Re: Multiverse Morality

--- In [email protected], Ismail Atalay <i_c_atalay@...> wrote:
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> >On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 0:44 PM, Gary Oberbrunner wrote:
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> >>On Thu, Aug 8, 2013 at 6:32 PM, Ismail Atalay <i_c_atalay@...>wrote:
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> >> do not think anyone has such prospect if MWI is correct. There is no room
> >> for subjectivity or genuine choice in MWI. AFAIC, according to MWI, we
> >> humans are very complex entities who are pushed to fool ourselves as if we
> >> have a real influence or choice but essentially the universes are splitting
> >> according to objective equations during these processes  and thus we do not
> >> make any real choice.
> >> Ismail Atalay
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> >Just to be clear, this point of view above is not specific to the MWI.  It
> >applies to any deterministic non-dualistic physics, such as a Newtonian
> >block universe (no splitting, but no "real choice" either), or the
> >Copenhagen interpretation of QM.  You would need some kind of non-physical
> >mind or soul in order to have it not be according to objective equations.
> >Which of course raises all the standard mind/body dualism questions, which
> > I won't repeat here.
> There could be subjectivity without dualistic physics. Personally I think dualistic physics or any conception of non-physical existence does not make sense and is not supported by (actually goes against) modern scientific evidence. 
> Having said  that how could we be sure that the whole physics is solely explained and governed by deterministic and objective equations? Maybe there is a subjective aspect of monistic physical reality that eludes us because we can not access to it or our current scientific knowledge is not enough for any access to thus aspect. Maybe this is the reason why we are in great trouble in understanding, analyzing or modeling the subjective nature of consciousness or the qualia phenomenon.
> By subjective aspect of physical reality, I am referring to some concept along the lines of panpsychism.
> Ismail Atalay
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Hmm, I'm not sure that panpsychism is necessary for subjectivity.  

But I'm interested in multiple levels of emergence, and how the different levels do interface with each other.  DD's analysis in The Beginning of Infinity, clearly indicates that higher levels of emergence are coarse-grained relative to more detailed levels of explanation, and the latter do not exercise deterministic control the former (although they may define feasible and infeasible regions).  The lack of determinate causation among explanatory levels might provide a space in which subjectivity can arise.

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