Re: Looking for LUKS GUI
Michael Kjörling <[email protected]> Sat, 5 Apr 2025 17:47:35 +0000
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.cryptsetup |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 5 Apr 2025 16:22 +0000, from [email protected] (Darek Hisc): >> I tried to find Linux GUI install guide, but I can’t find it. > > Try ZuluCrypt https://github.com/mhogomchungu/zuluCrypt I'm not familiar with ZuluCrypt (looks like it's just a front-end for creating and mounting encrypted block devices?) but keep in mind that temporary files can be left scattered around the file system, particularly in places like /tmp, ~/.cache, ~/.local/state and ~/.local/tmp. The minimum for a situation like you describe should probably be: - LUKS for full-disk encryption at the system level _including_ the boot loader and kernel - Optionally separate encryption of different projects' data - Different, _unrelated_ passphrases for each such container - Use tmpfs for /tmp - Use encrypted swap with an ephemeral encryption key - A drop-by-default firewall configuration - Always make sure you are running up-to-date software, and be _extremely_ restrictive about installing from third-party repositories - Strong, unique passwords/passphrases _everywhere_ - Maintain physical control of the hardware (so that an adversary can't, for example, plug in a flush-with-the-port USB key logger while you are out for lunch) Your system might already be configured to do some of this; especially the last is not about software at all; and this mailing list is the wrong place to go into depth on how to set it all up. My point is that although LUKS and full-disk encryption can be an important component, _just_ LUKS (especially if used only for select data) probably won't be enough especially if an adversary is able to image the storage. For passwords and passphrases, I have a web page at <https://michael.kjorling.se/password-tips/> which is pretty much what it says on the tin. It's meant to be applicable to and _actionable_ by the general public; I basically wrote it because I grew tired of having to repeat it. :-) >> how really secure LUKS? > > TLDR: This is a golden standard for Linux for many years to encrypt > FDE (whole disk) in all Linux distributions I know. > To encrypt files, use ZuluCrypt or VeraCrypt (create containers for files). Unless you go out of your way to do otherwise, LUKS (via cryptsetup) uses well-understood industry-standard algorithms, and also includes techniques to make adversarial key recovery more difficult. (For example, the "anti-forensic stripes" or AF stripes in the LUKS header means that even a partially overwritten LUKS header is essentially useless for gaining access to the contents of the container it is associated with, often _even if_ you know a valid passphrase. Exceptions to this exist, but they are highly specific.) Essentially, if a LUKS container created with modern defaults uses a strong passphrase, then even for a highly resourceful adversary, it is believed to be computationally infeasible to gain access to the contents of that container _without_ actually somehow knowing a valid passphrase. Note all the caveats in that sentence, because they _are_ important. There _is_ a possibility that a weakness would be found in, say, Argon2 or AES-XTS which would change the security assumptions underlying LUKS; but personally, I would consider that unlikely, and if it were to happen, you certainly won't be alone in being in trouble with regards to data confidentiality. https://xkcd.com/538/ applies. -- Michael Kjörling 🔗 https://michael.kjorling.se