Re: Macroscopic Emergence in MWI worlds

On Thu, Jun 13, 2013 at 10:03 AM, hibbsa <hibbsa-/[email protected]> wrote:

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> --- In [email protected], "hibbsa" <hibbsa@...> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > --- In [email protected], "Alan" <alan_forrester2@>
> wrote:
> > >
> > > --- In [email protected], hibbsa <hibbsa@> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Thought I'd try a summary of where this is going.
> > > >
> > > > First of all, it's important to exclude - for now - MWI conceptions
> involving conscious decisions, and probably biological decisions. This
> isn't because what I'm driving at is weak...but that this is the best way
> forward. So please note we are considering the more primitive, non
> conscious or pre-conscious/pre-biological world.
> > > >
> > > > By 'emergent properties' I just mean the way macroscopic reality
> emerges from QM. The specific description I'm using is Deutsch's 'Reality
> of Abstractions' chapter. In that, he basically describes the way
> macroscopic properties (say those associated with boiling the kettle) arise
> with a great amount of independence from the atomic behaviour going on
> beneath.
> > > >
> > > > Regarding this sort of emergence, it occurs to me that unless there
> was a huge amount of stability/reliability/repeatability in terms of the
> emergence of the same macroscopic properties - for any given QM 'object'
> (I'll describe 'object' below), our macroscopic world would not be stable,
> nor deterministic, the way we find it.
> > >
> > > There are limits to our ability to predict stuff owing to the
> divergence of macroscopic universes over time. There's a bit about this in
> FoR where David discusses chaos theory.
> > >
> > > The macroscopic quantities we are used to dealing with are very coarse
> grained and so they can be the same for objects whose microscopic
> constitutions are different, e.g. - bubbles in boiling water forming in
> different places. As the difference between two versions of the same object
> grow they may become macroscopically different.
> >
> > Hi Alan - thanks for engaging. In his Reality of Abstractions BoI
> chapter Deutsch speaks of the high degree of mutual independence between
> the emergent level and the specifics of the underlying atomic arrangement.
> How would this mutual independence sit with what you say above which seems
> to go the way of mutual dependence somewhat.
> >
> > Additionally, the following taken together
> >
> > - given in many instances the starting point of what becomes a
> divergence in the multiverse, can be regarded as duplicated on a large
> scale across the universe, and
> >
> > - given that each such instance within this universe could manifest any
> of the quantum histories divergent in the multiverse from a single such
> event in this universe,and
> >
> > - given recurrences of such conditions as duplicates within this
> universe would need to exhibit a very high degree of consistency in terms
> of the macroscopic emergence produced, in order for our macroscopic reality
> to be stable and consistent, deterministic and so on, as we find it
> >
> > --> surely taken together the constraint emerges requiring the
> multiverse level divergent quantum histories from a single event in this
> universe to each and all produce the same macroscopic emergence, to the
> same order of consistency duplicates of the same event would need to
> produce the same macroscopic emergence in order for this universe to be
> stable, predictable, deterministic and so on?
> >
> > >
> > > > As an aside, I don't think this issue depends on the question
> whether macroscopic reality does emerge from the QM world, because to the
> extent it doesn't, the MWI model cannot represent divergence of, or any
> impact over, the components that don't (i.e. because the MWI multiverse is
> purely in terms of quantum divergence).
> > > >
> > > > But the inherent MWI logic does seem to be that all or some
> macroscopic emergence does arise from the QM world. For example Deutsch's
> definition of fungibility includes macroscopic objects.
> > > >
> > > > So, the issue I would like to explore is along the following
> lines. Given macroscopic reality is complex, it seems reasonable to expect
> there are many 'levels' of emergence involved, and many instances of
> emergence. It actually seems reasonable to think that pretty much
> all instances of quantum divergence will contribute toward some degree of
> emergence within individual universes.
> > > >
> > > > The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the
> requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be
> consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the
> other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour
> involves or is associated with some emergence.
> > > >
> > > > The consequence of taking the two together seems to be that the
> multiverse has to deliver the same emergence for the same QM in the same
> contexts. Because....at the level of individual universes, all the
> different possible quantum histories for a given context of occurrence,
> reflect *possible* occurences in each participating universe within the
> multiverse.
> > > >
> > > > Now...I think there are a lot of consequences from this, that need
> to be worked through and considered. The reason I'm not going into those
> yet is just that, unless people can understand wtf I'm saying so far,
> there's no point.
> > > >
> > > > But a sneak preview would be, for example, to do with Deutsch's
> conception of fungibility. Given he includes the macroscopic world, by
> implication he includes the levels of emergence up through that world.
> But...by his own philosophical reasoning, to do with, for example
> non-foundationalist conceptions, higher levels of emergence actually change
> the physical definition of what 'fungibility' can physically mean. For a
> simple example, the macroscopic conception of an object moving with
> constant velocity through space only has meaning in relativistic terms.
> > > >
> > > > Likewise - the principle of equivalence disallows certain
> distinctions. And so on and so forth.
> > > >
> > > > Returning to Deutschs conceptions of these issues, it is possible
> for an emergent level to be independently downward influential on a lower
> level of emergence. Therefore a higher level of emergence can theoretically
> be the primary causality behind what would amount to a breaking of
> fungibility.
> > > >
> > > > One of the implications of this seems to be the following logic: If
> macroscopic levels can break fungibility, fungibility must therefore be
> *physically* pegged to macroscopic levels. Which means that, whatever
> concept of 'being in the same place' Deutsch applies to fungible universes
> at the quantum level, has to also apply at the macroscopic levels.
> > > >
> > > > Which means that fungible universes are also in the 'same place' at
> macroscopic levels.
> > > >
> > > > Now.....to see the huge significance of where this is going, you
> have to go back to the question I am asking. If the vast majority of
> universes in the multiverse produce the same emergence, then the
> macroscopic reality of the vast majority of universes in the
> multiverse REMAINS IN THE SAME PLACE.
> > > >
> > > > The consequence of that being, the multiverse is not
> divergent....but CONVERGENT up macroscopic levels.
> > > >
> > > > Which implies convergence toward ONE macroscopic universe.
> > >
> > > This is all wrong. The emergent laws of physics do not completely
> determine the macroscopic state.
> >
> > Sure, but I do address this matter with the argument. To the extent the
> macroscopic state is not determined by emergence from the quantum level,
> the multiverse by definition has no influence on that aspect of the
> macroscopic state, since the multiverse can only differentiate at the
> quantum level (i.e. so can only cause differentiation at the macroscopic
> level that is emergent from the quantum level).
> >
> > Therefore there is no dependence here on assumptions about what arises
> by emergence and what doesn't. What does is subject to the arguments I am
> making which suggest the multiverse divergence from any given point (i.e.
> ancester universe) is heavily constrained to all and each history produce
> the same emergence. On the other hand What doesn't emerge from the quantum
> level, the multiverse histories have absolutely no influence to alter in
> the first place thus will all feature the same state with no variance (if
> that state is stable by whatever does cause it)
> > >
> > > Alan
> > >
> >
>
> Anticipating some possible objections:
>
> 1. "You use concepts that contain errors" [could be about initial states,
> or duplicates of something in this universe being equivalent to divergent
> histories multiverse histories of a single instance of same thing in this
> universe, or no two quantum histories are the same or whatever]
>
> None of this would matter because all concepts are there for rough
> illustrative purposes only. The argument ultimately depends only on the
> same assumptions about this universe as we find it, that are essential for
> MWI itself to arise as an interpretation of QM (i.e. principle of local
> realism, determinism, etc).
>
> E.g. let's say it's invalid to define things like I do above like this
>
> >given in many instances the starting point of what becomes a >divergence
> in the multiverse, can be regarded as duplicated on a >large scale across
> the universe,.....
>
> If it's not valid it only makes the argument stronger, because we have to
> return to the universe as we find it which requires macroscopic stability
> and consistency on small and large scales. Therefore if the objection is
> about the way duplicate objects (within one universe) get defined, say
> because the idea of there being the same type of quantum divergence based
> on similar starting points or whatever.
>
> Doesn't matter because the universe as we find requires macroscopic
> emergence be duplicated. So if the quantum histories are never the same,
> always have different starting conditions, then the choice is between
> requiring more broadly defined sets of quantum history with more divergence
> of key characteristics like starting condition, to all never the less
> produce the same emergent macroscopic effects.
>
> Or alternatively if that's impossible for some QM law I don't know about,
> then the macroscopic world as we find it still takes precedence (because
> without the same assumptions I am using like determinism and local realism
> MWI never comes about in the first place). So if it's impossible for
> emergence to go upward, it has to happen downward in some counter intuitive
> way, or some combination of the two that is consistent with QM, or no
> causality between QM and the macroscopic world at all. None of these
> options or any of the others I can think of weaken the argument my end.
>
> (p.s. I apologize if there is any impression given above of unrealistic
> confidenc. That absolutely isn't the reality....I do fully expect to be
> corrected here. It's just that I have obviously attempted to construct the
> argument to the highest standard I am currently able.)
>
> -
>
>  
>

Al,

I really like your idea of Macroscopic Emergence to a Single Macroscopic
World.
May I suggest that one aspect of the Emergence is Entanglement
and that this Mechanism ensures a Single Macroscopic World.
and even has a Substance-Base in Super-String Theory.
Yanni Ru
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