Re: Question about FAQ 5.21: "Why is there no "Nuke-Option"?"

On 11/6/25 3:38 PM, techmetx11 wrote:
> The outer configuration can have keyslots for the hardware security
> chips, to decrypt the inner configuration (which includes the keyslot
> parameters for the duress password and the normal password, and other
> LUKS parameters). Not only does this make it so that wiping the
> HSM/TPM/etc. permanently destroys any chance of decrypting the inner
> configuration and thus the rest of the hard drive, this may also make it
> hard to determine if the hard drive is "booby-trapped" just from reading
> the LUKS header.
> 
> Why was not such a design considered for this kind of setup? (if it wasn't
> due to complexity). Computers have advanced so far after
> (persumably) this FAQ entry was written

Cryptsetup never communicates directly with TPM or HSM; it only provides
space for storing metadata through LUKS2.

Integration with TPM is handled in systemd-cryptsetup; it is not part
of the cryptsetup project, but rather a subsystem within systemd.

Moreover, such data-destruction options are not user-friendly; there will
be many users who do not understand the concept and will wipe data by mistake.

If you want it, you can easily implement it through some external tool.

The nuke option will never be supported directly by libcryptsetup.
If you disagree, do not use LUKS. It is your choice.

Milan