Re: Intuitive

On 3 May 2013 01:14, hibbsa <hibbsa-/[email protected]> wrote:
> --- In [email protected], "hibbsa" wrote:
>>
>>
>> Let's say there was this amazing, unique and complex phenomenon never before seen in human history, that was regarded as hugely important and transformational, but not at all well understood and so important to get a deep explanation about.
>>
>> Further examination revealed that in terms of the complexity and
>> uniqueness the phenomenon clustered in two places: in terms of its
>> physical manifestation - the regularities, reccurrent themes,
>> organization, approaches - basically everything. All this and then its
>> evolution in time as well. The whole thing, its parts its whole, as a
>> suite of traits, as a history: in the overwhelming majority was both
>> complex and unique - not seen before in human history.
>>
>> The other cluster was basically everything describing its product, its
>> productivity, its influence, its byproducts, and so on. This was also
>> complex and unique in human history, and then amazing on top of that as
>> well.
>>
>> So thinking about the various possibilities of how all this was
>> explained, what I think I am comfortable to say is that, given this
>> complex uniqueness characterized the underlying suite of traits, and
>> then shows up again in its product and influence also complex and unique
>> (if anything more so), far and away the most intuitive - and reasonable,
>> and most promising, hypothesis would be that the underlying unique
>> complexity is the major causal force giving rise to the unique and
>> complex outcomes. I'd say there'd be every reason to put this at the top
>> of the list of the most promising prospects and exploring that would
>> reasonably be the first port of call.
>>
>> Where would others here stand on this matter? Do you see it the same? Do
>> you agree it's certainly intuitive and reasonable. I should think it
>> would also be the best explanation in the popperian sense too. Or is the
>> intuitiveness a worry in your books? Is it a reason to look elsewhere,
>> for something more counter-intuitive? I'm being serious.
>>
>> What about Popper? It's pretty clear I'm talking about something that is
>> just like Science. Just like a process of philosophizing science.
>>
>> Or if let's say you don't experience my view so strongly as I seem to
>> be. Let's say for you this would be priority 2, or priority 3. That
>> would be fine. But then what about the possibility you or someone else
>> would regard this explanation as so unpromising that they didn't put it
>> on their to-do list at all. In fact didn't regard any direct examination
>> of the phenomenon as useful at all, and didn't put that on his to-do
>> list either.
>>
>> Would that be rational? Would that be appropriate? Yes, it's what Popper
>> appears to have done, or something reasonably approximating to that. But
>> why? Or am I wrong and badly needing putting out of my misery, in which
>> case please let's get it over with :O)
>>
>
> so to summarize. the criticism is not that Popper sought to explain both
> the suite of traits characterizing the manifestation of science on the
> ground, and also the phenomenal growth of knowledge that was the
> product, by the same common thing ( basically C&R ).
>
> The criticism is that the key principles involved in C&R were selected
> largely in a process of elimination, that largely featured the
> philosophical components such as Justificationalism, Induction,
> Foundationalism, Empiricism, Positivism, and so on, as possible
> competing candidates.
>
> But, those philosophical positions, didn't come from a direct analysis
> of what was happening in science itself, but from attempts by scientists
> to do philosophy about that underlying science. And, basically for many
> of the reasons Popper himself identified about those philosophical
> attempts, there is good reason to think the scientists that tried to do
> this philosophy, were not at all clear what was happening in Science.
>
> So the criticism is that of a fragility right at the core of the
> philosophy. A dependency on the philosophical impressions of scientists
> as to what was happening in Science, where Popper might have seen
> something rather different had he analysed the reality of science
> directly, from a philosophical standpoint.
>
> I think this is a fairly straightforward and simple criticism. It should
> be possible for David Deutsch or someone suitable to refute the critcism
> or ask for more information, or whatever. I will endeavour to keep
> looking for ways to make the criticism more clear, working on the
> assumption if I'm not getting any kind of 'bite' it's because I haven't
> yet made things clear enough.
>
> So as and when I get the time, this is what I will endeavour to do.

What would analysing science "directly" entail and how would the
results differ from what Popper did?

Also, Popper's philosophy is not solely a description, it also
prescribes standards for scientists to live up to. Can you improve on
those standards?

Alan