Re: 'Justified' Developments in Philosophy of Science...? are we there yet?

--- In [email protected], Bruno Marchal <marchal@...> wrote:
>
> 
> On 14 Feb 2013, at 00:45, Alan Forrester wrote:
> 
> >
> > On 13 Feb 2013, at 22:38, "JAG" jaguarnight2012@...> wrote:
> >
> > > --- In [email protected], Alan Forrester wrote:
> > >
> >
> > > Hi Alan,
> > >
> > > your post below PROVES exactly my point! and below is the respond  
> > to your great question, but let's clear the air about a few starting  
> > points:
> > >
> > > 1) Philosophy of Science is/means exactly that: PHILOSOPHY ;)
> > >
> > > "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.  
> > Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A  
> > philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy  
> > does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the  
> > clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as  
> > it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and  
> > give them sharp boundaries." -Ludwig Wittgenstein
> >
> > No philosophy is about solving philosophical problems. Philosophy  
> > does not aim solely at the logical clarification of thoughts, it's  
> > aimed at solving philosophical problems. This may require new ideas,  
> > not logical clarification of current ideas. Popper criticised  
> > Wittgenstein in "Open Society and Its Enemies" and Chapter 2 of  
> > "Conjectures and Refutations".

hmm...i think we are playing with words here, especially when you say 'solely' (and i agree to a certain degree) but Philosophy does aim at the logical clarification of thoughts and NOT just @ philosophical problems. I don't see where and why someone would disagree....
Somehow, you sound very 'opinioned' and in favor of Popper's ideas as the ultimate truth=as method, and again, while i agree and use most of his concepts, I don't think that Popper's intention was to produced some dogmatic method/philosophy.
Actually, i am using his brilliant 'refutation' concept/method to *refut* some of his own ideas. ;)

Read again maybe, and hopefully you'll see what i mean by that....

and please comment on my Piaget's quote? what do you think of that? anyone? 

> >
> > >>> sorry but i have to disagree. It's not impossible; but yes,  
> > kinda difficult. That's why if we are really good in what we do  
> > 'here' we'll find a way to justify IT.
> > >>
> > >> No. It's impossible. Knowledge can't be proven to be true since  
> > any argument that allegedly proves this has to start with premises  
> > and rules of inference that might be wrong. In addition, any alleged  
> > foundation for knowledge would be unexplained and arbitrary, so  
> > saying that an idea is a foundation is grossly irrational.
> > >>

well, ok, If knowledge can NOT be proben to be true, then all SCIENCE and all theories and methods are fraudulent! To avoid such pitfalls and that kind of irrational thinking, we need to be situation/theory-specific and then use examples to make sense ?...and be rational. 
Rational enough to see what works and wise enough to choose the next best and available solution -beyond dogmatic thinking and reasoning. I would say that some knowledge can be said to be proven true, for the time being, based on 'evidence' and other agreeable conditions, and of course until it is proven wrong...HOW ELSE? (and like that we are still in line with Popper, not bc Popper said so, but bc it works!) ;)

> >
> > > 2)Justification IN NOT impossible, rather and simply, it's  
> > CONDITIONAL! ;)
> >
> > Justification is not conditional. First, if you are taking the  
> > condition for granted then the condition is just a conjecture and so  
> > is any argument in which you use it. Second, the rules of inference  
> > of the argument are also unjustified conjectures so your argument is  
> > unjustified for that reason too.

Again, if that is valid, then it should be valid for all 'arguments' incuding Popper's idea about how a few things are 'totally unjustified and unjustifiable' -and that would imply that Hume (as quoted earlier) is correct. ;)

Furthermore, how can you claim that we can NOT take a condition for granted? That is a hasty generalization used to prove your argument here, and while true for some, not true and valid for ALL conditions. 

I think, i can see what you mean and you are right up to a point but for the wrong reasons as you stated above. :)
Please, support your idea (if you care of course), with your own words and thinking, why *justification* is not necessary and then why it can NOT be conditional. I would expect some original thinking here -beyond Popper's ideas. ;0

> 
> But the point is may be that it can still be conditionally justified.  
> Perhaps.
> I agree with Popper and Deutsch on some key points, but I disagree  
> with the wording and the vocabulary.

Exactly! and it even goes beyond that....I think that Bertrand Rusell's work could be of great help here, in this specific argument, but then we do need to have an open mind to accept certain things ;)
 
> 
> It is better to assume that knowledge is related to truth, by  
> definition. And belief are the conjecture and theories, which are  
> always falsifiable. So I can sum up Popper by saying that in science  
> there is only beliefs. But knowledge still exist, in the non  
> constructive way, because some beliefs, despite falsifiable, can be  
> true, and never actually falisfied. We can of course never know that,  
> but that's does not make it non existing, on the contrary, this can be  
> used to show that science needs some form of faith, in some reality.
> 
> Bruno
> 

True, but in some cases we CAN know for sure. Furthermore, it's not just about *faith* but some other kind of direct 'knowledge'. I won't use the words 'instictual' or 'intuitive' bc we are gonna get in another argument here, but some things/situations offer POTENTIAL insights of what could be, at least @ the conceptual level! (example: gravity, senses, hidden dimensions, etc.) and the example of Ayers last words, (at the bottom of this post)
I believe, the subject matters above belong and need the same *philosophical* inquiry and examination.
Furthermore, i beleive, we are in need of *JUSTIFICATION* in philosophy of science and method but *justification* of why we should refuse to give some when it is necessary. 
I think that Popper offered constructed criticism and stated his views, but in some instances he didn't *justified* his views/conclusion either!
and that's exactly my point here.! ;)  
 
> 
> >
> > > "There are two modes of acquiring knowledge, namely by reasoning  
> > and experience.Reasoning draws a conclusion and makes us grant the  
> > conclusion, but does not make the conclusion certain, nor does it  
> > remove doubt so that the mind may rest on the intuition of truth,  
> > unless the mind discovers it by the path of experience."
> > > -Roger Bacon
> >
> > Experience has to be interpreted and the interpretation may be  
> > wrong, so Bacon is wrong.

Again Allan, I strongly disagree. Bacon is not wrong but let's say..he is kinda incomplete and not that all-inclusive. You are right though that exeperience needs to be interpreted, and that's why in my 'model' and reasoning/approach i have to use findings and 'analogies' from cognitive psychology and other fields.

A quick answer to the 'interpetation' problem as you put it, is nothing else but Whitehead's idea that 'the process of reality becomes reality itself" and that would be good enough, and *justified* enough to solve and explain a few things -based on findings from perceptual/cognitive processes ;)


> > >>> Now, about 'legimization' and "justificatiohn":
> > >>> if we can't justify a few things, then at bets, we are fooling  
> > ourselves or we are looking for LEGIT excuses to do so and get away  
> > with it! ;)
> > >>
> > >> No. If you kid yourself that your ideas can be guaranteed true or  
> > probably true, rather than admitting that any idea you hold could be  
> > wrong, then you are fooling yourself and will spend at least some of  
> > your time engaged in an empty ritual of "justification" rather than  
> > looking for better ideas.
> > >
> > > vivid example for you: an x-ray exists ONLY as long we have an X- 
> > ray MACHINE, (and then the material to make it, and then the 'terms/ 
> > means' to read it etc)!
> > > thus, we can say that an x-ray DOES NOT exist, but only in the  
> > absence of the X-ray machine, and that's where we agree, i think,  
> > but i argue, that until we invent and posses an 'x-ray' machine  
> > (since we have the ability/capacity/vision) we can NOT really say  
> > that is not possible AT ALL -to have an x-ray; here x- 
> > ray=justification, that's what you are saying and that's exactly  
> > where i am looking for better ideas -than consuming/fooling myself,  
> > as you put it,
> >
> > We can say that it's possible to have an X-ray machine before we  
> > build one. Having an explanation as to why it should be possible to  
> > build one doesn't justify the idea that it is possible, but then nor  
> > does actually building an X-ray machine because we may be mistaken  
> > about what we have built. So you are fooling yourself.

ok, i will buy that, but what happens when we know for sure that we can be build the machine (after many trial/errors etc) and have the x-ray etc. Can you still say that we can't justify a few things? I don't think so. So, CONDIONALLY only we can say and accept and refuse a few things ;)

i think we have an entirely different approach and reasoning here. And while i think that Popper was brilliant and contributed so much, and am in agreement, still he is not that all-conclusive. Personally, I can NOT really ACCEPT that there can be NO justification. My idea of CONDITIONAL justification could solve the problem but we do need an open mind to accept a few things ;) 

Furthermore, and as pointed out above, a few things can be valid, and JUSTIFIED, CONDITIONALLY as you just did prove above! ;)


> > >>> I am kinda surpised to hear that a few things don't justification
> > >>>
> > >>> I am not here to argue about 'dogmas' but to find solutions to  
> > empirical methods/problems and conceptual issues in philosophy of  
> > science.
> > >>
> > >> You have not criticised Popper's ideas, nor have you even stated  
> > them. However, since you are interested in arguing about conceptual  
> > problems in the philosophy of science I have a question for you.  
> > What is your criticism of Popper's concept that all knowledge is  
> > created by conjecture and criticism and is totally unjustified and  
> > unjustifiable?

My original comment/question was about 'justification'. I didn't use Popper's ideas only, but am not here to attack his ideas either. Quite the contrary, and as a free thinker, i think i should express my concerns and questions about a few things without the fear or the need to state certain things according to Poppers terms ONLY, and in agreement with his terms, ONLY ;)
That would forfeit both the motive and the goal here.
Somehow, i feel that you *force* me, and my question/inquiry, to that specific direction and i think that's kinda....unacceptable in personal and philosophical terms! so, thanks but no thanks! :(
 but still very challenging! thanks! :) 


> > > As of Popper's concept "that all knowledge is created by  
> > conjecture and criticism and is totally unjustified and  
> > unjustifiable", i would argue that since conjecture and criticism  
> > are the ONLY given means of investigations, at the same time they  
> > are ALSO the means for justification (conditionally and having  
> > meaning based on those conditions). It's that SIMPLE! i didn't state  
> > anything bc simply, i answered to your suggestion to read his work.  
> > if you want i will be more precice later!
> >
> > Conjecture and criticism are not a means of justification as you  
> > have explained it above.
> >
> > Alan
> > 
> 

Allan, yes, as i CONDIOTIONALLY explained it above. ;) 

To illustrate, think and please relate the argument above, to Ayer's last words, after his near death experience:
"What I saw when I was dead....slightly weakened my conviction that my genuine death ... will be the end of me, though I continue to hope that it will be."

then he revised it and said:

"what I should have said is that my experiences have weakened, not my belief that there is no life after death, but my inflexible attitude towards that belief"

Now, use the above, as an example of how 'Conjecture and Criticism' could justify epistemeologically certain truths -in this case, not about death, but about his 'inflexible attitude' ;)

My point here, epistemologically thinking the 'unjustfiable' argument in NOT valid, certain aspects are both very NECESSARY and very JUSTIFIED-JUSTIFIABLE too.

Finally, and to take advantage of his great last words, I think that's the spirit, the FLEXIBLE attitude we all need to have here, regardless of any other differences we might (?) have  -to understand both the 'problem' and what we are talking about..!

Cheers!