Re: [Question] Distinction responsibilities LUKS and dm-crypt
Michael Kjörling <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.cryptsetup |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <04746dcc-945a-400a-bad7-747bf881bd69@localhost> |
On 31 Mar 2022 21:32 +0200, from [email protected] (Christoph Anton Mitterer): > Some people may say that with "plain" /.../ > /.../ > It may have some tiny advantages when using it for temporary devices > (like temporarily encrypted swap devices). For that use case I would prefer to say that using LUKS has no added benefit over a plain dm-crypt mapping, because the key material would be thrown away on a reboot anyway. (Effectively giving swap the same largely-emphemeral storage properties as RAM.) You _can_ do the same thing by reformatting a LUKS container before passing it to swapon(8), but doing so has no significant benefit that I can see compared to just re-opening a plain dm-crypt mapping with a key read each time from /dev/{u,}random and treating any pre-existing data as garbage. Another use case for plain dm-crypt mappings is when you want to pre-fill a storage device with random data to conceal which parts are in use by what's inside a LUKS container: my experience is that it's much faster to open a dm-crypt mapping with a throwaway key and then write from /dev/zero through it, than is writing from /dev/{u,}random to the raw backing device, and absent the key the output of any competent encryption algorithm _should_ be indistinguishable from random anyway. But maybe with the up-and-coming changes to /dev/{u,}random in Linux that'll be subject to change. -- Michael Kjörling • https://michael.kjorling.se • [email protected] “Remember when, on the Internet, nobody cared that you were a dog?”