such thing as justification, or that it is never rational to rely on theories, is to provide no explanation.

Again, Deutsch presents himself as a critic of Popperian epistemology,
and as intentionally rejecting the Popperian position on
justification.