RE: Is *Justification* necessary for Meaning and Verification?

--- In [email protected], Alan Forrester <alanmichaelforrester@...> wrote:
>
> On 15 Feb 2013, at 16:12, JAG <jaguarnight2012@...> wrote:
> 
> >>> Hi Alan,
 let's clear the air about a few starting  
> >>> points:
> >>> 
> >>> 1) Philosophy of Science is/means exactly that: PHILOSOPHY ;)
> >>> 
> >>> "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.  
> >>> Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A  
> >>> philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy  
> >>> does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the  
> >>> clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as  
> >>> it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and  
> >>> give them sharp boundaries." -Ludwig Wittgenstein
> >> 

> > 
> > Actually, i am using his brilliant 'refutation' concept/method to *refut* some of his own ideas. ;)
> 
> A refutation involves pointing out some problem that a position fails to solve. You have not done this.

True, I have NOT done it for many reasons (conceptual and practical), so before we proceed (yes, i will ask/need for your help here), let's take into account the following, and correct me if/when am wrong :

1) To be politically correct, it's not exactly a 'refutation' simply bc we are not talking about a theory here but disagreement of some of his ideas/statements.
So from that perspective is more than an attempted refutation of the validity of his claims.

2) in similar terms, if you say that it can not be done, i would say that your 'irrefutability' is not valid, (not a virtue bc it lacks the necessary *MEANING*), indeedy, so please let's check and see what applies here ;)

3) on the other hand, it is true that the way i use *justification* becomes an explanatory power, it gives MEANING and VERIFIES certain processes, and i think that's the root of our difference/argument here. From that 'prohibions' about *justification* are unacceptable, but yes, from that perspetcive, i can see that in the very same way my views are kinda irrefutable.


Now, it's also true that i have not make myself clear enough and probably have not stated a few things appropriately -so far, but the point am trying to make here, is specific and in relation to *JUSTIFICATION* -and then taking into account others, Hume's idea Piaget etc. Also, keep in mind that that when i say am using Poppers' method, is more like being selective in concepts and methods and attempting a synthesis of ideas, more specifically,  my insighs and INDUCTIONS (yes) ;), supported in part by selected releavant wok and concepts by others, but without being in full agreement with them either ;)

So, The argument here is about Popper's idea that *justification* is not necessary -and then that a few things are *unjustifiable*. 

1)Simply, I don't think that he explains/supports this idea enough to be acceptable. His particular idea seems to me more like an ad hoc assumption than truth -philosophiically speaking. Your respond/defense is more like a way of stating things that actually would make a refuation impossible (that's why i said earlier that we are playing with words)

2)I am asking for the criteria which could make his claims true and valid for most inquiries. So far I heard none! quite the contrary, you seem to escape 'falsification' yourself by giving a conventional twist of his claims, but then i do the same by inserting the variable of *MEANING* here, just bc *justifications* provide *meaning* and aim *verification* and not necessarily falsifiability ;) 

3)Now about the need and why we can NOT do without it: I propose that justification is what provides clarity and ensures some kind of fairness, FLEXIBILITY, and while is independent by other processes and concepts, is still relevant and part of them. I beleive that without *justification* we are prone to deception, exploitation/misdirection. from that perspective, a few things also become justifiable! ;)

4)Popper's idea that we can get away without justification misdirects/boycotts both our perception/method and then the outcome/gools. his ideas even fail to be self-evident in terms of observation -in reality/practice there is alsways a potential (conditional) justification and need for meaning. What am saying is that without justification there is no meaning. In other words, am asking you to prove how *justifications* are instrinscically false and inappropriate as Popper/you claim to be.


> 
> > and please comment on my Piaget's quote? what do you think of that? anyone? 
> > 
> 
> > "To assert that metaphysical problems are meaningless is
> > unacceptable from the point of view of knowledge itself, not that
> > the validity of metaphysical knowledge can be accepted without
> > question, but because we are not justified in definitely
> > classification of a problem as either scientific or metaphysical; at
> > the most a disputed problem can be said to be without(cognitive)
> > meaning....there are can be many wisdoms, while ther exists only one
> > truth."
> > -Piaget
> 
> 
> This quote does not explain Piaget's position. What problem is Piaget trying to address? What does "without (cognitive) meaning" mean? 
> 

Great question, at last! :) "without...justification" maybe? but then it is also a trap :)

Yes, ok the quote does not explain his postion but he adressses the problem of 'classification' of a problem as either scientific or metaphysical -and that remains a challenging issue/problem for many reasons which i will try to elaborate....
At the mean time, please, think of it, in line with Poppers own question about what makes a theory valid and true, its criteria etc. and probably  you''ll see what am talking about and how is related here. Popper as you very well know rejected certain theories based on the grounds of falsifiability...but then somehow he managed to propose that problems of demarcations and inductions were the same thing! Thing again, and try to see how and where *justification* could make the difference and ad another dimension here. ;0

Now, if were to be creative, we'll take it to the next level:
*justification* becomes the criterion of and for the validity of induction. Think about it! ;) 

Furthermore it becomes the common denominator to the classification problem! ;)


From my perspective (and GREAT interest) in a META-theoretical level, this problem of 'classification' becomes of paramount value, and then it is also extended and valid in specifc 'problems' (mainly in variouw demarcations)...again, we need *MEANING* !!! how else? what is possible/real/valid without it?

I will try to connect the dots here and make some sense but it has to do with the problem of knowledge as discussed (quoted) below,  the true nature of reality-the ultimate reality and various implications of *knowing*. First, it would be wise to agree in some basic ideas and then examine the implications and differences in methods and in what we think and accept as necessary and relevant, -here specifcally the issue about 'justification'. But then, and since there way too many ideas and concepts involved will make this task impossible here.

> >> 
> >> No. It's impossible. Knowledge can't be proven to be true since  
> >> any argument that allegedly proves this has to start with premises  
> >> and rules of inference that might be wrong. In addition, any alleged  
> >> foundation for knowledge would be unexplained and arbitrary, so  
> >> saying that an idea is a foundation is grossly irrational.
> > 

> 
> You are taking for granted that justification (showing that an idea is true or probably true) is necessary for rationality and knowledge. It is not necessary. We can try to discover better ideas by looking for criticisms of our current ideas, suggesting solutions to those problems and looking for problems with the solutions. 


Well, I am taking from 'granted' that justification is necessary to show that an idea has a good='positive' reason (or the potential) to be true or probaly true/useful. I don't see how we can try to *discover* better ideas if that part is not met and satisfied, that is, justified! -yes, even deductively this time ;)



> 
> Knowledge is just useful or explanatory information: it does not have to be justified. Scientists have created a lot of useful and deep knowledge by looking for problems with their previous ideas and suggesting better replacements. Why would they need to do anything else?
> 
> What problem does the idea of justification solve that cannot be solved with conjecture and criticism?

It has to do with conjecture's veracity and in cases with undecible conjectures and that's where *justification* could be the solution ;)  but as you very well pointed out elsewher/below, this argument as well can also be taken to pieces indefinitely. Way to many concepts and variables here to make sense and have clear starting and finishing point.....


> 
> >>> 2)Justification IN NOT impossible, rather and simply, it's  
> >>> CONDITIONAL! ;)
> >> 
> >> Justification is not conditional. First, if you are taking the  
> >> condition for granted then the condition is just a conjecture and so  
> >> is any argument in which you use it. Second, the rules of inference  
> >> of the argument are also unjustified conjectures so your argument is  
> >> unjustified for that reason too.
> > 
> > Again, if that is valid, then it should be valid for all 'arguments' incuding Popper's idea about how a few things are 'totally unjustified and unjustifiable' -and that would imply that Hume (as quoted earlier) is correct. ;)
> 
> Arguments serve as ways to criticise ideas not to justify them.

That's where we disagree and i propose that arguments could be the means to justify ideas=give meaning, which in return would support and direct *verification* rather falsifiability-testability (actually, that's exactly my critique of anyone and Poppers idea about eliminating justification) and furtermore to point out glinches and imperfections of conjectures and criticism. How else? that's exactly my point, we need *justification* to test and verify conjectures thmesleves; otherwise we are subjected to the very (potentially) limitations and pitfalls of conjecture and criticism. it is *MEANING* that makes the difference and justification provides meaning and thn makes conjectures and critisism valid/true ;) 



> 
> > "How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
> > justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
> > conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable from
> > their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is arguing
> > in circle."
> > -Hume
> 
> 
> Hume like you assumes that justification is necessary. Both you and he are wrong.
> 


Well, that's the argument here, but still you haven't *justified* your criticism and conclusion either -why he is wrong, we need a *true* falsifying statement here, but then probably, that is exactly the limitation am talking about when there is no JUSTIFICATION ;)

Now, if IN GENERAL you think that it is not necessary then there is no way to agree and there is no point in 'arguing' about it.
Simply i don't see another possible way -conceptually speaking even as the criterion of falsifibility.

> 
> Why take a condition for granted rather than proposing it as a conjecture that may be wrong?


Because a *condition* can be controlled/tested/agreed upon on. It becomes the means we may need later in *verifying* the truth or falsity of a 'conjecture'. That proves the need for justification and that could also solve the problem of 'arguing in circles'  ;)


> 
> I have already addressed the non-necessity. As for why it can't be conditional. I can just take any step in your argument and ask you to justify it, show why it is true or probably true. And then I can take that argument, pick a step and ask you to justify it. And I can keep doing this indefinitely. Even if I were willing to grant some set of conditions that doesn't matter because the rest of your argument can be taken to pieces indefinitely.

Again, please read above, and think how 'counter-examples' work -and the role of *meaning* !!!!!
 You are right though that we could spend many lifetimes arguing about it :)

The way we have put is so far, it makes things way too complex, but in essence am looking for a *verifacation* in line and in terms of Ayer than Popper ;)

> 
> >>> "There are two modes of acquiring knowledge, namely by reasoning  
> >>> and experience.Reasoning draws a conclusion and makes us grant the  
> >>> conclusion, but does not make the conclusion certain, nor does it  
> >>> remove doubt so that the mind may rest on the intuition of truth,  
> >>> unless the mind discovers it by the path of experience."
> >>> -Roger Bacon
> >> 
> >> Experience has to be interpreted and the interpretation may be  
> >> wrong, so Bacon is wrong.
> > 
> > 
> > A quick answer to the 'interpetation' problem as you put it, is nothing else but Whitehead's idea that 'the process of reality becomes reality itself" and that would be good enough, and *justified* enough to solve and explain a few things -based on findings from perceptual/cognitive processes ;)
> 
> This is vague. I'm not going to say anything further in reply because there is not enough substance here for any further criticism.
> 

The 'substance' is 'there', I call it * MEANING* but as i mentioned before, i have not stated/connected a few things appropriately, so you are fully *justified* saying something like that ;)


Now, the problem is that Popper's ideas are NOT independent of psychological considerations -and that's why i used Whitehead's idea of perceiving reality as a PROCESS, where that nature of reality, of an Ultimte reality (if existent) depends and opreates both intrinscically and extrinscically, VERIFIES and finally gives meaning to the exepeience/method/theory, and in order to avoid confusion and mis-interpation, certain *justifications* are both necessary and justifiable. Now, bc a few things/events are kinda impossible, (such TOTAL AWARENESS of all KNOWLEDGE/PROCESSES in meaningul terms) only *conditionally* we could accept and make sense of themselves -and ourselves...(ontologically and Epistemologically)

in other words, i don't believe that we can sacrifice *MEANING* in any case/method/theory ;)

 
> 
> What is the distinction between (1) a conditional justification, and (2) an idea that you have not managed to refute and are not currently actively trying to refute because it doesn't seem problematic?
> 
> Alan
>

You are politically correct but (1) a conditional justification solves the problems (by giving *MEANING*) mentioned above, and (2) the problematic idea we need to 'refute' here is that of *justification*, as necessary for *verification* 

Indeed, i propose that *verifiability* could NOT really be replaced with UNJUSTIFIED falsifiability, and i guess that's the root of all argument and confusion here! ;)

cheers!

JAG