Re: Implications of Recent Developments in Network Science

On 19 Feb 2013, at 21:28, Alan Forrester wrote:

>
> On 19 Feb 2013, at 11:15, Bruno Marchal [email protected]> wrote:
>
> > On 18 Feb 2013, at 18:41, JAG wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> --- In [email protected], Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On 11 Feb 2013, at 12:41, JAG wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> --- In [email protected], "hibbsa" wrote:
> >>>>> Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of  science' as
> >>>>> I see it.
> >>>>
> >>>> Greetings to all.....
> >>>>
> >>>> not exactyly a respond to the topic discussed here but here is
> >>>> another real-LEGIT implication to the domain of philosophy of
> >>>> science (that is, according to Hume's following idea):
> >>>>
> >>>> "How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
> >>>> justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
> >>>> conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable   from
> >>>> their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is   arguing
> >>>> in circle."
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> Computationalism does illustrate why experimental reasoning can be
> >>> justified from some principle in philosophy/metaphysics/theology.
> >>>
> >>> If you believe that the brain is Turing emulable, the physical   reality
> >>> exists and consists in the sum of all possible (arithmetical)
> >>> computations going through your computational states.
> >>>
> >>> The only mystery which remains is our belief in elementary  arithmetic,
> >>> but this one, can be justified not being amenable to anything  simpler.
> >>> It has to be a mystery, somehow.
> >>>
> >>> Hume, unconsciously, assumed an Aristotelian conception of   reality. I
> >>> think that we can doubt about it.
> >>>
> >>> Bruno
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
> >>>
> >>
> >> From a META-theoretical point of view 'Computationalism' could also
> >> *prove* how some methods and philosophies are truly outdated and
> >> problematic. ;)
> >>
> > Yes. That is how we can progress. I think we agree with David here.
>
> David doesn't say that the theory of computation proves that  
> anything is false. He has stated clearly that he does not think it  
> is possible to prove ideas are true or probable. So this statement  
> that you agree with David is false.
>

Computationalism does not prove anything true, it refutes, only, the  
Aristotelian metaphysics, and thus physicalism, naturalism, and/or  
materialism.  David seems to not have yet study the refutation, and I  
just said that we agree with David here, because David clearly agree  
that we can learn through the refutation (and thus outdating) of old  
theories.

Physicalism is refuted in the comp theory of mind. Not physics, but  
the idea that there is a primary physical reality on which other  
realities, like consciousness would emerge or be explained from  
physics. On the contrary, with comp physics *has to be* reducible to  
arithmetic, which is a simpler theory already part of physics. The  
conceptual simplification is big, and is, assuming the brain is Turing  
emulable at some level, unavoidable.

Bruno




>
> Alan
> 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]