Re: Clarification about mirror neurons

On Wed, Jan 9, 2013 at 2:02 PM, a b <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 12:44 PM, Alan Forrester
> <alanmichaelforrester-gM/[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5 Jan 2013, at 09:54, a b [email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> > On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 9:27 PM, Alan Forrester
>> > alanmichaelforrester-gM/[email protected]> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 2 Jan 2013, at 21:17, David Deutsch david.deutsch-LR/[email protected]> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>>> In animals, the neurons used to do imitation may not change much
>> >>>> since
>> >>>> the knowledge in the animal's brain is coded for by genes and the
>> >>>> animal
>> >>>> creates no new knowledge. So then looking for neurons that go off
>> >>>> when an
>> >>>> animal does something and when it recognises another animal doing the
>> >>>> same
>> >>>> thing, mirror neurons, may provide a way of testing ideas about
>> >>>> mirror
>> >>>> algorithms. Having a term for that idea makes some sense and that
>> >>>> seems to
>> >>>> be David's position in BoI.
>> >>>
>> >>> One reason I think it's vital to take that position is that the
>> >>> commonsense theory of how animals, especially apes, can imitate
>> >>> complex
>> >>> actions is that they do it by understanding what the actions are for
>> >>> -- i.e.
>> >>> the same way that humans do it. Indeed, that misconception was one of
>> >>> the
>> >>> motivations for biologists to search for mirror neurons in the first
>> >>> place.
>> >>>
>> >>> It is an attractive misconception because copying even a simple action
>> >>> does indeed require a large amount of knowledge to be present in the
>> >>> copying
>> >>> animal. So the traditional misconception that knowledge requires a
>> >>> knowing
>> >>> subject then leads directly to the conclusion that an ape must be a
>> >>> knowing
>> >>> subject.
>> >>>
>> >>> To make the arguments in BoI about what humans are and how they
>> >>> evolved,
>> >>> one must therefore refute those misconceptions. One thing I referred
>> >>> to for
>> >>> that purpose was the excellent research of Richard Byrne, which showed
>> >>> that
>> >>> apes have no idea of the purpose of their complex meme-encoded
>> >>> actions,
>> >>> which are not directly copied but are composed of several copied
>> >>> actions put
>> >>> together in coordinated ways. And he showed how those composite
>> >>> actions are
>> >>> learned. But that learning process requires apes to be able to
>> >>> recognise and
>> >>> copy the individual actions, and Byrne's research does not tell us how
>> >>> they
>> >>> do that because it happens inside the ape's brain. So it is vital to
>> >>> explain
>> >>> how that is possible.
>> >>>
>> >>> The answer, in short, is that the necessary knowledge is encoded in
>> >>> the
>> >>> ape's genes, and implemented in a special-purpose computational system
>> >>> in
>> >>> its brain, which translates from sensory to motor signals. But only a
>> >>> particular class of actions, fixed once and for all in the animal's
>> >>> genome,
>> >>> can be copied using that system.
>> >>>
>> >>> Would it not have been perverse, given that it was essential to argue
>> >>> that such a system must exist in the brains of apes, for BoI not to
>> >>> mention
>> >>> that a plausible candidate for that system has recently been
>> >>> discovered? Or
>> >>> not to call that system by its conventional and perfectly reasonable
>> >>> name,
>> >>> namely mirror neurons?
>> >>
>> >> Yes. It is important to explain how animals can imitate without doing
>> >> human level stuff and mirror neurons may help solve that problem.
>> >>
>> >> Some people might be concerned that the mirror neuron idea might be
>> >> used
>> >> as a scientistic excuse for coercive policies. A coercive person might
>> >> say
>> >> that an autistic child has faulty mirror neurons and to fix that we
>> >> have to
>> >> force him to take medication or follow a routine or whatever. However,
>> >> this
>> >> problem only makes it more urgent the task of explaining mirror neurons
>> >> properly, rather than abandoning an idea with some good features to
>> >> coercive
>> >> quacks.
>> >>
>> >> Alan
>> >
>> > What about if quacks say a specialized region for language is faulty?
>> > These are acknowledged in BoI
>>
>> If a doctor discovers that in one of his patients a specialised region in
>> the brain devoted to language has some problem, then there several relevant
>> issues:
>>
>> (1) If the patient can express preferences, then the doctor should ask him
>> for consent for treatments. The idea that the patient's family or friends
>> wanted the patient to be coerced does not legitimise coercion, nor does the
>> idea that the doctor doesn't like the patient.
>>
>> (2) Suppose the patient can't communicate any preferences as a result of
>> this damage. If this is the case, then the doctor should treat the patient
>> in such a way as to get him back to being healthy and able to express
>> preferences.
>>
>> (3) Suppose the patient uses physical force or fraud on the doctor or
>> makes a credible threat to do so. The doctor should defend himself and seek
>> prosecution if he thinks it is right to do so. It is possible that a patient
>> could misinterpret something the doctor does as an attempt to use force or
>> something like that and he might attack the doctor for this perceived
>> violation. Such misunderstandings may be settled without legal action. It is
>> important to be clear that while the doctor is defending himself, the
>> patient and doctor have an adversarial relationship and the doctor is not
>> acting to help the patient.
>>
>> (4) If the patient has a fit and as a result of this fit the doctor is
>> injured, then the doctor should not attack the patient. It would be
>> reasonable to take steps to prevent himself and others from being further
>> injured.
>>
>> Alan
>>
>
> This is fine. This is a candidate set of guidelines for good philosphy
> procedure.
>
> But what I'm looking for is the distinctiveness between special areas
> for language and special areas for enhancing certain types of commonly
> used visualization...which is basically what 'mirror neurons' seem to
> be about.
>
> The other thing I'm looking for is precisely what or where the reality
> or not of such areas contradict or cause problems for the philosophy.
>
> I've read the better explanation you say popperians already have, but
> a lot of assumptions go into that, that I don't think hold water. I'll
> list a couple.
>
> - You seem to be assuming that if apes used a 'mirror neuron' system
> for some rather hard coded processes, that with evolution into humans
> that function become redundant AND SO mirror neuron functionality fell
> by the wayside. But that isn't necessarily what happens when traits
> become redundant in their old role. What might actually happen is the
> trait finds a new way to be useful to other functions. Given the
> evolution into humans increased brain complexity rather a lot, it is
> quite possible 'mirror neuron' functionality dramatically increased
> its useful to a range of different processes.
>
> - Your 'better explanation' assumes what the problem was to be solved.
> But what if that was just one part of a bigger problem that needed to
> be solved? That could change everything and leave your better
> explanation inadequate. For example. What if the 'mirror function' is
> referenced by multiple processes...that sometimes need to happen
> simultaneously? Or what if some of those processes need to reference
> the mirror-function multiply, or what if the mirror-function needs to
> develop in real-time potentially in parallel to many other processes,
> some, all or none of which may need to reference that mirror function?
> These would all be good reasons for a process to get abstracted away
> into a specialized area.
>
> It's worth noting that specialized areas would need this sort of
> reason to have become specialized in the first place, and a corollary
> of that is that specialized regions probably get referenced by other
> processes when if those processes (which may be rational thoughts)
> fire up. Which means no processes may reference the specialized
> region, in which case it may just form part of the background
> perception or it may wait awhile and shut down again.
>
> - Finally, there doesn't seem to be any reason why a 'mirror function'
> wouldn't have gone on to be referenced by language related processes.
> For example, linking body language into the process of better guessing
> what the person might be trying to say. Or perhaps for working out
> what they are saying when they can't hear them properly..maybe when a
> long way off. It's well known that if someone hears, say, "take me to
> Bale Street' at the same time as looking at someone's lips saying
> "take me to vale street" that they will actually hear the word Vale.
> So language already links into body language in deep ways that
> actually change what our brain's  decide that they hear.
>
> It's important to point out something else about a 'special region
> for....' in the brain. The special region may be one place doing one
> thing. But the 'for...' part is determined by the process that
> references that special region. A 'Special region...for language' may
> or may not be exclusively for language. In fact we know of some
> special regions for language that aren't exclusively for language.
> Mutations in one such has becme the leading candidate for explaining
> conditions like Dylexia. The region in question distinguishes between
> similar sounds by identifying subtle differences.
>
> Which as an aside raises ANOTHER question. Does Deutsch's acceptance
> of special brain regions for langauge, mean that he accepts certain
> conditions linked to language-related impairments, are plausible and
> may have a genetic basis? Which leaves the position on mental illness
> /mental conditions....where? Autism like conditions are out, but
> Dyslexia type are in? Where are we?
>
> Back to the main line of reasoning.  Look......the situation we are in
> is that 'mirror functionality' could in some contexts actually BE
> specialized services to languages. So it's very hard to see that the
> distinctions you and Deutsch are making hold much water under
> reasonable scrutiny. It all seems to rely on a bunch of underlying
> assumptions ....that don't kick very well with some very boilerplate
> evolutionary concepts about where special regions might come from, how
> they might get referenced and be useful to other processes, and what a
> 'specialized region' FOR something necessarily is (i.e. does it
> necessary have to be exclusively for language...what about for musical
> ability?)
>
> A lot of problems I am seeing. A lot of them pretty straight off the
> bat for just accepting those specialized language regions in the first
> place.
>
> It looks to me like Deutsch and you and others just don't see the
> value in thinking through the consequencs of delving into the domain
> of physical brain architecture and actually introducing concepts like
> 'specialized regions for language'.
>
> I mean....straight off the bat....does this mean language impairment
> related conditions like Dyslexia are now deemed good-philosophy
> non-scientism conditions? Or not? And if not, why not?

Just in case that was too long, here are a couple of the highlights

- Does accepting specialized regions for language imply accepting
condition s related to language impairment (like dyslexia) are
possibly legitimate? In which case is it now that autism-like
conditions are scientism but dyslexia-like conditions aren't? If not,
why not?

- Mirror-Neuron regions could be referenced by language related
processes, in which case they would actually be specialized areas for
language in those contexts (likewise there are specialized areas for
language that may be referenced by non-language processes, say
relating to Music).

- So...where are we? If mirror-neuron regions are referenced by
language-related processes, and Deutsch already accepts specialized
regions for language....