Re: 'Justified' Developments in Philosophy of Science...? are we there yet?

On 15 Feb 2013, at 17:12, JAG wrote:

> > It is better to assume that knowledge is related to truth, by
> > definition. And belief are the conjecture and theories, which are
> > always falsifiable. So I can sum up Popper by saying that in science
> > there is only beliefs. But knowledge still exist, in the non
> > constructive way, because some beliefs, despite falsifiable, can be
> > true, and never actually falisfied. We can of course never know  that,
> > but that's does not make it non existing, on the contrary, this can be
> > used to show that science needs some form of faith, in some reality.
> >
> > Bruno
> >
>
> True, but in some cases we CAN know for sure.

Yes. But I think this might be our consciousness here and now. All  
other conscious content can be doubted.
But I do agree that elementary arithmetic is almost not doubtable,  
although, strictly speaking, it can.




> Furthermore, it's not just about *faith* but some other kind of  
> direct 'knowledge'.

Certainly. To be clear, faith is doubtable. If it was not, it would  
not ask for faith.



> I won't use the words 'instictual' or 'intuitive' bc we are gonna  
> get in another argument here, but some things/situations offer  
> POTENTIAL insights of what could be, at least @ the conceptual  
> level! (example: gravity, senses, hidden dimensions, etc.)

Well, here I disagree. Feeling something does make the actual feeling  
undoubtable, but if we interpret it in a theory (like grandmother  
theory of gravitation: objects fall), we are in front of something  
doubtable.
I can conceive that I can wake up in a reality where objects don't fall.




> and the example of Ayers last words, (at the bottom of this post)
> I believe, the subject matters above belong and need the same  
> *philosophical* inquiry and examination.
> Furthermore, i beleive, we are in need of *JUSTIFICATION* in  
> philosophy of science and method but *justification* of why we  
> should refuse to give some when it is necessary.

OK. (To be sure I don't believe in "philosophy of science", except  
conventionally for the curriculum. Either we tackle problems with a  
scientific attitude, or we don't).



> I think that Popper offered constructed criticism and stated his  
> views, but in some instances he didn't *justified* his views/ 
> conclusion either!
> and that's exactly my point here.! ;)

To be sure, I am not sure I understand the critics of "justification".  
I think that people makes a links between truth and justification  
which does not exist. I am not sure there is any difference in  
"explanation" and "justification", except as nuances, useful at some  
stage, but misleading outside a rigorous theory, making clear what is  
assumed, and what is derived. Both BOI and FOR seems to me having a  
lot of justification and a lot of inductive inference too. Each time  
we refer to a theory, we do an induction, even for a mundane theory  
like "we have to pay bill", or the like. I guess I might miss  
something, of course, but it looks it might be just a problem of  
vocabulary, and this hides the real critics I can do on FOR, like  
presenting the 'physical Church-Turing thesis" as a more precise  
version of Church's thesis, where I think it is just a complete  
different thesis, probably even contradicting Church-Turing thesis (at  
least when we assume computationalism, as David Deutsch is doing).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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