Re: Multiverse Morality

--- In [email protected], Gary Oberbrunner <garyo@...> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 8, 2013 at 6:32 PM, Ismail Atalay <i_c_atalay@...>wrote:
> 
> > do not think anyone has such prospect if MWI is correct. There is no room
> > for subjectivity or genuine choice in MWI. AFAIC, according to MWI, we
> > humans are very complex entities who are pushed to fool ourselves as if we
> > have a real influence or choice but essentially the universes are splitting
> > according to objective equations during these processes  and thus we do not
> > make any real choice.
> > Ismail Atalay
> >
> 
> Just to be clear, this point of view above is not specific to the MWI.  It
> applies to any deterministic non-dualistic physics, such as a Newtonian
> block universe (no splitting, but no "real choice" either), or the
> Copenhagen interpretation of QM.  You would need some kind of non-physical
> mind or soul in order to have it not be according to objective equations.
>  Which of course raises all the standard mind/body dualism questions, which
> I won't repeat here.
> 
> -- 
> Gary
> 


Hi Gary - Sorry for not replying sooner but I am away quite a lot and often don't see these lists for days or weeks or longer. However, what I want to do right off the bat, is express my appreciation to you for taking the time from your own busy life to try to decode my often incoherent rantings. This is strongly appreciated and valued by myself. 

About what you say here. Admittedly in this particular thread I had begun to pretty much challenge whether the sort of variation seen in diverging universings had *any* influence up emergent levels. But that was partly motivated by the lack of responses....I thought I'd try throwing a trap or two. Seriously... if you search back on this basic issue I've been raising, you'll see that generally the discussion has been in terms of whether such differences are ever statistically significant - statistics being in whatever single universe terms that word is usually used to mean.

On that matter - the tense that you are raising here with your chaos example of macroscopic amplification - my basic position has been that I am saying exactly the same thing that MWI itself says. Namely, that the multiverse represents all the possible outcomes, in the same way that, within a one-universe model - a statistical model of the possibilities would say the same thing. As such, the multiverse could be conceptualized as a statistical model. Albeit one that cannot be derived for real.   

In that context, what I am challenging, is whether the multiverse - in context of the divergence from some ancestor world, can ever produce novelty that, were that novelty to have occurred in the ancestor world, it would have amounted to a statistically significant change in that ancestor world. 

I know that the idea of sensitive initial conditions, and the example you have given, do back off onto hard theory that does say this is possible. The Butterfly effect and so on, as you have mentioned a couple of times. 

But the problem I have with applying that sort of theory within the context of emergence, is that....what if there are 100 or 100 fully distinct emergent levels in our universe. So far as I know, there are no properly worked through variants on chaos theory, that describe the effect in terms of that emergence. I don't even think there are yet any hard scientific models of emergence that have made it all the way to mathematics. In which case, it's hard to see how it can currently  be regarded as reliable, robust, reasoning, to speak of such effects within a context of emergence at all. 

Beyond that, as I mentioned to you in a private mail a few weeks or months back, the issue I am raising here is not primarily about MWI itself, but about Deutsch's specific variant of MWI, which heavily involves the concept of fungibility. Emergence isn't directly linked, but he does describe a personal theory about emergence in BoI. So the issue I'm raising is really about whether these three concepts all work together properly, or whether there is a problem. 

For example, can you or anyone, explain how worlds can be fungible - which Deutsch describles as being literally in the same dimensional 'place'....and not just at the quantum level but at all levels. How does that work, using Deutsch's description of emergence which explicitly rejects a purely bottom-up determinism in terms of emergences. 

The implication being, that macroscopic levels - supposedly fungible - can potent ially be influenced by top-down effects, which presumably in some possible instances result in changes at the macroscopic level. Which presumably would violate fungibility. Which so far as I can see, would have to be see as a refutation of the concept of fungibility itself, unless Deutsch has an explanation how this can nevcer happen.....which in turn maintains consistency with his explanation of emergence itself. 

Sorry for the brain dump....but once again....thanks for trying to make sense of me. I am grateful for your time.