Re: Intuitive

On 4 May 2013, at 07:43, hibbsa <hibbsa-/[email protected]> wrote:

> 
> 
> --- In [email protected], Alan Forrester wrote:
>> 
>> On 3 May 2013 01:14, hibbsa hibbsa@... wrote:
>>> --- In [email protected], "hibbsa" wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Let's say there was this amazing, unique and complex phenomena never before seen in human history, that was regarded as hugelyimportant and transformational, but not at all well understood and so important to get a deep explanation about.
>>>> 
>>>> Further examination revealed that in terms of the complexity and
>>>> uniqueness the phenomenon clustered in two places: in terms of its
>>>> physical manifestation - the regularities, reccurrent themes,
>>>> organization, approaches - basically everything. All this and then its
>>>> evolution in time as well. The whole thing, its parts its whole, asa
>>>> suite of traits, as a history: in the overwhelming majority wasboth
>>>> complex and unique - not seen before in human history.
>>>> 
>>>> The other cluster was basically everything describing its product,its
>>>> productivity, its influence, its byproducts, and so on. This was also
>>>> complex and unique in human history, and then amazing on top ofthat as
>>>> well.
>>>> 
>>>> So thinking about the various possibilities of how all this was
>>>> explained, what I think I am comfortable to say is that, given this
>>>> complex uniqueness characterized the underlying suite of traits,and
>>>> then shows up again in its product and influence also complex and unique
>>>> (if anything more so), far and away the most intuitive - and reasonable,
>>>> and most promising, hypothesis would be that the underlying unique
>>>> complexity is the major causal force giving rise to the unique and
>>>> complex outcomes. I'd say there'd be every reason to put this at the top
>>>> of the list of the most promising prospects and exploring that would
>>>> reasonably be the first port of call.
>>>> 
>>>> Where would others here stand on this matter? Do you see it the same? Do
>>>> you agree it's certainly intuitive and reasonable. I should think it
>>>> would also be the best explanation in the popperian sense too. Or is the
>>>> intuitiveness a worry in your books? Is it a reason to look elsewhere,
>>>> for something more counter-intuitive? I'm being serious.
>>>> 
>>>> What about Popper? It's pretty clear I'm talking about something that is
>>>> just like Science. Just like a process of philosophizing science.
>>>> 
>>>> Or if let's say you don't experience my view so strongly as I seem to
>>>> be. Let's say for you this would be priority 2, or priority 3. That
>>>> would be fine. But then what about the possibility you or someone else
>>>> would regard this explanation as so unpromising that they didn't put it
>>>> on their to-do list at all. In fact didn't regard any direct examination
>>>> of the phenomenon as useful at all, and didn't put that on his to-do
>>>> list either.
>>>> 
>>>> Would that be rational? Would that be appropriate? Yes, it's what Popper
>>>> appears to have done, or something reasonably approximating to that. But
>>>> why? Or am I wrong and badly needing putting out of my misery, in which
>>>> case please let's get it over with :O)
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> so to summarize. the criticism is not that Popper sought to explain both
>>> the suite of traits characterizing the manifestation of science on the
>>> ground, and also the phenomenal growth of knowledge that was the
>>> product, by the same common thing ( basically C&R ).
>>> 
>>> The criticism is that the key principles involved in C&R were selected
>>> largely in a process of elimination, that largely featured the
>>> philosophical components such as Justificationalism, Induction,
>>> Foundationalism, Empiricism, Positivism, and so on, as possible
>>> competing candidates.
>>> 
>>> But, those philosophical positions, didn't come from a direct analysis
>>> of what was happening in science itself, but from attempts by scientists
>>> to do philosophy about that underlying science. And, basically for many
>>> of the reasons Popper himself identified about those philosophical
>>> attempts, there is good reason to think the scientists that tried to do
>>> this philosophy, were not at all clear what was happening in Science.
>>> 
>>> So the criticism is that of a fragility right at the core of the
>>> philosophy. A dependency on the philosophical impressions of scientists
>>> as to what was happening in Science, where Popper might have seen
>>> something rather different had he analysed the reality of science
>>> directly, from a philosophical standpoint.
>>> 
>>> I think this is a fairly straightforward and simple criticism. It should
>>> be possible for David Deutsch or someone suitable to refute the critcism
>>> or ask for more information, or whatever. I will endeavour to keep
>>> looking for ways to make the criticism more clear, working on the
>>> assumption if I'm not getting any kind of 'bite' it's because I haven't
>>> yet made things clear enough.
>>> 
>>> So as and when I get the time, this is what I will endeavour to do.
>> 
>> What would analysing science "directly" entail
> 
> Minimally it would entail a decision to cut out the philosopher middle
> men and go see for himself. How things would develop would depend on
> what was coming up for Popper and the directions he judged to go.
> 
> Both parts of my answer - I think - in large part arise as consequences
> of the goals Popper had set himself. He was there to do fundamental
> work. Popper was a visionary - he seen the possibility to solve the
> puzzles of philosophy and the Western Enlightenment as part of the same
> approach. Or that's my guess. Whatever his vision was, though, his
> ambition was to do primary top-level problem solving.
> 
> How that's not a goal that can be reconciled with a policy of
> outsourcing top-level judgements off to third parties. To be
> fundamental, Popper had to be at the centre...with full spectrum control
> over third party input at every stage. But the way he structured things
> in the event, had no possibility at all of securing an adequate degree
> of primacy to Popper's judgement in the process. He was effectively
> deferring to the judgements of the philosopher middlemen.
> 
> Another way to conceptualize the arrangement he was left with is in
> terms of the scourge of Authority. He could criticize the internal logic
> of what the middlemen were proposing. But he couldn't criticize the
> judgements and decisions and other influences that translated the
> reality of Science, or some part of it, into the proposition being
> recieved by Popper. And because he couldn't criticize it, by consequence
> those philosophical middlemen manifested as a cluster of Authorities,
> encircling Popper's core.
> 
> It's logically impossible to do fundamental work on something outside
> and wider, like Science or the Englightenment, if the embryonic
> philosophy you are using for a vehicle, defines a set of independent
> authorities for its core. Think about it. It's impossible. 

You have said a lot about the origin of something or other that you say is bad. You have then asserted that since Popper had some unspecified bad assumptions he made unspecified mistakes. This cloud of vague abstraction is no good at all as a criticism. 

You further assert that you can't start with a bad set of authorities and make progress, but that's false. Provided that you're willing to discard ideas that don't survive criticism and you look for problems, starting with bad ideas is not an insurmountable obstacle to progress. See Popper's "On the sources of knowledge and of ignorance" in "Conjectures and Refutations".

Alan