Re: Filling a device with random data

On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 03:37:56PM +0000, Michael Kjörling wrote:
> On 9 Feb 2023 16:01 +0100, from [email protected] (David Joaquín Shourabi Porcel):
> > $ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/null status=progress
> > 4819285504 bytes (4,8 GB, 4,5 GiB) copied, 12 s, 402 MB/s^C
> > 9708379+0 records in
> > 9708378+0 records out
> > 4970689536 bytes (5,0 GB, 4,6 GiB) copied, 12,379 s, 402 MB/s
> 
> That's doing I/O in blocks of 512 bytes, so syscall overhead is likely
> to be a large limiting factor. (Each block requires at least a few
> kernel/userspace context switches through syscalls; at an _absolute_
> minimum, for each block, it's likely going to go through userspace dd
> to kernel read through kernel /dev/urandom driver to userspace dd to
> kernel write through kernel /dev/null driver to userspace dd.) Compare
> and contrast that to a cryptsetup benchmark which is likely (I haven't
> looked) primarily one or the other. If you want to gauge the
> performance of /dev/urandom, I suggest trying with something like
> bs=1M to reduce that overhead. Going from bs=512 to bs=1M I get an
> about 60% speed increase, although it still comes up far short of a
> cryptsetup benchmark (with bs=1M at about a quarter of the throughput
> of the cryptsetup benchmark on my particular system). So for fast
> storage media, going through a crypt mapping can still be beneficial,
> although the degree of benefit will obviously depend on the relative
> performance of CPU (including encryption instructions) and storage
> device. Whether you use a plain dm-crypt mapping or a LUKS container
> should be largely irrelevant for these purposes, however.
> 
> Similarly, when you're writing to a real-life storage device, doing so
> in blocks of 512 bytes is going to utterly devastate performance
> compared to using blocks on the order of tens of megabytes or even
> larger. (I realize that's not what either of your tests do.)
> 
> Also, what kernel version are you running?
> 
> The major advantage to doing a separate full-disk write with a
> throwaway key is that the data is going to be meaningless also through
> the eyes of the final LUKS container mapping. Depending on your use
> case, this can provide a slight confidentiality advantage.
> 
> Doing a full-disk overwrite pass on SSDs has its problems, though;
> primarily that it forces the SSD to consider every user-accessible
> block as being in use, hampering wear leveling. That becomes a far
> more delicate balancing act between storage metadata confidentiality
> (the full-disk overwrite hampers an attacker's ability to determine
> what blocks are in use) and giving the SSD's firmware a decent chance
> of doing wear leveling (for which you want to leave the underlying
> storage pristine and perhaps also allow TRIM passthrough, but which
> leaks information about which parts of the storage device are in use).
> 

While this is a creative use of dm-crypt, a cleaner way to generate very high
throughput cryptographically secure random data (specifically, even higher
throughput than /dev/urandom which is usually good enough) is to just generate
it in userspace.  For example, the command 'openssl rand $LENGTH' does this.

- Eric