Re: Duress PIN, Mixfit and PlugMate

Ch1ffr3punk wrote:
> Anonymous wrote:
> > Claas spreads FUD:
> > > Ch1ffr3punk wrote:
> > > > Nomen Nescio wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > > > But you have no Duress-PIN for border control and no hardware sandbox,
> > > > > 
> > > > > Irrelevant with an encrypted USB drive holding a hidden container.
> > > > 
> > > > I desperately hope that people reading your dangerous nonsense do a search...
> > > > 
> > > ??????????, ???????? ?????????, ??? ????? ??????? ????? ?? ???? ???????.
> > > 
> > > 1. The Hidden Container vs. the Duress-PIN (The Human Factor)
> > > They claim a hidden container makes the Duress-PIN unnecessary. This is dangerously naive.
> > > 
> > > The hidden container is designed for plausible deniability of the data. The Duress-PIN, however, is designed to protect you from physical/psychological coercion, lengthy detention, or denial of entry.
> > > 
> > > Even if your hidden container is mathematically perfect, modern forensic tools at border control check more than just free space. They analyze filesystem metadata, access timestamps, and the entropy pattern of the outer volume. If your outer volume looks completely unused or filled with random garbage, trained agents will spot it
> > immediately.
> > 
> > Any proof?  I don't think so.  That's just another FUD attack.
> > 
> > > 
> > > Without a Duress-PIN that opens a believable, actively used outer system, you have no way to satisfy the officer in a stressful situation. The hidden container alone does absolutely nothing to stop the rubber-hose (coercion) attack. Ignoring the human factor is a rookie mistake.
> > 
> > And a Duress-PIN helps in that situation where the simple presence of a
> > PlugMate computer indicates that you have something to hide?  That's the
> > exact opposite of plausible deniability.  Furthermore, can you imagine
> > how LEAs react when you offer them a PIN that clears your device?  Good
> > luck with it.
> > 
> > > 
> > > 2. The Hidden Container vs. the Hardware Sandbox (The Kill Shot)
> > > This is where their claim becomes outright dangerous and technically absurd. They say a sandbox is irrelevant because the drive is encrypted. That is fundamentally wrong.
> > > 
> > > The hidden container protects Data-at-Rest (the stored files on the drive). The hardware sandbox protects Data-in-Use (the active decryption process).
> > 
> > An isolated hidden OS on a hidden device is a sandbox.
> > 
> > > 
> > > The moment you plug your drive into an untrusted computer at the border and enter your hidden container password, that foreign machine decrypts the data directly into its RAM.
> > 
> > Who would do that?  Only you, Claas, come to my mind.
> > 
> > > 
> > > If that host lacks a hardware sandbox (or is compromised), it can easily run malware that:
> > > 
> > > Captures your password via a keylogger before it even reaches the drive.
> > > 
> > > Extracts the decrypted files directly from the system's RAM (via Cold-boot or DMA attacks) while the container is mounted.
> > > 
> > > Injects malicious code into your USB drive's firmware (an Evil-Maid attack), which will then exfiltrate your password the next time you plug it into your own trusted computer at home.
> > 
> > Yes, the party is over when your PlugMate device has to access
> > peripherial devices of its host system like its touch screen.
> > 
> 
> What you fail to understand, VeraCrypt usage, like you propose with
> a hidden container, can easily been spotted by Border Control, so
> that you have to reveal your password.
> 

And consider this rookie, border control can if they don't like your face
format your VeraCrypt USB stick properly, so that you can't use your hidden
software and then you loose your oudated OpenPGP secret key(s), nym aliases
and other outdaded anonymous software settings, like from OmniCrap etc.

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