Re: Implications of Recent Developments in Network Science

On 19 Feb 2013, at 11:15, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

> On 18 Feb 2013, at 18:41, JAG wrote:
> 
>> 
>> 
>> --- In [email protected], Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> On 11 Feb 2013, at 12:41, JAG wrote:
>>> 
>>>> --- In [email protected], "hibbsa" wrote:
>>>>> Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of science' as
>>>>> I see it.
>>>> 
>>>> Greetings to all.....
>>>> 
>>>> not exactyly a respond to the topic discussed here but here is
>>>> another real-LEGIT implication to the domain of philosophy of
>>>> science (that is, according to Hume's following idea):
>>>> 
>>>> "How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
>>>> justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
>>>> conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable from
>>>> their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is arguing
>>>> in circle."
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> Computationalism does illustrate why experimental reasoning can be
>>> justified from some principle in philosophy/metaphysics/theology.
>>> 
>>> If you believe that the brain is Turing emulable, the physical reality
>>> exists and consists in the sum of all possible (arithmetical)
>>> computations going through your computational states.
>>> 
>>> The only mystery which remains is our belief in elementary arithmetic,
>>> but this one, can be justified not being amenable to anything  simpler.
>>> It has to be a mystery, somehow.
>>> 
>>> Hume, unconsciously, assumed an Aristotelian conception of  reality. I
>>> think that we can doubt about it.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>>> 
>> 
>> From a META-theoretical point of view 'Computationalism' could also  
>> *prove* how some methods and philosophies are truly outdated and  
>> problematic. ;)
>> 
> Yes. That is how we can progress. I think we agree with David here.

David doesn't say that the theory of computation proves that anything is false. He has stated clearly that he does not think it is possible to prove ideas are true or probable. So this statement that you agree with David is false.

Alan