Re: Clarification about mirror neurons
a b <[email protected]> Sat, 5 Jan 2013 09:54:49 +0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.science.physics.fabric-of-reality |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAKYbZ8txkhzXV=crurVwEPcoxwuLCSQFPGu2pJ3jbyBOY+3xnA@mail.gmail.com> |
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 9:27 PM, Alan Forrester <alanmichaelforrester-gM/[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > On 2 Jan 2013, at 21:17, David Deutsch david.deutsch-LR/[email protected]> wrote: > > >> In animals, the neurons used to do imitation may not change much since > >> the knowledge in the animal's brain is coded for by genes and the animal > >> creates no new knowledge. So then looking for neurons that go off when an > >> animal does something and when it recognises another animal doing the same > >> thing, mirror neurons, may provide a way of testing ideas about mirror > >> algorithms. Having a term for that idea makes some sense and that seems to > >> be David's position in BoI. > > > > One reason I think it's vital to take that position is that the > > commonsense theory of how animals, especially apes, can imitate complex > > actions is that they do it by understanding what the actions are for -- i.e. > > the same way that humans do it. Indeed, that misconception was one of the > > motivations for biologists to search for mirror neurons in the first place. > > > > It is an attractive misconception because copying even a simple action > > does indeed require a large amount of knowledge to be present in the copying > > animal. So the traditional misconception that knowledge requires a knowing > > subject then leads directly to the conclusion that an ape must be a knowing > > subject. > > > > To make the arguments in BoI about what humans are and how they evolved, > > one must therefore refute those misconceptions. One thing I referred to for > > that purpose was the excellent research of Richard Byrne, which showed that > > apes have no idea of the purpose of their complex meme-encoded actions, > > which are not directly copied but are composed of several copied actions put > > together in coordinated ways. And he showed how those composite actions are > > learned. But that learning process requires apes to be able to recognise and > > copy the individual actions, and Byrne's research does not tell us how they > > do that because it happens inside the ape's brain. So it is vital to explain > > how that is possible. > > > > The answer, in short, is that the necessary knowledge is encoded in the > > ape's genes, and implemented in a special-purpose computational system in > > its brain, which translates from sensory to motor signals. But only a > > particular class of actions, fixed once and for all in the animal's genome, > > can be copied using that system. > > > > Would it not have been perverse, given that it was essential to argue > > that such a system must exist in the brains of apes, for BoI not to mention > > that a plausible candidate for that system has recently been discovered? Or > > not to call that system by its conventional and perfectly reasonable name, > > namely mirror neurons? > > Yes. It is important to explain how animals can imitate without doing > human level stuff and mirror neurons may help solve that problem. > > Some people might be concerned that the mirror neuron idea might be used > as a scientistic excuse for coercive policies. A coercive person might say > that an autistic child has faulty mirror neurons and to fix that we have to > force him to take medication or follow a routine or whatever. However, this > problem only makes it more urgent the task of explaining mirror neurons > properly, rather than abandoning an idea with some good features to coercive > quacks. > > Alan > What about if quacks say a specialized region for language is faulty? These are acknowledged in BoI [reposting due to earlier format problems]