Re: Multiverse Morality

On Thu, Aug 8, 2013 at 7:04 AM, Nick Belane <[email protected]> wrote:

> **
>
>
> On 7 August 2013 16:50, Ismail Atalay <i_c_atalay-/[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > **
> >
> > >On Thursday, 23 May 2013 hibssa wrote
> >
> > >I see this as really key to understanding the wider worldview expressed
> > by Popperians.
> > >The big mistake I notice from non-popperians regarding MWI are the moral
> > implications. For them, typically, the implication is that there is no
> > morality because everything that can >happen will happen somewhere, with
> > nothing special attached to what happens 'here'.
> >
> > >The reality is clearly different, and, I think....possibly this is the
> > source of the attachment of Popperians to the counter-intuitive.
> >
> > >The true moral implications are actually really stunning and profound.
> > Definitely putting morality to the centre of everything...above even
> > physical reality itself in a way.
> >
> > >Only by living purposefully...being consistent...being philosophically
> > correct....not compromising on principle, not living arbitrarily, not
> > living altruistically...only by doing these things >can you in this one
> > universe exert influence into the multiverse itself, and ultimately shape
> > who you are.
> > I know it is a rather late reply but I noticed that no one answered to
> > your candid post.
> > Let me explain my position as an "anti-popperian"
> > I read your post. I think I understood it. Unfortunately your effort to
> > come up with some type of morality from MWI belief does not seem
> convincing
> > to me.
> > The whole premise of morality (at least in the classical sense) is based
> > on moral agents making choices in the way they act (out of multiple
> > options) and their choices making a meaningful existential and
> > circumstantial difference in themselves and in the world they live. In
> MWI
> > world, the moral agent's choice looses its significance. Actually the
> moral
> > agent him/herself looses its significance and meaning.
> > In MWI, there are infinite number of moral agents and they do choose
> every
> > possible option anyway in infinite number of universes. Why would the
> > choice of one particular self in one of the infinite number of universes
> > make a meaningful difference from the perspective of multiverse
> existence?
> >
>
> I would say that it makes an infinitesimal difference.
>
> > We know all possible universes do exist right?
> >
>
> Yes, and each of them has a measure in the multiverse (roughly a
> "probability" if you want to see it in a different way).
>
> > And they do not have any superiority or uniqueness with respect to others
> > according to MWI. There is nothing special in any of the universes. We
> can
> > not say one universe would be "better" than the other.
> > Or should we say it? There would be universes which are "better" than
> > others from consistency, purposefulness and correctness perspective.
> Shall
> > we try to be in the best possible universe? Why I would have such
> > motivation if I already know that all other lower morality universes
> would
> > exist in parallel whatever I choose and in the end I am not making any
> > difference from the overall existential perspective?
> >
>
> What you could do is to try to maximise the measure of "good" universes
> whith respect to "bad" ones in the whole of the multiverse.
> That's definitely something meaningful you can do!
>
> I hope I have understood your points,
> Piernicola

My opinion is that the "measure" of a universe in the multiverse is a
snooker to make MWI agree with experiment.
Richard Ruquist