Reality of Abstractions

By far Reality of Abstractions is my favourite BoI chapter, particularly
Deutsch's treatment of the layering or levels of abstractions as when
interrelated.

Purely for  their pertenance to what I will be wanting to say (i.e. why
this post ) I illustrate some strands Deutsch said or I picked up maybe
mistakenly

- that in some sense, different manifestations of the same explanation
(in terms of explaining the same thing) can exist on different layers.

- Apparent paradoxes resolved by layering in which explanations are
simultaneously the same yet different.

- Speculative / personal-intuition of what means the whole 'stack' or
'spectrum' of  layers or levels of some interrelated thing

------as the true or complete or objective form of an explanation of
some thing

------all the properties described or inherent in the levels and
relations between them

----- -e.g. commonalities, regularities, upward/downward inheritences,
emergences, convergences, divergences)

[Note: just to say again that all the above essentially for illustrative
purposes....to help you recall and visualize Deutsch's arguments in that
chapter, faithful to your not my level of understanding]

AND NOW MY BUILD UP QUESTIONS.

Q1: Is the extent the objective existence of an explanation on or across
objectively real layers or levels (of reality)  dependent/proportionate
with the extent, depth and reach overwhich it is an explanation of
objective reality?

Q1: Does all of this apply to philosophical explanations? Does the
PopperDeutsch philosophy exist on objectively real layers of abstraction
to the exist the philosophy 'touches' (describes, is, navigates,
reflects, etc) on objective[ly true] reality? Both in its whole and in
its parts?

LEADING TO MY ULTIMATE QUESTION:

If a component of the Deutsch Philosophy, say regarding Foundations or
the Conjecture or Refutation (or as a pair), can exist on multiple
objectively real levels, and if each level can differently manifest that
same explanation, then does its significance/importance/application to
the 'human condition' also apply differently by level?

If that is so, doesn't that mean that:

- the level of abstraction that poppper applied the philosophy he had
corrected, was one or a subset of a larger potential set, thus a choice
requiring its own explanation. Unless....

- popper analysed and reapplied the corrected philosophy at the same
level of abstraction conceived by the early pioneers of science at the
time of their attempts at philosophy of science. But then...wouldn't
that equivalence require an explaination also?