US relinquishing NATO command ‘not immin ent, not unthinkable’

The potential for the United States to relinquish its long-standing role=
  =

as NATO=E2=80=99s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) would represe=
nt a  =

seismic shift in the alliance=E2=80=99s structure, but such a move remai=
ns  =

unlikely in the short term, Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman told MPs thi=
s  =

week.

Speaking before the Defence Committee on 1 April, Freedman was asked abo=
ut  =

reports=E2=80=94most notably from NBC=E2=80=94that the Trump administrat=
ion had considered  =

removing the US from the SACEUR role or combining it with US Africa  =

Command.

=E2=80=9CIt would be a tremendous shift for the Americans to hand over c=
ommand,=E2=80=9D  =

Freedman said, cautioning that =E2=80=9Cwe have some way to go before we=
 are  =

there.=E2=80=9D

While acknowledging growing internal pressure within the Pentagon to han=
d  =

over more responsibilities to European allies, he stressed that such a  =

change would face stiff institutional resistance.

https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/us-relinquishing-nato-command-not-immine=
nt-not-unthinkable/

=E2=80=9CYou=E2=80=99ll see tremendous pushback in the Senate and certai=
nly in the army.  =

Armies don=E2=80=99t like giving up command posts,=E2=80=9D he noted. =E2=
=80=9CSo long as the  =

Americans are involved in European security, they will want what influen=
ce  =

they have over it.=E2=80=9D

Still, Freedman acknowledged that any serious cut to US force posture in=
  =

Europe could eventually make continued American leadership at SACEUR  =

harder to justify. =E2=80=9CAt some point, if you=E2=80=99re cutting you=
r forces below a  =

certain point, it would be very hard to explain why you=E2=80=99re holdi=
ng on to  =

the command.=E2=80=9D

Asked directly by Committee Chair Tan Dhesi MP whether the move was  =

imminent, Freedman replied: =E2=80=9CI hope it is not imminent.=E2=80=9D=


The conversation then turned to whether Europe could, in the event of a =
 =

diminished US presence, emerge as a =E2=80=9Cthird great power=E2=80=9D =
alongside the US  =

and China. While acknowledging that such a shift would likely bring  =

=E2=80=9Cshort-term pain=E2=80=9D for European states, Dhesi asked wheth=
er a truly unified  =

and rearmed Europe might reach that status in the coming years.

Freedman was sceptical: =E2=80=9CThe Europeans don=E2=80=99t have the un=
ity to think in  =

those terms yet,=E2=80=9D he said, noting that =E2=80=9CBritain, France,=
 Germany and Spain  =

were the great powers of the past,=E2=80=9D but the current political la=
ndscape is  =

far more complex.

While China, he observed, does not mirror the traditional model of a  =

globe-spanning great power, Europe lacks the political coherence require=
d  =

for such a role. =E2=80=9CThere used to be talk about the EU as a civil =
power=E2=80=A6 not  =

so militaristic and so on,=E2=80=9D he added.

Freedman concluded that while European nations may increasingly need to =
 =

=E2=80=9Cdo more on their own continent,=E2=80=9D achieving global great=
 power  =

status=E2=80=94particularly in the military sense=E2=80=94remains distan=
t.

Freedman is one of Britain=E2=80=99s foremost strategic thinkers and ser=
ved as  =

Professor of War Studies at King=E2=80=99s College London from 1982 to 2=
014. He  =

was a key foreign policy adviser to successive UK governments and was  =

appointed to the Iraq Inquiry panel in 2009. Known for his analysis of  =

nuclear strategy, international conflict, and the evolution of military =
 =

doctrine, his views continue to shape defence debates at the highest lev=
el.

### - makes sense all this, the US (or nato) are stepping down and europ=
e  =

can fund it's own damn equivalent defense force, even to the point of  =

potentially becoming a 3rd/4th world power if europe can really unite an=
d  =

become say: the federated/united states of europe, far more than just a =
 =

common market...

the 'panic' being - even though there's been no sign of it - that russia=
  =

could suddenly expand its aims to move into OTHER nations and thus the  =

rush to quickly amass a huge-enough force to fill the gap left by the US=
  =

and to act as a deterrent in it's own right, that europe in that sense i=
s  =

taking-over the support of ukraine in its war with russia...

the problem being that we talk a lot here about 'peace' and 'ceasefires'=
  =

and how russia isn't complying, but we're not actually offering russia  =

anything or negotiating a peace settlement as such, out of the blue we  =

just want them to declare a ceasefire for nothing in return, we're  =

demanding it, there is no negotiation...

So nothing's changed... we can send weapons 'into' ukraine to use but  =

can't directly do anything ourselves from outside ukraine, we can huff &=
  =

puff from the sidelines and even supply the weapons and support, but we =
 =

CAN'T intervene directly!

e.g., the uk has just announced sending 4.5 billion in new weapons to  =

ukraine, presumably the same 4.5 billion they just took away from the  =

disabled for winter fuel payments, and ukraine will quickly use them up =
 =

and need more, and that's on-top of the funds already pledged (more  =

billions)

the point being that unless russia 'actually' attacks another nation  =

beyond ukraine, then this could potentially continue-on, as-is, for year=
s!  =

literally!! and all to no avail!!!

meanwhile, they's now talking cryptically in europe, about how THIS is t=
he  =

CRUCIAL year and the CRUCIAL battle with russia!? (the crucial year? now=
??  =

not 2 or 3 years later??? so was this a slip?)

fact remains: unless WE attack russia, russia can just sit there exactly=
  =

right where it is, for decades, and there's nada we can do about it whil=
e  =

all our economies go slowly down the drain, else we seem to be banking a=
n  =

awful lot on russia making some bigger move, this being just like the uk=
  =

versus germany and the uk saying if you go into poland then we will be  =

at-war and lamenting the fact that we didn't act sooner... in that  =

instance germany did invade poland and it started ww2, but what if russi=
a  =

never DOES go any farther, what then??

'acting sooner' would have also meant attacking germany and declaring wa=
r  =

sooner, a move into poland being a step too far being what it all came  =

down to, exactly the same situation we're now AGAIN in today! (we  =

obviously didn't learn anything from history then!) everyone waiting to =
 =

see if 'the enemy' takes another step and THEN we'll act, but CAN'T act =
 =

BEFORE that without setting-off what everyone wants to avoid: an open  =

clash!

iow: it's a total stalemate situation! russia has played for stalemate a=
nd  =

gotten there! (it's actually been a series of stalemates all through,  =

first with ukraine and now europe?) and there's fuck-all we can now do  =

without it being VERY clear that WE'RE attacking them! (we could feed  =

endless supplies INTO ukraine but they haven't got endless manpower to  =

fight with! and we can't send them any troops either!)

so what's gonna happen given THAT scenario then thang, you tell me?

coz am scared it means we either attack russia and break the stalemate  =

THAT way, or suffer the economic consequences of being in a decades-long=
  =

stalemate situation that we can never win!

we can't AFFORD to continue like this for another year or 10!

(and that's dangerous coz WE'RE likely to start something!)

Ps... don't make the mistake of thinking am taking sides in 'any' of thi=
s  =

thang, am merely an interested observer in the audience watching the wor=
ld  =

grand masters champion chess final ;)