Re: [PATCH v10 12/27] ima: Define mac_admin_ns_capable() as a wrapper for ns_capable()
"Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.containers,org.kernel.vger.linux-integrity,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.linux-security-module |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Mon, Feb 07, 2022 at 01:43:31PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote: > > On 2/6/22 12:20, Stefan Berger wrote: > > > > On 2/5/22 00:58, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > On Tue, Feb 01, 2022 at 03:37:20PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote: > > > > Define mac_admin_ns_capable() as a wrapper for the combined > > > > ns_capable() > > > > checks on CAP_MAC_ADMIN and CAP_SYS_ADMIN in a user namespace. Return > > > > true on the check if either capability or both are available. > > > > > > > > Use mac_admin_ns_capable() in place of capable(SYS_ADMIN). This > > > > will allow > > > > an IMA namespace to read the policy with only CAP_MAC_ADMIN, which has > > > > less privileges than CAP_SYS_ADMIN. > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Denis Semakin <[email protected]> > > > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]> > > > > --- > > > >  include/linux/capability.h     | 6 ++++++ > > > >  security/integrity/ima/ima.h   | 6 ++++++ > > > >  security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 5 ++++- > > > >  3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h > > > > index 65efb74c3585..991579178f32 100644 > > > > --- a/include/linux/capability.h > > > > +++ b/include/linux/capability.h > > > > @@ -270,6 +270,12 @@ static inline bool > > > > checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns) > > > >          ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); > > > >  } > > > >  +static inline bool mac_admin_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns) > > > > +{ > > > > +   return ns_capable(ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN) || > > > > +       ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); > > > Do you care about audit warnings? If the task has CAP_SYS_ADMIN but > > > not CAP_MAC_ADMIN, is it desirable that selinux_capable() will audit the > > > CAP_MAC_ADMIN failure? > > > > Good point. I will switch both to ns_capable_noaudit() so that the user > > cannot provoke unnecessary audit message. > > Actually, I will only change the MAC_ADMIN to not do auditing and not > change the auditing behavior related to SYS_ADMIN. Right, that makes the most sense.