Re: Looking for LUKS GUI
Bill Merriam <[email protected]> Fri, 09 May 2025 20:17:49 -0400
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.cryptsetup |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
I have never used qubes-os but my understanding is that it intends to provide a secure environment without the loopholes you have mentioned. btw, I use LUKS encryption with a Yubico Bio key so decryption requires a password and a pin and a thumb print. I hope this prevents someone with a key logger from getting access but I can't be sure. The Yubikey emits FIDO2 credentials that LUKS uses for the decryption key. I will write up the process I use and send it to the list so others can criticize it or benefit from it. Bill On Sat, 2025-04-05 at 17:47 +0000, Michael Kjörling wrote: > On 5 Apr 2025 16:22 +0000, from [email protected] (Darek Hisc): > > > I tried to find Linux GUI install guide, but I can’t find it. > > > > Try ZuluCrypt https://github.com/mhogomchungu/zuluCrypt > > I'm not familiar with ZuluCrypt (looks like it's just a front-end for > creating and mounting encrypted block devices?) but keep in mind that > temporary files can be left scattered around the file system, > particularly in places like /tmp, ~/.cache, ~/.local/state and > ~/.local/tmp. > > The minimum for a situation like you describe should probably be: > > - LUKS for full-disk encryption at the system level _including_ the > boot loader and kernel > - Optionally separate encryption of different projects' data > - Different, _unrelated_ passphrases for each such container > - Use tmpfs for /tmp > - Use encrypted swap with an ephemeral encryption key > - A drop-by-default firewall configuration > - Always make sure you are running up-to-date software, and be > _extremely_ restrictive about installing from third-party > repositories > - Strong, unique passwords/passphrases _everywhere_ > - Maintain physical control of the hardware (so that an adversary > can't, for example, plug in a flush-with-the-port USB key logger > while you are out for lunch) > > Your system might already be configured to do some of this; > especially > the last is not about software at all; and this mailing list is the > wrong place to go into depth on how to set it all up. My point is > that > although LUKS and full-disk encryption can be an important component, > _just_ LUKS (especially if used only for select data) probably won't > be enough especially if an adversary is able to image the storage. > > For passwords and passphrases, I have a web page at > <https://michael.kjorling.se/password-tips/> which is pretty much > what > it says on the tin. It's meant to be applicable to and _actionable_ > by > the general public; I basically wrote it because I grew tired of > having to repeat it. :-) > > > > > how really secure LUKS? > > > > TLDR: This is a golden standard for Linux for many years to encrypt > > FDE (whole disk) in all Linux distributions I know. > > To encrypt files, use ZuluCrypt or VeraCrypt (create containers for > > files). > > Unless you go out of your way to do otherwise, LUKS (via cryptsetup) > uses well-understood industry-standard algorithms, and also includes > techniques to make adversarial key recovery more difficult. (For > example, the "anti-forensic stripes" or AF stripes in the LUKS header > means that even a partially overwritten LUKS header is essentially > useless for gaining access to the contents of the container it is > associated with, often _even if_ you know a valid passphrase. > Exceptions to this exist, but they are highly specific.) > > Essentially, if a LUKS container created with modern defaults uses a > strong passphrase, then even for a highly resourceful adversary, it > is > believed to be computationally infeasible to gain access to the > contents of that container _without_ actually somehow knowing a valid > passphrase. > > Note all the caveats in that sentence, because they _are_ important. > > There _is_ a possibility that a weakness would be found in, say, > Argon2 or AES-XTS which would change the security assumptions > underlying LUKS; but personally, I would consider that unlikely, and > if it were to happen, you certainly won't be alone in being in > trouble > with regards to data confidentiality. > > https://xkcd.com/538/ applies.