Re: [PATCH v9 4/5] proc: Skip the visibility check if subset=pid is used

On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 01:19:43PM +0200, Alexey Gladkov wrote:
> When procfs is mounted with the subset=pid option, all system files and
> directories from the root of the filesystem are not accessible in
> userspace. Only dynamic information about processes is available, which
> cannot be hidden with overmount.
> 
> For this reason, checking for full visibility is not relevant if mounting
> is performed with the subset=pid option.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <[email protected]>
> ---
>  fs/fs_context.c            |  1 +
>  fs/namespace.c             | 15 +++++++--------
>  fs/proc/root.c             |  7 +++++++
>  include/linux/fs_context.h |  1 +
>  4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/fs_context.c b/fs/fs_context.c
> index a37b0a093505..2fd3d6422a38 100644
> --- a/fs/fs_context.c
> +++ b/fs/fs_context.c
> @@ -545,6 +545,7 @@ void vfs_clean_context(struct fs_context *fc)
>  	kfree(fc->source);
>  	fc->source = NULL;
>  	fc->exclusive = false;
> +	fc->skip_visibility = false;
>  
>  	fc->purpose = FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE;
>  	fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_RECONF;
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index 539b74403072..32aaedb020c1 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -3755,7 +3755,7 @@ static int do_add_mount(struct mount *newmnt, const struct pinned_mountpoint *mp
>  	return graft_tree(newmnt, mp);
>  }
>  
> -static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags);
> +static bool mount_too_revealing(struct fs_context *fc, int *new_mnt_flags);
>  
>  /*
>   * Create a new mount using a superblock configuration and request it
> @@ -3764,19 +3764,17 @@ static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags
>  static int do_new_mount_fc(struct fs_context *fc, const struct path *mountpoint,
>  			   unsigned int mnt_flags)
>  {
> -	struct super_block *sb;
>  	struct vfsmount *mnt __free(mntput) = fc_mount(fc);
>  	int error;
>  
>  	if (IS_ERR(mnt))
>  		return PTR_ERR(mnt);
>  
> -	sb = fc->root->d_sb;
> -	error = security_sb_kern_mount(sb);
> +	error = security_sb_kern_mount(fc->root->d_sb);
>  	if (unlikely(error))
>  		return error;
>  
> -	if (unlikely(mount_too_revealing(sb, &mnt_flags))) {
> +	if (unlikely(mount_too_revealing(fc, &mnt_flags))) {
>  		errorfcp(fc, "VFS", "Mount too revealing");
>  		return -EPERM;
>  	}
> @@ -4463,7 +4461,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fsmount, int, fs_fd, unsigned int, flags,
>  		return ret;
>  
>  	ret = -EPERM;
> -	if (mount_too_revealing(fc->root->d_sb, &mnt_flags)) {
> +	if (mount_too_revealing(fc, &mnt_flags)) {
>  		errorfcp(fc, "VFS", "Mount too revealing");
>  		return ret;
>  	}
> @@ -6368,10 +6366,11 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns,
>  	return false;
>  }
>  
> -static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags)
> +static bool mount_too_revealing(struct fs_context *fc, int *new_mnt_flags)
>  {
>  	const unsigned long required_iflags = SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
>  	struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
> +	const struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
>  	unsigned long s_iflags;
>  
>  	if (ns->user_ns == &init_user_ns)
> @@ -6388,7 +6387,7 @@ static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags
>  		return true;
>  	}
>  
> -	return !mnt_already_visible(ns, sb, new_mnt_flags);
> +	return (!fc->skip_visibility && !mnt_already_visible(ns, sb, new_mnt_flags));
>  }
>  
>  bool mnt_may_suid(struct vfsmount *mnt)
> diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
> index 05558654df31..6dc870b3061b 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/root.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/root.c
> @@ -263,6 +263,13 @@ static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * The dynamic part of procfs cannot be hidden using overmount.
> +	 * Therefore, the check for "not fully visible" can be skipped.
> +	 */
> +	if (fs_info->pidonly)
> +		fc->skip_visibility = true;
> +
>  	/* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */
>  	s->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE | SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;

I think we should move the SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE check to the fs_type. It
really is something that applies to the filesystem type and isn't a
per-superblock thing. Then we can raise SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE only on
superblocks that are restricted via pid_only and discount those when
deciding to allow procfs mount without pid_only. Something that Aleksa
had pointed out on an earlier review. Let ms see if I can write that up.