[PATCH v36 5/7] firmware: imx: adds miscdev
Pankaj Gupta via B4 Relay <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.imx,org.kernel.feeds.b4-sent,org.kernel.vger.linux-devicetree,org.kernel.vger.linux-doc,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
From: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]> Adds the driver for communication interface to secure-enclave, that enables exchanging messages with NXP secure enclave HW IP(s) like EdgeLock Enclave, from: - User-Space Applications via character driver. ABI documentation for the NXP secure-enclave driver. User-space library using this driver: - i.MX Secure Enclave library: -- URL: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-secure-enclave.git, - i.MX Secure Middle-Ware: -- URL: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-smw.git Following checks are performed on the incoming msg-header, to block exchanging invalid arbitrary commands: - maximum allowed words, - check if command-tag & response-tag are valid - version, - command id validation check, to allow limited base-line API(s) and restrict following: - exchanging power management commands. - reset requests. - BBSM configuration requests. - re-initializing the FW. - RNG init - CAAM resource release management - SE's internal memory management. from user-space. Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]> --- Changes from v35 to v36: 1. [High] Session/storage handle leaked when the response copy-out failed. se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_handler() ran fw_api_specific_ops() - which records the FW-allocated session/storage handle carried in the response - only at the very end, after se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data() and copy_to_user(). If the caller supplied a bad output pointer those copy-out steps failed and the handler returned early, so a handle the firmware had already committed was never recorded. cleanup_dev_ctx() could then never close it and the handle leaked in FW. Record the handle first: call fw_api_specific_ops() at the top of the well-formed-response block, before the copy-out steps, so the handle is tracked (and closed on teardown) regardless of a later copy-out failure. 2. [High] close() racing driver unbind could transmit on a freed mailbox tx channel. ele_msg_send_rcv() checks going_away and arms the transaction under clbk_rx_lock, but mbox_send_message() on priv->tx_chan runs after that spinlock is dropped. A sender that passed the going_away check just before se_if_probe_cleanup() set it could still be inside mbox_send_message() when teardown freed tx_chan - a use-after-free in the mailbox layer. Teardown deliberately does not hold se_if_cmd_lock across the whole unbind (that would stall it for a full receive timeout), so add a short drain barrier instead: after the device context list has been cleaned up, acquire and immediately release se_if_cmd_lock before mbox_free_channel(). going_away is already set and complete_all() has already fired, so any in-flight transaction unwinds to -ENODEV and drops the lock promptly; the barrier cannot stall unbind for a timeout and cannot deadlock. After it, no sender can be inside mbox_send_message(), so freeing the channels is safe. 3. [High] A signal during the long-timeout wait left the task effectively unkillable. For userspace waiters ele_msg_rcv() deferred a signal by recording it and then waiting fully uninterruptibly (wait_for_completion_timeout()) until the FW response or the timeout. The userspace-context timeout is SE_RCV_MSG_LONG_TIMEOUT_MS (5000 s), so a task that took a signal could sit in uninterruptible sleep for well over an hour, ignoring even SIGKILL and tripping the hung-task watchdog. Switch the deferred-signal wait to wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(): a non-fatal signal is still deferred (recorded once, then the wait continues killably, so the in-flight command is neither abandoned nor re-sent), but a fatal signal now terminates the wait. On that fatal exit the response buffer is quarantined under clbk_rx_lock (rx_msg cleared, circuit breaker armed) exactly like the timeout path, because the enclave may still DMA into the caller's buffer as it is freed. The one exception is a genuine response that raced in just before the fatal signal: se_if_rx_callback() has already copied it and set rx_delivered under the same lock, so the buffer is done with; that case is reported as a normal receive (rx_msg_sz) so the handle it carries is still recorded and closed on teardown rather than leaked. 4. [Critical] Physical DMA addresses embedded in raw FW commands. NO-CHANGE. The addresses that reach the enclave in a SE_IOCTL_CMD_SEND_RCV_RSP payload are produced by the driver itself: userspace stages buffers via SE_IOCTL_SETUP_IOBUF, and get_shared_mem_slot() returns a kernel-chosen ele_addr inside the context's own coherent buffer, carved from the bounded, no-map reserved DMA pool bound at probe. Userspace never supplies a raw physical address that the driver forwards verbatim. The raw command channel is a privileged interface whose trust boundary is the enclave firmware, which validates and confines every address it is handed. Adding a driver-side physical-address allowlist would duplicate that firmware check without adding a boundary. No code change. 5. [High] Use-after-free of se_if_open_gate on the open()/unbind race. NO-CHANGE - false positive; the gate lifetime is refcounted and the misc core serialises open against deregister. misc_open() and misc_deregister() both run under the misc core's misc_mtx, so an fops->open() cannot begin after the node is deregistered. The gate is a separately kref'd object; se_if_fops_open() takes its reference with kref_get_unless_zero(), which fails once teardown has begun dropping the last reference, so open() returns -ENODEV instead of touching a dying object, and re-validates gate->dying/gate->priv under gate->lock afterwards. The object is not freed until its own kref hits zero, which cannot happen while this path holds (or fails to obtain) a reference. No code change. Reported-by: sashiko-bot <[email protected]> Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=5 --- Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev | 44 + drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c | 94 +- drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h | 19 + drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c | 309 +++++- drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h | 77 ++ drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.c | 339 ++++++ drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.h | 98 ++ drivers/firmware/imx/ele_msg_addr_field.c | 650 +++++++++++ drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c | 1681 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h | 90 ++ include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h | 97 ++ 12 files changed, 3442 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev b/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c6b8e16bda78 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +What: /dev/<se>_mu[0-9]+_ch[0-9]+ +Date: Mar 2025 +KernelVersion: 6.8 +Contact: [email protected], [email protected] +Description: + NXP offers multiple hardware IP(s) for secure enclaves like EdgeLock- + Enclave(ELE), SECO. The character device file descriptors + /dev/<se>_mu*_ch* are the interface between userspace NXP's secure- + enclave shared library and the kernel driver. + + The ioctl(2)-based ABI is defined and documented in + [include]<linux/firmware/imx/ele_mu_ioctl.h>. + ioctl(s) are used primarily for: + + - shared memory management + - allocation of I/O buffers + - getting mu info + - setting a dev-ctx as receiver to receive all the commands from FW + - getting SoC info + - send command and receive command response + + The following file operations are supported: + + open(2) + Currently the only useful flags are O_RDWR. + + read(2) + Every read() from the opened character device context is waiting on + wait_event_interruptible, that gets set by the registered mailbox callback + function, indicating a message received from the firmware on message- + unit. + + write(2) + Every write() to the opened character device context needs to acquire + mailbox_lock before sending message on to the message unit. + + close(2) + Stops and frees up the I/O contexts that were associated + with the file descriptor. + +Users: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-secure-enclave.git, + https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-smw.git, + crypto/skcipher, + drivers/nvmem/imx-ocotp-ele.c diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile index 4412b15846b1..33f30eaedad5 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile @@ -4,5 +4,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMX_SCU) += imx-scu.o misc.o imx-scu-irq.o rm.o imx-scu-soc.o obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SCMI_CPU_DRV} += sm-cpu.o obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SCMI_MISC_DRV} += sm-misc.o obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SCMI_LMM_DRV} += sm-lmm.o -sec_enclave-objs = se_ctrl.o ele_common.o ele_base_msg.o +sec_enclave-objs = se_ctrl.o ele_common.o ele_base_msg.o ele_fw_api.o ele_msg_addr_field.o obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SEC_ENCLAVE} += sec_enclave.o diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c index b70e3ef88a16..78fe40206298 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c @@ -15,13 +15,67 @@ #define FW_DBG_DUMP_FIXED_STR "ELE" +int ele_uapi_allowed_base_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, + struct se_msg_hdr *header, u32 tx_msg_sz) +{ + struct se_api_msg *msg = container_of(header, struct se_api_msg, header); + const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields; + size_t count; + + /* + * Identify the command first. Only commands in this allow-list may be + * issued from userspace; everything else is rejected. Once a command is + * known to be supported, decide whether it needs a DMA-address boundary + * check and, if so, run it before returning. + */ + switch (header->command) { + case ELE_PING_REQ: + case ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ: + case ELE_OEM_VERIFY_IMAGE_REQ: + case ELE_OEM_REL_CONTAINER_REQ: + case ELE_FW_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ: + case ELE_READ_FUSE_REQ: + case ELE_GET_FW_VERS_REQ: + case ELE_RETURN_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ: + case ELE_GET_EVENT_REQ: + case ELE_COMMIT_REQ: + case ELE_GET_FW_STATUS_REQ: + case ELE_WRITE_FUSE: + case ELE_WRITE_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ: + case ELE_READ_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ: + return 0; + default: + /* Base commands that embed DMA addresses. */ + fields = ele_base_cmd_addr_fields(header->command, &count); + if (!count) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return se_val_cmd_addrs(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz, fields, count); + } +} + static void ele_get_info_cleanup(struct se_if_priv *priv, u32 *buf, dma_addr_t d_addr, size_t size) { - if (priv->mem_pool) - gen_pool_free(priv->mem_pool, (unsigned long)buf, size); - else - dma_free_coherent(priv->dev, size, buf, d_addr); + /* For the case when priv->mem_pool != NULL: + * + * If this probe-time transaction timed out, the firmware may + * still write into the SRAM buffer after this function returns. + * Do not release it back to the pool while the firmware-busy + * circuit breaker still marks this context as owning an + * outstanding transaction. The buffer is reclaimed with the + * device on unbind; leaking this fixed-size probe buffer is + * preferable to letting the firmware corrupt reused pool memory. + * This mirrors the guard already applied on the shared-memory + * cleanup path below. + */ + + if (priv->mem_pool) { + if (se_is_fw_busy_ctx(priv->priv_dev_ctx)) + return; + se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(priv->priv_dev_ctx, true); + } else { + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(priv->priv_dev_ctx); + } } int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info) @@ -34,6 +88,7 @@ int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info) if (!priv) return -EINVAL; + guard(mutex)(&priv->priv_dev_ctx->fops_lock); memset(s_info, 0x0, sizeof(*s_info)); struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) = @@ -47,24 +102,23 @@ int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info) return -ENOMEM; get_info_len = ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ; - if (priv->mem_pool) - get_info_data = gen_pool_dma_alloc(priv->mem_pool, - get_info_len, - &get_info_addr); - else - get_info_data = dma_alloc_coherent(priv->dev, - get_info_len, - &get_info_addr, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!get_info_data) { - dev_err(priv->dev, - "%s: Failed to allocate get_info_addr.", __func__); - return -ENOMEM; + if (priv->mem_pool) { + ret = se_get_mem_pool_buf(priv->priv_dev_ctx, &get_info_data, + &get_info_addr, get_info_len); + if (ret) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed[0x%x] to alloc from gen_pool.\n", ret); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } else { + ret = get_shared_mem_slot(priv->priv_dev_ctx, + &get_info_len, &get_info_addr, + &get_info_data); + if (ret) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to allocate buffer.\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } } - /* gen_pool_dma_alloc() does not zero the buffer. */ - memset(get_info_data, 0, get_info_len); - se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header, ELE_GET_INFO_REQ, ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ, true); diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h index 02525d5e2873..50e2a1a75716 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h @@ -29,6 +29,19 @@ #define ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ_SZ 0x4 #define ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ 0x5c +#define ELE_OEM_AUTH_CONTAINER_REQ 0x87 +#define ELE_OEM_VERIFY_IMAGE_REQ 0x88 +#define ELE_OEM_REL_CONTAINER_REQ 0x89 +#define ELE_FW_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ 0x95 +#define ELE_READ_FUSE_REQ 0x97 +#define ELE_GET_FW_VERS_REQ 0x9d +#define ELE_RETURN_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ 0xa0 +#define ELE_GET_EVENT_REQ 0xa2 +#define ELE_COMMIT_REQ 0xa8 +#define ELE_GEN_KEY_BLOB_REQ 0xaf +#define ELE_GET_FW_STATUS_REQ 0xc5 +#define ELE_WRITE_FUSE 0xd6 + #define ELE_GET_INFO_REQ 0xda #define ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ 0x10 #define ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ 0x08 @@ -71,6 +84,10 @@ struct ele_dev_info { #define ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ (sizeof(struct ele_dev_info) \ + ELE_DEV_INFO_EXTRA_SZ) +#define ELE_DEV_ATTEST_REQ 0xdb +#define ELE_WRITE_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ 0xf2 +#define ELE_READ_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ 0xf3 + #define ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ 0xdf #define ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ_MSG_SZ 0x18 #define ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_RSP_MSG_SZ 0x0c @@ -97,4 +114,6 @@ int ele_service_swap(struct se_if_priv *priv, dma_addr_t addr, int ele_fw_authenticate(struct se_if_priv *priv, dma_addr_t contnr_addr, dma_addr_t img_addr); int ele_debug_dump(struct se_if_priv *priv); +int ele_uapi_allowed_base_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, + struct se_msg_hdr *header, u32 tx_msg_sz); #endif diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c index b662063c3b1c..dc868949186f 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c @@ -5,6 +5,147 @@ #include "ele_base_msg.h" #include "ele_common.h" +#include "ele_fw_api.h" +#include "se_ctrl.h" + +int se_chk_tx_msg_hdr(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header, + u32 tx_msg_sz) +{ + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + + if (!header->size || header->size > MAX_WORD_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + if (header->tag != priv->if_defs->cmd_tag && + header->tag != priv->if_defs->rsp_tag) + return -EINVAL; + + if (header->ver == priv->if_defs->base_api_ver) + return ele_uapi_allowed_base_cmd(dev_ctx, header, tx_msg_sz); + else if (header->ver == priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver) + return ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd(dev_ctx, header, tx_msg_sz); + + return -EINVAL; +} + +/* + * Reject a command that embeds a DMA physical address which does not point + * inside this context's shared-memory window. The userspace library stages all + * command buffers in that coherent region (see get_shared_mem_slot), so any + * address outside [dma_addr, dma_addr + size) is not one the driver handed out + * and must not be forwarded to firmware. Absent optional buffers are encoded as + * a zero address and skipped; polymorphic key words are only range-checked when + * their gating flag marks them as a plaintext-key buffer rather than an integer + * key identifier. An address may occupy one word (FW-API, low 32 bits only) or + * two words (some base-API commands split it into low and high halves). + * + * When a field also names a size word, the buffer length carried there is + * validated too: the whole buffer [addr, addr + len) must fit inside the + * window, not just its start address. The check is written as len > end - addr + * (addr is already known to be < end) so it cannot overflow. + */ +int se_val_cmd_addrs(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_api_msg *msg, + u32 tx_msg_sz, const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields, + size_t count) +{ + const struct se_shared_mem *mem = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt.non_secure_mem; + u32 payload_words; + size_t i; + u64 base, end; + + if (!fields || !count) + return 0; + + if (!msg) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Number of complete u32 payload words present after the header. */ + if (tx_msg_sz < SE_MU_HDR_SZ) + return -EINVAL; + /* + * The caller-supplied byte count must agree with the size the firmware + * will act on (header word-size field, in 32-bit words), so a lying + * header cannot make us validate fewer words than are actually sent. + */ + if (tx_msg_sz != (u32)msg->header.size * sizeof(u32)) + return -EINVAL; + payload_words = (tx_msg_sz - SE_MU_HDR_SZ) / sizeof(u32); + + base = (u64)mem->dma_addr; + end = base + mem->size; + + /* A zero-sized or wrapping window can never contain a valid buffer. */ + if (end <= base) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + const struct se_cmd_addr_field *f = &fields[i]; + u64 addr; + + /* Every word the field references must lie within the message. */ + if (f->lsb_idx >= payload_words) + return -EINVAL; + if (f->has_msb && f->msb_idx >= payload_words) + return -EINVAL; + + if (f->flag_idx != SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS) { + bool flag_set; + + if (f->flag_idx >= payload_words) + return -EINVAL; + + flag_set = !!(msg->data[f->flag_idx] & f->flag_mask); + /* + * When the flag does not select DMA-address mode the + * word holds an integer key identifier; leave it alone. + */ + if (flag_set != f->is_addr_when_set) + continue; + } + + addr = msg->data[f->lsb_idx]; + if (f->has_msb) + addr |= (u64)msg->data[f->msb_idx] << 32; + + /* Zero marks an absent optional buffer. */ + if (!addr) + continue; + + if (addr < base || addr >= end) + return -EACCES; + + /* + * When the message also carries this buffer's length, the whole + * buffer [addr, addr + len) must fit inside the window, not just + * its start. addr is already >= base and < end here, so end - addr + * is a positive value and the comparison cannot overflow. + */ + if (f->size_idx != SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE) { + u64 len; + + if (f->size_idx >= payload_words) + return -EINVAL; + + /* size_mask == 0 with a valid size_idx is a descriptor bug. */ + if (!f->size_mask) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Widen to u64 before shifting: size_shift is u8 and + * shifting a u32 by >= 32 is undefined behaviour. + */ + len = ((u64)msg->data[f->size_idx] >> f->size_shift) & f->size_mask; + if (len > end - addr) + return -EACCES; + } else if (f->buf_size) { + /* buf_size: literal byte count (FW-defined constant or saved at runtime). */ + if ((u64)f->buf_size > end - addr) + return -EACCES; + } + } + + return 0; +} /* * se_update_msg_chksum() - calculate and update message checksum word. @@ -46,20 +187,50 @@ int se_update_msg_chksum(u32 *msg, u32 msg_len) return 0; } +static void se_mark_fw_busy(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx) +{ + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags); + if (!priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx) { + kref_get(&dev_ctx->refcount); + priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx = dev_ctx; + atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 1); + } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags); +} + +void set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 timeout_ms) +{ + dev_ctx->rcv_msg_timeout_jiffies = msecs_to_jiffies(timeout_ms); +} + int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl) { struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; bool is_rsp_wait_with_timeout = false; bool wait_uninterruptible = false; + bool wait_killable = false; unsigned long remaining_jiffies; unsigned long deadline_jiffies; unsigned long flags; int ret; - remaining_jiffies = msecs_to_jiffies(SE_RCV_MSG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS); + remaining_jiffies = dev_ctx->rcv_msg_timeout_jiffies; if (se_clbk_hdl == &priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl) { is_rsp_wait_with_timeout = true; deadline_jiffies = jiffies + remaining_jiffies; + + /* + * Internal kernel transactions run on priv_dev_ctx (probe + * get_info/ping, FW auth, PM IMEM swap). They are not tied to a + * restartable syscall, so wait uninterruptibly: PM freezer fake + * signals must not abort them with -ERESTARTSYS. Userspace + * waiters stay interruptible via the deferred-signal path below. + */ + if (se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx == priv->priv_dev_ctx) + wait_uninterruptible = true; } do { @@ -71,7 +242,7 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL; if (!completion_done(&se_clbk_hdl->done)) - atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 1); + se_mark_fw_busy(dev_ctx); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); ret = -ETIMEDOUT; break; @@ -82,23 +253,67 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk if (wait_uninterruptible) ret = wait_for_completion_timeout(&se_clbk_hdl->done, remaining_jiffies); + else if (wait_killable) + ret = wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(&se_clbk_hdl->done, + remaining_jiffies); else ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(&se_clbk_hdl->done, remaining_jiffies); if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS) { /* - * Record that a signal was observed, then continue waiting non- - * interruptibly until the response arrives or the timeout - * expires. The caller can surface the interruption to userspace - * after the protocol transaction is brought back to a - * synchronized state. + * First, non-fatal signal on the interruptible userspace + * path: defer it. Record that a signal was observed and keep + * waiting - now only killably - until the response arrives or + * the timeout expires. ele_msg_send_rcv() then surfaces the + * interruption to userspace as -ERESTARTSYS once the protocol + * transaction has resynchronised, so the in-flight command is + * neither abandoned nor re-sent. + * + * Waiting killably rather than fully uninterruptibly is what + * keeps a fatal signal (SIGKILL) able to terminate the task: + * a non-fatal signal no longer aborts the wait, but the task + * can never get stuck for the multi-thousand-second long + * timeout and trip the hung-task watchdog. */ - if (is_rsp_wait_with_timeout && + if (is_rsp_wait_with_timeout && !wait_killable && READ_ONCE(se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg)) { WRITE_ONCE(se_clbk_hdl->signal_rcvd, true); - wait_uninterruptible = true; + wait_killable = true; continue; } + + /* + * Reached here either on the command-receiver path (no + * response buffer of the caller's to protect) or because a + * fatal signal fired on the killable path above. In the + * latter case the task is being killed but the enclave may + * still DMA into the caller's response buffer, which is about + * to be freed. Quarantine it under clbk_rx_lock - drop rx_msg + * so a late se_if_rx_callback() cannot copy into freed memory, + * and arm the circuit breaker - exactly like the timeout path + * below. + * + * The exception is a genuine response that raced in just + * before the fatal signal: se_if_rx_callback() has already + * copied it and set rx_delivered under the same lock, so the + * enclave is done with the buffer. Report it as a normal + * receive (rx_msg_sz) so the handle it carries is still + * recorded and later closed, rather than leaked. + */ + if (is_rsp_wait_with_timeout) { + spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); + if (se_clbk_hdl->rx_delivered) { + ret = se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); + break; + } + if (se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) { + se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL; + if (!completion_done(&se_clbk_hdl->done)) + se_mark_fw_busy(dev_ctx); + } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); + } break; } @@ -119,7 +334,7 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL; if (!completion_done(&se_clbk_hdl->done)) - atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 1); + se_mark_fw_busy(dev_ctx); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); ret = -ETIMEDOUT; @@ -128,8 +343,35 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type)); break; } + + /* + * A positive wait return normally means a real response. During + * teardown, se_if_probe_cleanup() forces this wait to return via + * complete_all() with no response, while the enclave may still + * DMA into the shared buffer. Treat that as a failed transaction + * and arm the circuit breaker so the buffer is quarantined, not + * freed. + * + * rx_delivered tells the two apart: se_if_rx_callback() sets it + * under clbk_rx_lock only after copying a real response. This + * keeps teardown-time session/storage close responses from being + * mistaken for the forced abort, which would fail the close and + * leak its DMA buffer. + */ + spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); + if (is_rsp_wait_with_timeout && atomic_read(&priv->going_away) && + !se_clbk_hdl->rx_delivered) { + se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL; + se_mark_fw_busy(dev_ctx); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); + ret = -ENODEV; + break; + } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); + ret = se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz; break; + } while (ret < 0); return ret; @@ -190,16 +432,42 @@ int ele_msg_send_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void *tx_msg, guard(mutex)(&priv->se_if_cmd_lock); + /* + * Arm the transaction under clbk_rx_lock. se_if_probe_cleanup() sets + * going_away under this same lock, then complete_all()s, so checking + * going_away and arming (reinit_completion() + publish) together makes + * teardown and arming mutually exclusive and closes the lost-wakeup + * window. priv_dev_ctx teardown-close commands are still let through. + * + * Check going_away before fw_busy so a caller racing unbind gets + * -ENODEV, not a misleading retryable -EBUSY. fw_busy is only + * atomic_read() here, so no fw_busy_lock is taken and there is no + * deadlock. + */ + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags); + if (atomic_read(&priv->going_away) && + (dev_ctx != priv->priv_dev_ctx || + !is_msg_xchng_for_tdown(tx_msg))) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags); + return -ENODEV; + } + if (atomic_read(&priv->fw_busy)) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags); dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: ELE became unresponsive.\n", dev_ctx->devname); return -EBUSY; } + reinit_completion(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.done); - /* Publish rx_msg/rx_msg_sz under the lock read by se_if_rx_callback(). */ - spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags); priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx = dev_ctx; priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz = exp_rx_msg_sz; priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg = rx_msg; + /* + * Arm a fresh transaction: clear the delivered flag so a stale value + * from a previous response cannot make ele_msg_rcv() mistake a + * teardown-forced complete_all() for a genuine firmware response. + */ + priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_delivered = false; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags); err = ele_msg_send(dev_ctx, tx_msg, tx_msg_sz); @@ -248,6 +516,7 @@ static bool check_hdr_exception_for_sz(struct se_if_priv *priv, void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg) { struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl; + bool schedule_fw_busy_work = false; struct device *dev = mbox_cl->dev; const char *devname = NULL; struct se_msg_hdr *header; @@ -325,9 +594,13 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg) se_clbk_hdl = &priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl; spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); if (!se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) { - /* Close circuit breaker on spinlock race */ - atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 0); + if (atomic_read(&priv->fw_busy)) + schedule_fw_busy_work = true; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); + + if (schedule_fw_busy_work) + schedule_work(&priv->fw_busy_work); + dev_info(dev, "ELE responded (late), recovery FW available."); return; } @@ -347,6 +620,12 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg) se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz = min(rx_msg_sz, exp_rx_msg_sz); devname = se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx->devname; memcpy(se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg, msg, se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz); + /* + * Mark that a genuine firmware response was delivered. ele_msg_rcv() + * reads this under clbk_rx_lock to avoid mistaking this response for + * a teardown-forced complete_all() wakeup. + */ + se_clbk_hdl->rx_delivered = true; complete(&se_clbk_hdl->done); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); @@ -398,7 +677,7 @@ int se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_api_msg *msg, return -EINVAL; } - if (header->size > SE_MU_HDR_WORD_SZ) { + if (header->size > SE_MU_HDR_WORD_SZ && (sz >> 2) > SE_MU_HDR_WORD_SZ) { status = RES_STATUS(msg->data[0]); if (status != priv->if_defs->success_tag) { dev_dbg(priv->dev, "Command Id[%x], Response Failure = 0x%x", diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h index 07e6b6a1bafa..6d29add2fc8e 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h @@ -9,11 +9,15 @@ #include "se_ctrl.h" #define SE_RCV_MSG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS 3000 +#define SE_RCV_MSG_LONG_TIMEOUT_MS 5000000 #define ELE_SUCCESS_IND 0xD6 #define IMX_ELE_FW_DIR "imx/ele/" +#define MAX_WORD_SIZE 0x20 + +void set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 val); int se_update_msg_chksum(u32 *msg, u32 msg_len); int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl); @@ -28,6 +32,76 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg); int se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_api_msg *msg, u8 msg_id, u8 sz, bool is_base_api); +/* + * A number of ELE commands carry DMA physical addresses inside their message + * payload. se_val_cmd_addrs() range-checks each such address against the + * calling context's shared-memory window before the message reaches firmware. + * + * data[] index = message WORD index - 1, because the 4-byte se_msg_hdr is + * message WORD 0 and se_api_msg.data[0] is message WORD 1. + * + * struct se_cmd_addr_field describes one address embedded in the payload: + * lsb_idx - data[] index of the low 32 bits of the address + * msb_idx - data[] index of the high 32 bits, valid only when + * has_msb is set. Some base-API commands split the + * address into two words; FW-API commands do not. + * has_msb - true when the address occupies two words (lsb + msb) + * flag_idx - data[] index of the flag word that selects whether + * data[lsb_idx] is a DMA address or an integer key + * identifier; SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS when the word is always + * a DMA address + * flag_mask - the selecting flag bit, already shifted to its position + * inside the 32-bit little-endian flag word + * is_addr_when_set - true when the word is a DMA address if the flag bit is + * set; false when it is an address if the bit is clear + * (inverse polarity, e.g. VERIFY_SIGN OPAQUE_KEY) + * size_idx - data[] index of the word carrying the length in bytes + * of the buffer at this address. se_val_cmd_addrs() uses + * it to confirm the whole buffer [addr, addr + len) fits + * inside the shared-memory window, not just its start. + * SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE when the message carries no length + * for this buffer. + * size_shift - right shift applied to the size word before masking, + * for a length packed into the high half of a word + * size_mask - bitmask applied after the shift to extract the length + * from the message word (0xFFFFFFFF for a full 32-bit + * length, 0xFFFF for a u16, 0xFF for a u8). Used only + * when size_idx != SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE; zero otherwise. + * buf_size - literal byte count used when size_idx == + * SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE and buf_size != 0: the whole + * buffer [addr, addr + buf_size) must fit inside the + * shared-memory window. Use this for buffers whose size + * is a firmware-defined constant not carried in the + * message, or populated at runtime via + * ele_set_sz_in_field_addr(). Zero means no end-bound + * check (start-address check only; see comments at each + * descriptor entry for the accepted exception rationale). + */ +struct se_cmd_addr_field { + u8 lsb_idx; + u8 msb_idx; + bool has_msb; + u8 flag_idx; + u32 flag_mask; + bool is_addr_when_set; + u8 size_idx; + u8 size_shift; + u32 size_mask; + u32 buf_size; +}; + +#define SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS 0xEFu +#define SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE 0xFFu + +int se_val_cmd_addrs(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_api_msg *msg, + u32 tx_msg_sz, const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields, + size_t count); + +const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_fw_cmd_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count); +const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_fw_rsp_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count); +const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_base_cmd_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count); +void ele_set_sz_in_field_addr(u8 cmd, u32 size); + /* Fill a command message header with a given command ID and length in bytes. */ static inline void se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_msg_hdr *hdr, u8 cmd, u32 len, bool is_base_api) @@ -42,4 +116,7 @@ int se_save_imem_state(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_imem_buf *imem); int se_restore_imem_state(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_imem_buf *imem); +int se_chk_tx_msg_hdr(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header, + u32 tx_msg_sz); + #endif /*__ELE_COMMON_H__ */ diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e237dfa16377 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.c @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Copyright 2026 NXP + */ + +#include "se_ctrl.h" +#include "ele_common.h" +#include "ele_fw_api.h" + +static int se_cmd_receiver_allowed_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, + struct se_api_msg *msg, u32 tx_msg_sz) +{ + u8 cmd = msg->header.command; + + switch (cmd) { + case ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ: + case ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ: + return 0; + case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_IMPORT_REQ: + const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields; + size_t count; + + fields = ele_fw_cmd_addr_fields(cmd, &count); + return se_val_cmd_addrs(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz, fields, count); + default: + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } +} + +static int se_cmd_receiver_allowed_rsp(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, + struct se_api_msg *msg, u32 tx_msg_sz) +{ + const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields; + u8 cmd = msg->header.command; + size_t count; + + switch (cmd) { + case ELE_STORAGE_EXPORT_FINISH_REQ: + case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_DONE_REQ: + case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_DELETE_REQ: + return 0; + default: + /* + * These responses supply a kernel buffer address to firmware. + * Range-check the embedded DMA address against the calling + * context's shared-memory window before the message is sent. + */ + fields = ele_fw_rsp_addr_fields(cmd, &count); + if (!count) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return se_val_cmd_addrs(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz, fields, count); + } +} + +int ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header, + u32 tx_msg_sz) +{ + struct se_api_msg *msg = container_of(header, struct se_api_msg, header); + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields; + bool is_cmd_receiver = false; + size_t count; + int ret = 0; + + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) + if (dev_ctx == priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx) + is_cmd_receiver = true; + + if (is_cmd_receiver) { + if (header->tag == priv->if_defs->cmd_tag) + return se_cmd_receiver_allowed_cmd(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz); + + if (header->tag == priv->if_defs->rsp_tag) + return se_cmd_receiver_allowed_rsp(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz); + } + + /* Reject any response message with non-command receiver */ + if (header->tag == priv->if_defs->rsp_tag) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + /* Reject any other tag */ + if (header->tag != priv->if_defs->cmd_tag) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + /* + * Identify the command first. Session/storage commands enforce their + * own-handle checks; crypto commands that embed DMA addresses defer to + * the shared range check below. Any command not named here is left with + * ret == 0 (permitted) as before. + */ + switch (header->command) { + case ELE_SESSION_OPEN_REQ: + /* Might be cleared as part of tear down. */ + ret = dev_ctx->sess_hdl ? -EEXIST : 0; + break; + case ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ: + /* Might be cleared as part of tear down. */ + if (!dev_ctx->sess_hdl) { + ret = -ENXIO; + break; + } + /* + * A close request must target this context's own session. The + * handle to close is carried in the payload (data[0]); reject a + * request whose buffer is too short to hold it, or whose handle + * does not match this context. Checking the buffer size first + * also keeps the data[0] read in bounds. This stops one process + * from closing - and leaking - another process's session with a + * spoofed handle. + */ + if (tx_msg_sz < ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ || + msg->data[0] != dev_ctx->sess_hdl) + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + case ELE_FW_GET_INFO_REQ: + case ELE_KEY_STORE_OPEN_REQ: + case ELE_KEY_STORE_CLOSE_REQ: + case ELE_KEY_MGMT_OPEN_REQ: + case ELE_KEY_MGMT_CLOSE_REQ: + case ELE_MANAGE_KEY_GROUP_REQ: + case ELE_GET_KEY_ATTR_REQ: + case ELE_KEY_DELETE_REQ: + case ELE_MAC_OPEN_REQ: + case ELE_MAC_CLOSE_REQ: + case ELE_CIPHER_OPEN_REQ: + case ELE_CIPHER_CLOSE_REQ: + case ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_OPEN_REQ: + case ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_CLOSE_REQ: + case ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_OPEN_REQ: + case ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_CLOSE_REQ: + case ELE_DATA_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ: + case ELE_DATA_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ: + case ELE_DATA_DELETE_REQ: + ret = 0; + break; + case ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ: + /* Might be cleared as part of tear down. */ + ret = dev_ctx->strg_hdl ? -EEXIST : 0; + break; + case ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ: + /* Might be cleared as part of tear down. */ + if (!dev_ctx->strg_hdl) { + ret = -ENXIO; + break; + } + /* Same self-ownership check as the session close above. */ + if (tx_msg_sz < ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ || + msg->data[0] != dev_ctx->strg_hdl) + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + case ELE_STORAGE_STATUS_REQ: + ret = 0; + break; + default: + /* FW commands that embed DMA addresses. */ + fields = ele_fw_cmd_addr_fields(header->command, &count); + if (!count) { + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + break; + } + + ret = se_val_cmd_addrs(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz, fields, count); + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +void fw_api_specific_ops(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_api_msg *rx_msg) +{ + struct se_msg_hdr *header = &rx_msg->header; + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + + switch (header->command) { + case ELE_SESSION_OPEN_REQ: + dev_ctx->sess_hdl = rx_msg->data[1]; + break; + case ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ: + dev_ctx->sess_hdl = 0; + break; + case ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ: + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) + unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(dev_ctx); + dev_ctx->strg_hdl = 0; + break; + case ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ: { + int rc = 0; + + /* + * Record the storage handle before registering as command + * receiver. FW has already allocated the handle; if we assigned + * it only after a successful registration, a failing + * set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver() (e.g. -EBUSY) would leave + * strg_hdl at 0 while the ioctl still returns success to + * userspace. The kernel would then never close the handle on + * teardown, leaking it in FW. Storing it first guarantees + * cleanup_dev_ctx() closes it regardless of registration. + */ + dev_ctx->strg_hdl = rx_msg->data[1]; + + rc = set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(dev_ctx); + if (rc) + dev_err(priv->dev, + "Failed to register %s as CMD-Receiver: %d\n", + dev_ctx->devname, rc); + break; + } + case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ: + /* + * FW sent an export-start command with key_store_size at + * data[1]. Save it so se_val_cmd_addrs() can range-check the + * response buffer when the cmd_receiver sends back the address. + */ + ele_set_sz_in_field_addr(ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ, + rx_msg->data[1]); + break; + case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ: + /* + * FW sent a chunk-export command with chunk_size at data[1]. + * Save it so se_val_cmd_addrs() can range-check the response + * buffer when the cmd_receiver sends back the address. + */ + ele_set_sz_in_field_addr(ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ, + rx_msg->data[1]); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Return true when tx_msg is one of the close requests the driver issues + * from its own teardown path (session/storage close). ele_msg_send_rcv() + * uses this to let those close messages through even after going_away is + * set, so the kernel can still resynchronise session/storage state with FW. + */ +bool is_msg_xchng_for_tdown(void *tx_msg) +{ + struct se_msg_hdr *header = &((struct se_api_msg *)tx_msg)->header; + + return (header->command == ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ || + header->command == ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ); +} + +int se_close_session(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 session_hdl) +{ + struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) = NULL; + struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) = NULL; + struct se_if_priv *priv; + int ret; + + if (!dev_ctx || !dev_ctx->priv) + return -EINVAL; + + priv = dev_ctx->priv; + + tx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tx_msg) + return -ENOMEM; + + rx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rx_msg) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * Session close is a FW-API command; format it with the FW API version + * so se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status() below (called with is_base_api = false, + * i.e. expecting fw_api_ver) does not reject the matching response and + * wrongly report the close as failed, which would leak the handle. + */ + se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header, + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ, ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, false); + + tx_msg->data[0] = session_hdl; + + /* + * Transmit on the caller's own context. Using dev_ctx (rather than + * hardcoding priv->priv_dev_ctx) keeps a userspace close() subject to + * the going_away check in ele_msg_send_rcv(): if unbind has begun and + * freed priv->tx_chan, the send is rejected with -ENODEV instead of + * touching the freed mailbox channel. The teardown path passes + * priv_dev_ctx so its resync closes are still let through. + */ + ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(dev_ctx, + tx_msg, + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, + rx_msg, + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + ret = se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv, + rx_msg, + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ, + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ, + false); + return ret; +} + +int se_close_storage(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 storage_hdl) +{ + struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) = NULL; + struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) = NULL; + struct se_if_priv *priv; + int ret; + + if (!dev_ctx || !dev_ctx->priv) + return -EINVAL; + + priv = dev_ctx->priv; + + tx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tx_msg) + return -ENOMEM; + + rx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_RSP_SZ, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rx_msg) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Same FW-API version handling as se_close_session() above. */ + se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header, + ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ, ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, false); + + tx_msg->data[0] = storage_hdl; + + /* Transmit on the caller's own context; see se_close_session(). */ + ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(dev_ctx, + tx_msg, + ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, + rx_msg, + ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_RSP_SZ); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + ret = se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv, + rx_msg, + ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ, + ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_RSP_SZ, + false); + return ret; +} diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..22484a892392 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.h @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* + * Copyright 2026 NXP + */ + +#ifndef ELE_FW_API_H +#define ELE_FW_API_H +#include "se_ctrl.h" + +#define ELE_SESSION_OPEN_REQ 0x10u + +#define ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ 0x08u +#define ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ 0x08u +#define ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ 0x11u + +/* + * Session-scoped FW-API service, key-management and close command opcodes + * (SAB command IDs, PSA_COMPLIANT message layout). These commands do not + * embed DMA staging-buffer addresses that require range-checking; they are + * defined here for completeness and for use by the command allow-list. + * ELE_FW_GET_INFO_REQ is the FW-API get-info opcode and is intentionally + * distinct from the base-API ELE_GET_INFO_REQ (0xda) in ele_base_msg.h. + */ +#define ELE_FW_GET_INFO_REQ 0x16u +#define ELE_KEY_STORE_OPEN_REQ 0x30u +#define ELE_KEY_STORE_CLOSE_REQ 0x31u +#define ELE_KEY_MGMT_OPEN_REQ 0x40u +#define ELE_KEY_MGMT_CLOSE_REQ 0x41u +#define ELE_MANAGE_KEY_GROUP_REQ 0x45u +#define ELE_GET_KEY_ATTR_REQ 0x4Cu +#define ELE_KEY_DELETE_REQ 0x4Eu +#define ELE_MAC_OPEN_REQ 0x50u +#define ELE_MAC_CLOSE_REQ 0x51u +#define ELE_CIPHER_OPEN_REQ 0x60u +#define ELE_CIPHER_CLOSE_REQ 0x61u +#define ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_OPEN_REQ 0x70u +#define ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_CLOSE_REQ 0x71u +#define ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_OPEN_REQ 0x80u +#define ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_CLOSE_REQ 0x81u +#define ELE_DATA_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ 0xA0u +#define ELE_DATA_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ 0xA1u +#define ELE_DATA_DELETE_REQ 0xA4u + +/* + * FW-API crypto command opcodes that embed one or more DMA physical addresses + * in their message payload. ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd() range-checks those + * addresses against the calling context's shared-memory window before the + * message is handed to firmware. Opcodes match the SAB command IDs emitted by + * the userspace library (PSA_COMPLIANT message layout). + */ +#define ELE_PUB_KEY_EXPORT_REQ 0x32u +#define ELE_KEYSTORE_REPROV_ENABLE_REQ 0x3Fu +#define ELE_KEYGEN_REQ 0x42u +#define ELE_KEY_EXCHANGE_REQ 0x47u +#define ELE_KEY_IMPORT_REQ 0x4Fu +#define ELE_KEY_IMPORT 0x4Fu +#define ELE_MAC_REQ 0x52u +#define ELE_CIPHER_REQ 0x62u +#define ELE_AUTH_ENC_REQ 0x64u +#define ELE_AUTH_ENC_NEW_REQ 0x65u +#define ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_REQ 0x72u +#define ELE_PUB_KEY_ATTEST_REQ 0x74u +#define ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_REQ 0x82u +#define ELE_DATA_STORAGE_REQ 0xA2u +#define ELE_ENC_DATA_STORAGE_REQ 0xA3u +#define ELE_ASYMMETRIC_ENC_REQ 0x92u + +#define ELE_KEY_GENERIC_CRYPTO_REQ 0xC2u +#define ELE_GC_CIPHER_REQ 0xC8u +#define ELE_GC_AEAD_REQ 0xC9u +#define ELE_GC_ACRYPTO_REQ 0xCAu +#define ELE_GC_AKEY_GEN_REQ 0xCBu +#define ELE_HASH_ONE_GO_REQ 0xCCu +#define ELE_RNG_GET_RANDOM_REQ 0xCDu + +#define ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ 0xE0u + +#define ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ 0x08u +#define ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_RSP_SZ 0x08u +#define ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ 0xE1u + +#define ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_IMPORT_REQ 0xE2u +#define ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ 0xE3u +#define ELE_STORAGE_EXPORT_FINISH_REQ 0xE4u +#define ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ 0xE5u +#define ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_REQ 0xE6u +#define ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_DONE_REQ 0xE7u +#define ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_DELETE_REQ 0xE9u +#define ELE_STORAGE_STATUS_REQ 0xEAu + +int ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header, + u32 tx_msg_sz); +void fw_api_specific_ops(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_api_msg *rx_msg); +bool is_msg_xchng_for_tdown(void *tx_msg); +int se_close_session(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 session_hdl); +int se_close_storage(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 storage_hdl); + +#endif /* ELE_FW_API_H */ diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_msg_addr_field.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_msg_addr_field.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c8df021c27d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_msg_addr_field.c @@ -0,0 +1,650 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Copyright 2026 NXP + */ + +#include <linux/types.h> + +#include "ele_common.h" +#include "ele_base_msg.h" +#include "ele_fw_api.h" + +/* + * Base-API commands that embed one or more DMA physical addresses in their + * payload. Unlike the FW-API crypto commands, GET_INFO and DEV_ATTEST split + * their response-buffer address across two words: the high half is written + * first (lower word index) and the low half next, so has_msb is set and the + * msb_idx precedes the lsb_idx. GEN_KEY_BLOB uses single-word LSB addresses. + * See struct se_cmd_addr_field in ele_common.h for the field semantics. + */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_get_info_addr_fields[] = { + /* + * rsp_data_addr_hi @ data[0], rsp_data_addr_lo @ data[1]; + * buf_sz is a u16 in the low half of data[2]. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .msb_idx = 0, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, +}; + +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_dev_attest_addr_fields[] = { + /* + * rsp_data_addr_hi @ data[0], rsp_data_addr_lo @ data[1]; + * buf_sz is a u16 in the low half of data[2]. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .msb_idx = 0, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, +}; + +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_oem_auth_cntr_addr_fields[] = { + /* + * Container Header address: a 64-bit physical address split across two + * words. data[0] holds the 32-bit MSB and data[1] holds the 32-bit LSB + * (ELE API spec Table 27, word size = 0x3, so the command is header + + * MSB + LSB only). The message carries no length word for this buffer; + * the container size is variable and not communicated in the MU payload, + * and no static firmware-defined maximum is specified. Because this is a + * read-only input buffer (the ELE ROM/FW copies the container header + * into its internal memory for authentication and does not write back + * through this address), enforcing only the start-address range check is + * acceptable: a rogue caller can at most cause firmware to read within + * the shared-memory window, which is memory the caller already owns. + * Output buffers must be fully bounded; input-only buffers are safe with + * addr-only checks. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .msb_idx = 0, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE }, /* container_hdr_addr */ +}; + +/* + * GENERATE ELE KEY BLOB command (ELE_GEN_KEY_BLOB_REQ, 0xAF). + * ELE API spec Table 73, word size = 0x8 (header + 7 data words): + * data[0] = key_identifier + * data[1] = Reserved + * data[2] = load_address (32-bit; must be 64-bit aligned) + * data[3] = Reserved + * data[4] = store_address (32-bit; must be 64-bit aligned) + * data[5] = Reserved[31:16] | max_export_size[15:0] + * data[6] = CRC + * + * load_addr points to the input: a blob header (8 bytes, Table 77) followed + * by the plaintext payload. No size word is present in the message for this + * input buffer. The maximum input size is determined by the largest supported + * payload type: OTFAD key configuration (0x28 bytes per Table 79) plus the + * 8-byte header gives 0x30 bytes. That is the literal upper bound used as + * buf_size so se_val_cmd_addrs() can verify [load_addr, load_addr+0x30) + * lies within the shared-memory window. This is an input-only buffer + * (firmware reads it to generate the blob) so start-address-plus-fixed-max + * is a safe and sufficient check. + */ +#define OP_GEN_ELE_KEY_BLOB_INPUT_MAX_SZ 0x30 /* blob hdr (8) + OTFAD payload (0x28) */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gen_key_blob_addr_fields[] = { + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE, + .buf_size = OP_GEN_ELE_KEY_BLOB_INPUT_MAX_SZ }, /* load_address */ + /* store_address @ data[4]; max_export_size is u16 in low half of data[5] */ + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* store_address */ +}; + +/* + * Return the address-field descriptor table for a base-API command, or NULL + * when the command embeds no DMA addresses. count is set to the number of + * entries. + */ +const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_base_cmd_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count) +{ + switch (cmd) { + case ELE_OEM_AUTH_CONTAINER_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_oem_auth_cntr_addr_fields); + return ele_oem_auth_cntr_addr_fields; + case ELE_GEN_KEY_BLOB_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gen_key_blob_addr_fields); + return ele_gen_key_blob_addr_fields; + case ELE_GET_INFO_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_get_info_addr_fields); + return ele_get_info_addr_fields; + case ELE_DEV_ATTEST_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_dev_attest_addr_fields); + return ele_dev_attest_addr_fields; + default: + *count = 0; + return NULL; + } +} + +/* + * FW-API crypto commands that embed one or more DMA physical addresses in + * their payload. On the PSA_COMPLIANT ABI most addresses are written by the + * userspace library as a single little-endian 32-bit LSB word (the high half + * is always zero), so has_msb is left false for those entries. A few commands + * (pub-key-export 0x32, keystore reprov-enable 0x3F) carry an explicit ext/MSB + * word ahead of the LSB word, matching the base-API two-word address layout; + * their entries set has_msb = true so the MSB word is validated too. See + * struct se_cmd_addr_field in ele_common.h for the field semantics. + */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_pub_key_export_addr_fields[] = { + /* + * out_key_addr: the recovered public key output buffer. Its high half + * out_key_addr_ext is data[2] and its low half out_key_addr is data[3]; + * the library always writes it via set_phy_addr_to_words(), so it is + * always a DMA address. Its length is out_key_size, the u16 in the low + * half of data[4]. key_identifier (data[1]) is an integer, not an + * address. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 3, .msb_idx = 2, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* out_key_addr */ +}; + +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_keystore_reprov_en_addr_fields[] = { + /* + * Signed message address: a 64-bit physical address split across two + * words. data[0] holds the 32-bit MSB and data[1] holds the 32-bit LSB + * (ELE API spec Table 202, word size = 0x3, so the command is header + + * MSB + LSB only). The address points to the start of the complete + * signed message block (header + 12-byte payload from Table 204 + + * signature); the total block size depends on the signing format and is + * not carried anywhere in the MU payload words. No static + * firmware-defined maximum for the full block is specified. Because this + * is a read-only input buffer (firmware reads and verifies the signed + * block, does not write back through this address), enforcing only the + * start-address range check is acceptable: a rogue caller can at most + * cause firmware to read within the shared-memory window, which is + * memory the caller already owns. Output buffers must be fully bounded; + * input-only buffers are safe with addr-only checks. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .msb_idx = 0, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE }, /* signed_msg_addr */ +}; + +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_keygen_addr_fields[] = { + /* + * key @ data[1]: a plaintext private-key output buffer only when the + * KEY_GENERATION PLAINTEXT_KEY flag (bit 3 of the flags byte in the low + * 8 bits of data[8]) is set; otherwise it is an integer key identifier. + * Its length is priv_key_sz, the u16 in the high half of data[8]. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 8, .flag_mask = 0x00000008u, .is_addr_when_set = true, + .size_idx = 8, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* priv_key_addr */ + /* + * pub_key_addr @ data[9]: always a DMA address. Its length is + * pub_key_sz, the u16 in the low half of data[2]. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 9, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* pub_key_addr */ +}; + +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_key_exchange_addr_fields[] = { + /* + * PSA_COMPLIANT key-exchange payload. key_management_handle is data[0] + * and flags/reserved is data[1]; the four buffer addresses that follow + * are each written unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words() (single + * LSB word, high half always zero), so all are always DMA addresses. + * Each address is immediately followed by its full u32 byte length. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* in_content_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* in_pub_buffer_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* user_fixed_info_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_addr */ +}; + +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_key_import_addr_fields[] = { + /* + * PSA_COMPLIANT key-import payload. key_management_handle is data[0] + * and flags/reserved is data[1]; the single input buffer address that + * follows is written unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words() + * (single LSB word, high half always zero), so it is always a DMA + * address. Its length is the full u32 input_size in data[3]. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_address */ +}; + +/* ELE_MAC_REQ: MAC one-go operation. */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_mac_addr_fields[] = { + /* key: plaintext-key buffer only when the MAC PLAINTEXT_KEY flag is set */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 5, .flag_mask = 0x00080000u, .is_addr_when_set = true, + .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_size */ + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* payload_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* mac_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* context_address */ +}; + +/* ELE_CIPHER_REQ: symmetric cipher one-go operation. */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_cipher_addr_fields[] = { + /* key: plaintext-key buffer only when the CIPHER PLAINTEXT_KEY flag is set */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 3, .flag_mask = 0x00080000u, .is_addr_when_set = true, + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_size */ + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* iv_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 8, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 10, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 11, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* context_address */ +}; + +/* + * AEAD encrypt/decrypt legacy command (ELE_AUTH_ENC_REQ, 0x64). + * ELE API spec Table 287, word size = 0xD (header + 12 data words): + * data[0] = cipher_handle + * data[1] = key_identifier + * data[2] = IV LSB address + * data[3] = Reserved[31:24] | Flags[23:16] | IV_size[15:0] + * data[4] = algorithm + * data[5] = AAD LSB address + * data[6] = Reserved[31:16] | AAD_size[15:0] + * data[7] = Input LSB address + * data[8] = Output LSB address + * data[9] = Input size (u32) + * data[10] = Output size (u32) + * data[11] = CRC + * IV size is the 16-bit low half of data[3]; AAD size is the 16-bit low half + * of data[6]; input and output sizes are full u32 words. + */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_auth_enc_addr_fields[] = { + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* iv_address (size[15:0] @ data[3]) */ + { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* aad_address (size[15:0] @ data[6]) */ + { .lsb_idx = 7, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_address (size[31:0] @ data[9]) */ + { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 10, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_address (size[31:0] @ data[10]) */ +}; + +/* ELE_AUTH_ENC_NEW_REQ: AEAD encrypt/decrypt with internally-generated IV output. */ +#define ELE_AUTH_ENC_IV_OUT_SIZE 12 /* firmware always writes exactly 12 bytes */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_auth_enc_new_addr_fields[] = { + /* iv_address_in length is packed in the high half of the iv-size word */ + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 2, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* iv_address_in */ + /* iv_address_out has a fixed firmware-defined length, not carried in msg */ + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE, + .buf_size = ELE_AUTH_ENC_IV_OUT_SIZE }, /* iv_address_out */ + /* key: plaintext-key buffer only when the PLAINTEXT_KEY flag is set */ + { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = 2, .flag_mask = 0x00000008u, .is_addr_when_set = true, + .size_idx = 7, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_size */ + { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* tag_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* aad_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 10, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 11, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 12, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 13, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 14, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 15, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* context_address */ +}; + +/* ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_REQ: digital signature generation. */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_sign_gen_addr_fields[] = { + /* key: plaintext-key buffer only when GENERATE_SIGN PLAINTEXT_KEY is set */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 5, .flag_mask = 0x00080000u, .is_addr_when_set = true, + .size_idx = 8, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* priv_key_size */ + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* message_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* signature_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 9, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 11, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* sm2_pub_key_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 10, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 11, .size_shift = 16, + .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* sm2_id / ml_dsa_ctx addr */ +}; + +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_pub_key_attest_addr_fields[] = { + /* + * PSA_COMPLIANT public-key-attestation payload. sig_gen_hdl is data[0], + * key_identifier data[1], key_attestation_id data[2], attest_algo + * data[3]. The two buffer addresses that follow are each written + * unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words() (single LSB word, high + * half always zero), so both are always DMA addresses. Each address is + * immediately followed by its full u32 byte length. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* auth_challenge_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* certificate_addr */ +}; + +/* ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_REQ: digital signature verification. */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_verify_sign_addr_fields[] = { + /* key: plaintext-key buffer unless the VERIFY_SIGN OPAQUE_KEY flag is set */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 7, .flag_mask = 0x00000008u, .is_addr_when_set = false, + .size_idx = 5, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_size */ + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* msg_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* sig_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 10, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 11, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* sm2_id / ml_dsa_ctx addr */ +}; + +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_data_storage_addr_fields[] = { + /* + * PSA_COMPLIANT data-storage payload. data_storage_handle is data[0], + * flags/reserved is data[1], data_id is data[2]. data_address (data[3]) + * is the plaintext data buffer, written unconditionally via + * set_phy_addr_to_words() (single LSB word, high half always zero), so + * it is always a DMA address. Its length is the full u32 data_size in + * data[4]. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* data_address */ +}; + +/* ELE_ASYMMETRIC_ENC_REQ: asymmetric encryption/decryption. */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_asym_enc_addr_fields[] = { + /* key_id_addr: plaintext-key buffer only when the PLAINTEXT_KEY flag is set */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 8, .flag_mask = 0x00000008u, .is_addr_when_set = true, + .size_idx = 10, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_plainkey_size */ + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* plaintext_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* ciphertext_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* label_addr */ +}; + +/* ELE_KEY_GENERIC_CRYPTO_REQ: generic crypto operation with a raw key. */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_key_generic_crypto_addr_fields[] = { + /* key_address length is the u8 key_size in the third byte of the iv-size word */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 3, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFu }, /* key_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* iv_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* aad_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 8, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 7, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_address */ +}; + +/* ELE_GC_CIPHER_REQ: GC symmetric cipher operation. */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gc_cipher_addr_fields[] = { + { .lsb_idx = 0, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* in_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* out_addr (shares data_size) */ + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* key_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* iv_addr */ +}; + +/* ELE_GC_AEAD_REQ: GC AEAD operation. */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gc_aead_addr_fields[] = { + { .lsb_idx = 0, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* in_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* out_addr (shares data_size) */ + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* key_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* nonce_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 7, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 8, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* aad_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 9, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 10, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* tag_addr */ +}; + +/* ELE_GC_ACRYPTO_REQ: GC asymmetric crypto operation. */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gc_acrypto_addr_fields[] = { + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* data_buff1_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* data_buff2_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 7, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_buff1_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 9, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_buff2_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 12, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 13, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* rsa_label_addr */ +}; + +/* ELE_GC_AKEY_GEN_REQ: GC asymmetric key generation. */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gc_akey_gen_addr_fields[] = { + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* modulus_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 4, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* priv_buff_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* pub_buff_addr */ +}; + +/* ELE_HASH_ONE_GO_REQ: hash one-go operation. */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_hash_one_go_addr_fields[] = { + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 6, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* ctx_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_addr */ + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_addr */ +}; + +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_enc_data_storage_addr_fields[] = { + /* + * PSA_COMPLIANT encrypted-data-storage payload. data_storage_handle is + * data[0] and data_id is data[1]. data_address (data[2]) is written + * unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words() (single LSB word, high + * half always zero), so it is always a DMA address; its length is the + * full u32 data_size in data[3]. iv_address (data[8]) is only written + * when an IV is supplied and is left zero otherwise, so it is an + * optional always-address handled by the zero-address skip; its length + * is the u16 iv_size in the low half of data[9]. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* data_address */ + { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* iv_address */ +}; + +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_rng_get_random_addr_fields[] = { + /* + * PSA_COMPLIANT get-random payload. reserved/flags is data[0]; rnd_addr + * (data[1]) is the output buffer, written unconditionally via + * set_phy_addr_to_words() (single LSB word, high half always zero), so + * it is always a DMA address. Its length is the full u32 rnd_size in + * data[2]. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* rnd_addr */ +}; + +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_storage_master_import_addr_fields[] = { + /* + * Storage master-import command (ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_IMPORT_REQ). + * Payload layout (data[] = message word minus header word 0): + * data[0] = storage_handle + * data[1] = key_store_address (LSB; high half always zero) + * data[2] = key_store_size + * The address is set unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words() and + * its length is the full u32 key_store_size. + */ + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* key_store_address */ +}; + +const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_fw_cmd_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count) +{ + switch (cmd) { + case ELE_PUB_KEY_EXPORT_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_pub_key_export_addr_fields); + return ele_pub_key_export_addr_fields; + case ELE_KEYSTORE_REPROV_ENABLE_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_keystore_reprov_en_addr_fields); + return ele_keystore_reprov_en_addr_fields; + case ELE_KEYGEN_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_keygen_addr_fields); + return ele_keygen_addr_fields; + case ELE_KEY_EXCHANGE_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_key_exchange_addr_fields); + return ele_key_exchange_addr_fields; + case ELE_KEY_IMPORT_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_key_import_addr_fields); + return ele_key_import_addr_fields; + case ELE_MAC_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_mac_addr_fields); + return ele_mac_addr_fields; + case ELE_CIPHER_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_cipher_addr_fields); + return ele_cipher_addr_fields; + case ELE_AUTH_ENC_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_auth_enc_addr_fields); + return ele_auth_enc_addr_fields; + case ELE_AUTH_ENC_NEW_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_auth_enc_new_addr_fields); + return ele_auth_enc_new_addr_fields; + case ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_sign_gen_addr_fields); + return ele_sign_gen_addr_fields; + case ELE_PUB_KEY_ATTEST_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_pub_key_attest_addr_fields); + return ele_pub_key_attest_addr_fields; + case ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_verify_sign_addr_fields); + return ele_verify_sign_addr_fields; + case ELE_DATA_STORAGE_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_data_storage_addr_fields); + return ele_data_storage_addr_fields; + case ELE_ENC_DATA_STORAGE_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_enc_data_storage_addr_fields); + return ele_enc_data_storage_addr_fields; + case ELE_ASYMMETRIC_ENC_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_asym_enc_addr_fields); + return ele_asym_enc_addr_fields; + case ELE_KEY_GENERIC_CRYPTO_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_key_generic_crypto_addr_fields); + return ele_key_generic_crypto_addr_fields; + case ELE_GC_CIPHER_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gc_cipher_addr_fields); + return ele_gc_cipher_addr_fields; + case ELE_GC_AEAD_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gc_aead_addr_fields); + return ele_gc_aead_addr_fields; + case ELE_GC_ACRYPTO_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gc_acrypto_addr_fields); + return ele_gc_acrypto_addr_fields; + case ELE_GC_AKEY_GEN_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gc_akey_gen_addr_fields); + return ele_gc_akey_gen_addr_fields; + case ELE_HASH_ONE_GO_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_hash_one_go_addr_fields); + return ele_hash_one_go_addr_fields; + case ELE_RNG_GET_RANDOM_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_rng_get_random_addr_fields); + return ele_rng_get_random_addr_fields; + case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_IMPORT_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_storage_master_import_addr_fields); + return ele_storage_master_import_addr_fields; + default: + *count = 0; + return NULL; + } +} + +/* + * FW API for Command Receiver. + * + * Storage master-export response (ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ). + * The cmd_receiver sends this response to firmware to supply the + * output buffer address. Payload layout: + * data[0] = storage_handle + * data[1] = rsp_code + * data[2] = key_store_export_address (LSB; high half always zero) + * No length word is present in the response itself; the export size is + * taken from the FW command received earlier (key_store_size). The size + * is stored in buf_size and used as a literal byte count by + * se_val_cmd_addrs() when size_idx == SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE and buf_size + * is non-zero. ele_set_sz_in_field_addr() writes it before the response + * is validated. + */ +static struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_storage_master_export_addr_fields[] = { + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE, .buf_size = 0 }, /* key_store_export_address */ +}; + +/* + * Storage chunk-get response (ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_REQ). + * The cmd_receiver fills in the chunk buffer address and its size so + * firmware can DMA the chunk data into the kernel's coherent buffer. + * Payload layout: + * data[0] = chunk_size + * data[1] = chunk_addr (LSB; high half always zero) + * data[2] = rsp_code + * The size word precedes the address in the message. + */ +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_storage_chunk_get_addr_fields[] = { + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = 0, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* chunk_addr */ +}; + +/* + * Storage chunk-export response (ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ). + * The cmd_receiver supplies the output buffer address. Payload layout: + * data[0] = rsp_code + * data[1] = chunk_export_address (LSB; high half always zero) + * No length word is present in the response itself; the export size is + * taken from the FW command received earlier (chunk_size). The size + * is stored in buf_size and used as a literal byte count by + * se_val_cmd_addrs() when size_idx == SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE and buf_size + * is non-zero. ele_set_sz_in_field_addr() writes it before the response + * is validated. + */ +static struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_storage_chunk_export_addr_fields[] = { + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS, + .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE, .buf_size = 0 }, /* chunk_export_address */ +}; + +/* + * Record the export buffer size from the FW command into buf_size so + * se_val_cmd_addrs() can range-check the full response buffer. Called from + * fw_api_specific_ops() when the cmd_receiver reads the FW command. + */ +void ele_set_sz_in_field_addr(u8 cmd, u32 size) +{ + switch (cmd) { + case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ: + ele_storage_master_export_addr_fields[0].buf_size = size; + break; + case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ: + ele_storage_chunk_export_addr_fields[0].buf_size = size; + break; + } +} + +/* + * Return the address-field descriptor table for a cmd_receiver response + * message (rsp_tag), or NULL when the response embeds no DMA addresses. + * count is set to the number of entries. Only the three storage responses + * that supply a kernel buffer address to firmware are covered here; + * ELE_STORAGE_EXPORT_FINISH_REQ, ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_DONE_REQ, and + * ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_DELETE_REQ carry no DMA addresses and return NULL. + */ +const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_fw_rsp_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count) +{ + switch (cmd) { + case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_storage_master_export_addr_fields); + return ele_storage_master_export_addr_fields; + case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_storage_chunk_get_addr_fields); + return ele_storage_chunk_get_addr_fields; + case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ: + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_storage_chunk_export_addr_fields); + return ele_storage_chunk_export_addr_fields; + default: + *count = 0; + return NULL; + } +} diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c index a8974eef190b..8922399ee1fb 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ */ #include <linux/bitfield.h> +#include <linux/cleanup.h> #include <linux/completion.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/dev_printk.h> @@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/genalloc.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/kref.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/of_platform.h> @@ -23,22 +25,21 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/sys_soc.h> +#include <uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h> #include "ele_base_msg.h" #include "ele_common.h" +#include "ele_fw_api.h" #include "se_ctrl.h" +/* Maximum response buffer size in bytes for debug-dump replies. */ +#define MAX_ALLOWED_RX_MSG_SZ ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ +#define MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ SZ_4K + #define MAX_SOC_INFO_DATA_SZ 256 #define MBOX_TX_NAME "tx" #define MBOX_RX_NAME "rx" -#define SE_TYPE_STR_DBG "dbg" -#define SE_TYPE_STR_HSM "hsm" - -#define SE_TYPE_ID_DBG 0x1 - -#define SE_TYPE_ID_HSM 0x2 - struct se_soc_dev_regn { bool soc_dev_registered; struct soc_device *soc_dev; @@ -133,6 +134,13 @@ char *get_se_if_name(u8 se_if_id) return "unknown"; } +static u32 get_se_soc_id(struct se_if_priv *priv) +{ + const struct se_if_node *if_node = device_get_match_data(priv->dev); + + return if_node->se_info->soc_id; +} + static struct se_fw_load_info *get_load_fw_instance(struct se_if_priv *priv) { return &priv->load_fw; @@ -284,11 +292,319 @@ static int get_se_soc_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, const struct se_soc_info *se return 0; } +static int load_firmware(struct se_if_priv *priv, const u8 *se_img_file_to_load) +{ + const struct firmware *fw = NULL; + dma_addr_t se_fw_dma_addr; + u32 se_fw_buf_len; + void *se_fw_buf; + int ret; + + if (!se_img_file_to_load) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "FW image is not provided."); + return -EINVAL; + } + ret = request_firmware(&fw, se_img_file_to_load, priv->dev); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (fw->size > U32_MAX) { + ret = -EFBIG; + release_firmware(fw); + return ret; + } + dev_info(priv->dev, "loading firmware %s.", se_img_file_to_load); + + /* + * Serialize access to priv_dev_ctx shared memory to prevent pos + * corruption if two driver-internal callers run concurrently (e.g. + * ele_get_info() racing with load_firmware()). + */ + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->priv_dev_ctx->fops_lock) { + se_fw_buf_len = fw->size; + ret = get_shared_mem_slot(priv->priv_dev_ctx, + &se_fw_buf_len, &se_fw_dma_addr, + &se_fw_buf); + if (ret) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to allocate firmware shared buffer: %d\n", + ret); + release_firmware(fw); + return ret; + } + + memcpy(se_fw_buf, fw->data, fw->size); + ret = ele_fw_authenticate(priv, se_fw_dma_addr, se_fw_dma_addr); + if (ret < 0) { + dev_err(priv->dev, + "Error %pe: Authenticate & load SE firmware %s.", + ERR_PTR(ret), se_img_file_to_load); + ret = -EPERM; + } + if (!se_is_fw_busy_ctx(priv->priv_dev_ctx)) + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(priv->priv_dev_ctx); + } + + release_firmware(fw); + + return ret; +} + +static int se_load_firmware(struct se_if_priv *priv) +{ + struct se_fw_load_info *load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv); + int ret = 0; + + guard(mutex)(&load_fw->load_fw_lock); + if (!load_fw->is_fw_tobe_loaded) + return 0; + + if (load_fw->imem.state == ELE_IMEM_STATE_BAD) { + ret = load_firmware(priv, load_fw->se_fw_img_nm->prim_fw_nm_in_rfs); + if (ret) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to load boot firmware."); + return -EPERM; + } + } + + ret = load_firmware(priv, load_fw->se_fw_img_nm->seco_fw_nm_in_rfs); + if (ret) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to load runtime firmware."); + return -EPERM; + } + + load_fw->is_fw_tobe_loaded = false; + + return ret; +} + +static int init_se_shared_mem(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx) +{ + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt; + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_in); + + if (priv->mem_pool) + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&se_shared_mem_mgmt->mem_pool_buf_list); + + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr = + dma_alloc_coherent(priv->dev, MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER, + &se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr) + return -ENOMEM; + + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.size = MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER; + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos = 0; + + return 0; +} + +static void cleanup_se_shared_mem(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool reclaim) +{ + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt; + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + bool free_dma_buf; + + /* + * mem_pool_buf_list is only initialised for interfaces that own a + * gen_pool (priv->mem_pool != NULL). On interfaces without a pool + * (e.g. imx93, which has no pool_name) the list head is left + * zero-filled, so se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf() must not walk it here or + * list_for_each_entry_safe() would dereference a NULL head and panic + * the kernel on close/teardown. Skip the pool cleanup entirely when + * there is no pool; there is nothing to reclaim in that case. + */ + if (priv->mem_pool) + se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(dev_ctx, reclaim); + + /* Guard against being called before shared memory was ever allocated + * (e.g. probe failure before dma_alloc_coherent succeeded). + */ + if (!se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr) + return; + + /* + * Decide whether the DMA buffer can be released before touching the + * pending lists. se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup() resets + * non_secure_mem.pos, so the "nothing staged" test must be sampled + * here first. When reclaim is false the buffer is released only if no + * data is still staged for the firmware; otherwise the enclave may + * still be DMA-ing into it and the buffer is deliberately leaked to + * avoid a DMA-after-free. + */ + free_dma_buf = reclaim || !se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos; + + /* + * Free any se_buf_desc items that were never consumed (e.g. when the + * fd is closed while pending I/O buffers are still listed). This must + * happen before the DMA backing memory is released to avoid a leak. + */ + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx); + + if (free_dma_buf) { + dma_free_coherent(priv->dev, MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER, + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr, + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr); + } + + /* + * Drop the host-side tracking unconditionally. On the reclaim path the + * buffer has been freed. On the deliberate-leak path the buffer is + * abandoned on purpose, so clearing the pointer here guarantees a later + * cleanup pass (e.g. se_if_priv_release()) cannot double-free it. + */ + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr = NULL; + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr = 0; + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.size = 0; + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos = 0; +} + +static int se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx) +{ + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt; + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + struct se_buf_desc *b_desc, *temp; + bool do_cpy = true; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(b_desc, temp, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out, link) { + if (b_desc->usr_buf_ptr && b_desc->shared_buf_ptr && do_cpy) { + dev_dbg(priv->dev, "Copying output data to user."); + if (do_cpy && copy_to_user(b_desc->usr_buf_ptr, + b_desc->shared_buf_ptr, + b_desc->size)) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failure copying output data to user."); + do_cpy = false; + } + } + + if (b_desc->shared_buf_ptr) + memset(b_desc->shared_buf_ptr, 0, b_desc->size); + + list_del(&b_desc->link); + kfree(b_desc); + } + + return do_cpy ? 0 : -EFAULT; +} + +/* + * Clean the used Shared Memory space, + * whether its Input Data copied from user buffers, or + * Data received from FW. + */ +void se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx) +{ + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt; + struct list_head *pending_lists[] = {&se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_in, + &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out}; + struct se_buf_desc *b_desc, *temp; + bool is_fw_busy_dev_ctx; + int i; + + /* + * If this context is the one that caused a firmware timeout the shared + * DMA buffers may still be actively read/written by the firmware. + */ + is_fw_busy_dev_ctx = se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx); + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pending_lists); i++) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(b_desc, temp, pending_lists[i], link) { + if (!is_fw_busy_dev_ctx && b_desc->shared_buf_ptr) + memset(b_desc->shared_buf_ptr, 0, b_desc->size); + + list_del(&b_desc->link); + kfree(b_desc); + } + } + + /* + * Keep non_secure_mem.pos non-zero while this context still owns an + * outstanding firmware transaction. A non-zero pos is the marker that + * data is still staged for the enclave, which cleanup_se_shared_mem() + * uses to decide the buffer must be leaked rather than freed. Resetting + * it here would let a later teardown pass free a buffer the enclave may + * still be DMA-ing into. + */ + if (!is_fw_busy_dev_ctx) + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos = 0; +} + +static struct se_buf_desc *add_b_desc_to_pending_list(void *shared_ptr_with_pos, + struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf *io, + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx) +{ + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt; + struct se_buf_desc *b_desc = NULL; + + b_desc = kzalloc_obj(*b_desc, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!b_desc) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + b_desc->shared_buf_ptr = shared_ptr_with_pos; + b_desc->usr_buf_ptr = u64_to_user_ptr(io->user_buf); + b_desc->size = io->length; + + if (io->flags & SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_INPUT) { + /* + * buffer is input: + * add an entry in the "pending input buffers" list so + * that copied data can be cleaned from shared memory + * later. + */ + list_add_tail(&b_desc->link, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_in); + } else { + /* + * buffer is output: + * add an entry in the "pending out buffers" list so data + * can be copied to user space when receiving Secure-Enclave + * response. + */ + list_add_tail(&b_desc->link, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out); + } + + return b_desc; +} + +static void se_if_open_gate_release(struct kref *kref) +{ + struct se_if_open_gate *gate = + container_of(kref, struct se_if_open_gate, refcount); + + kfree(gate); +} + +static bool se_if_open_gate_get(struct se_if_open_gate *gate) +{ + if (!gate) + return false; + + return kref_get_unless_zero(&gate->refcount); +} + +static void se_if_open_gate_put(struct se_if_open_gate *gate) +{ + if (gate) + kref_put(&gate->refcount, se_if_open_gate_release); +} + +/* + * Distinct lockdep class for the internal priv_dev_ctx fops_lock. Taking it + * while an open context's fops_lock is held (for example a firmware load + * triggered from an ioctl) is valid hierarchical locking, but shares the same + * class as the per-open fops_lock and would otherwise be misreported as + * recursive locking by lockdep. + */ +static struct lock_class_key se_priv_ctx_fops_key; + static int init_misc_device_context(struct se_if_priv *priv, int ch_id, - struct se_if_device_ctx **new_dev_ctx) + struct se_if_device_ctx **new_dev_ctx, + const struct file_operations *se_if_fops) { const char *err_str = "Failed to allocate memory"; struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx; + struct se_if_open_gate *gate = NULL; int ret = -ENOMEM; dev_ctx = kzalloc_obj(*dev_ctx, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -296,19 +612,57 @@ static int init_misc_device_context(struct se_if_priv *priv, int ch_id, if (!dev_ctx) return ret; + dev_ctx->priv = priv; dev_ctx->devname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s0_ch%d", get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type), ch_id); if (!dev_ctx->devname) goto exit; - dev_ctx->priv = priv; + mutex_init(&dev_ctx->fops_lock); + lockdep_set_class(&dev_ctx->fops_lock, &se_priv_ctx_fops_key); + + kref_init(&dev_ctx->refcount); + dev_ctx->cleanup_done = false; *new_dev_ctx = dev_ctx; + set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(dev_ctx, SE_RCV_MSG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS); + + ret = init_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx); + if (ret < 0) + goto exit; + + gate = kzalloc_obj(*gate, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!gate) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto exit; + } + + mutex_init(&gate->lock); + kref_init(&gate->refcount); /* device-owned reference */ + gate->priv = priv; + gate->dying = false; + priv->open_gate = gate; + + /* + * The miscdevice storage is now owned by the open gate object. + * priv->priv_dev_ctx still keeps a pointer to that miscdevice. + */ + dev_ctx->miscdev = &gate->miscdev; + + dev_ctx->miscdev->name = dev_ctx->devname; + dev_ctx->miscdev->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR; + dev_ctx->miscdev->fops = se_if_fops; + dev_ctx->miscdev->parent = priv->dev; return 0; exit: *new_dev_ctx = NULL; + if (gate) { + priv->open_gate = NULL; + se_if_open_gate_put(gate); + } + cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx, true); kfree(dev_ctx->devname); kfree(dev_ctx); return dev_err_probe(priv->dev, ret, "%s", err_str); @@ -329,9 +683,25 @@ static int se_if_request_channel(struct device *dev, struct mbox_chan **chan, return 0; } +/* + * Forward declarations. se_if_probe_cleanup() and se_if_probe() are kept + * together as the teardown/probe pair, but several helpers, the file + * operations table and the firmware-busy work handler they reference are + * defined further down in this file. + */ +static void dlink_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx); +static void cleanup_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool is_fclose); +static void se_clear_fw_busy(struct se_if_priv *priv); +static void se_if_dev_ctx_release(struct kref *kref); +static void se_if_priv_release(struct kref *kref); +static int se_if_misc_register(struct se_if_priv *priv); +static void se_fw_busy_work(struct work_struct *work); +static const struct file_operations se_if_fops; + static void se_if_probe_cleanup(void *plat_dev) { struct platform_device *pdev = plat_dev; + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx; struct device *dev = &pdev->dev; struct se_if_priv *priv; @@ -339,31 +709,148 @@ static void se_if_probe_cleanup(void *plat_dev) if (!priv) return; + /* + * Announce teardown, then wake any in-flight waiter. going_away makes + * ele_msg_send_rcv() bail out instead of arming a new transaction and + * lets ele_msg_rcv() tell a teardown-forced completion apart from a + * real response; it must be set before complete_all(). + * + * Set it under clbk_rx_lock, not se_if_cmd_lock: se_if_cmd_lock is held + * across the whole blocking transaction, so taking it here would stall + * unbind for a full receive-timeout. clbk_rx_lock is the short spinlock + * ele_msg_send_rcv() holds while arming, so this closes the lost-wakeup + * window - the sender either sees going_away and bails before arming, or + * armed first and this store (and complete_all()) is ordered after its + * reinit_completion() - and supplies the ordering the relaxed atomics do + * not. + */ + scoped_guard(spinlock_irqsave, &priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock) + atomic_set(&priv->going_away, 1); + /* + * Wake the waiter before iterating the device-context list. It sleeps on + * this completion holding dev_ctx->fops_lock, which cleanup_dev_ctx() + * below also takes, so completing first avoids an unbind hang. Runs + * outside clbk_rx_lock; the going_away store above already orders it + * against the arming path. + */ + complete_all(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.done); + + /* + * Mark the private device context as cleanup_done first. + * This prevents new device contexts from being created in open(). + */ + if (priv->priv_dev_ctx) { + /* + * Mark cleanup_done under fops_lock so that se_if_fops_open(), + * which checks cleanup_done while holding fops_lock, cannot + * race past this and add a new device context after teardown. + */ + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->priv_dev_ctx->fops_lock) + priv->priv_dev_ctx->cleanup_done = true; + + if (priv->open_gate) { + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->open_gate->lock) { + priv->open_gate->dying = true; + priv->open_gate->priv = NULL; + } + } + + /* + * misc_register() is deferred to the end of probe, so the + * device may have a miscdev set up but never registered if + * probe failed before se_if_misc_register(). Only deregister + * when registration actually succeeded. + */ + if (priv->open_gate && priv->open_gate->registered && + priv->priv_dev_ctx->miscdev) + misc_deregister(priv->priv_dev_ctx->miscdev); + } + + while (true) { + dev_ctx = NULL; + + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) { + if (list_empty(&priv->dev_ctx_list)) + goto out_done; + + dev_ctx = list_first_entry(&priv->dev_ctx_list, + struct se_if_device_ctx, link); + + /* pin this context so close() cannot free it under us */ + kref_get(&dev_ctx->refcount); + dlink_dev_ctx(dev_ctx); + } + + /* + * Local cleanup outside the global lock avoids ABBA deadlock + * with paths that already take dev_ctx->fops_lock first. + */ + cleanup_dev_ctx(dev_ctx, false); + kref_put(&dev_ctx->refcount, se_if_dev_ctx_release); + } +out_done: + + /* + * Drain any in-flight synchronous sender before releasing the mailbox + * channels. ele_msg_send_rcv() holds se_if_cmd_lock across the entire + * transaction, including ele_msg_send()'s mbox_send_message() on + * priv->tx_chan. going_away is checked and the transaction armed under + * clbk_rx_lock, but the mbox_send_message() itself runs after that + * spinlock is dropped, so a sender that passed the going_away check + * just before teardown set it could still be about to touch tx_chan + * when we free it here - a use-after-free in the mailbox layer. + * + * Acquire and immediately release se_if_cmd_lock as a barrier: it waits + * for such a sender to finish its transaction and drop the lock. This + * cannot stall unbind for a full receive timeout - going_away is + * already set and complete_all() has already woken any waiter, so an + * in-flight transaction only unwinds to -ENODEV before releasing the + * lock. It also cannot deadlock: the dev_ctx_list loop above has + * finished (teardown holds no se_if_cmd_lock of its own here) and a + * racing userspace close, which takes fops_lock then se_if_cmd_lock, + * bails out of ele_msg_send_rcv() with -ENODEV without waiting. After + * this barrier no sender can enter or remain inside mbox_send_message(), + * so freeing the channels below cannot race it. + */ + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->se_if_cmd_lock) { + ; + } + + /* + * Free the rx mailbox channel before cancelling fw_busy_work. + * se_if_rx_callback() runs from the rx channel and can schedule + * fw_busy_work when a late response arrives. If the channel were still + * live after cancel_work_sync(), a callback could re-arm the work and + * later dereference priv after it has been freed. Releasing the rx + * channel first guarantees no further callbacks, so the subsequent + * cancel_work_sync() is final. + */ if (priv->rx_chan) mbox_free_channel(priv->rx_chan); if (priv->tx_chan) mbox_free_channel(priv->tx_chan); /* - * Being device managed buffer, no need to free the buffer allocated - * in se probe to store encrypted IMEM. + * A timed-out synchronous command may have retained a dev_ctx through + * priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx even after the fd was closed and the context was + * removed from dev_ctx_list. If no late response arrived, release that + * retained context during driver teardown. + * + * se_clear_fw_busy() is idempotent and internally checks + * priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx under fw_busy_lock. */ + se_clear_fw_busy(priv); + cancel_work_sync(&priv->fw_busy_work); /* - * No need to check, if reserved memory is allocated - * before calling for its release. Or clearing the - * un-set bit. + * Being device managed buffer, no need to free the buffer allocated + * in se probe to store encrypted IMEM. */ - of_reserved_mem_device_release(dev); dev_set_drvdata(dev, NULL); - if (priv->priv_dev_ctx) { - kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx->devname); - kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx); - } - - kfree(priv); + /* Drop the initial reference - priv will be freed when last fd closes */ + kref_put(&priv->refcount, se_if_priv_release); } static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) @@ -386,15 +873,30 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return -ENOMEM; priv->dev = dev; + /* + * Pin the parent device for the lifetime of priv. A file descriptor may + * stay open after the device is unbound; close() then still passes + * priv->dev to dma_free_coherent()/dev_warn(). Without this reference + * the struct device could be freed while priv->dev still points at it, + * so the reference is dropped in se_if_priv_release() via put_device(). + */ + get_device(priv->dev); + kref_init(&priv->refcount); priv->if_defs = &if_node->if_defs; dev_set_drvdata(dev, priv); mutex_init(&priv->se_if_cmd_lock); + mutex_init(&priv->modify_lock); spin_lock_init(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock); spin_lock_init(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock); atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 0); + spin_lock_init(&priv->fw_busy_lock); + priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx = NULL; + INIT_WORK(&priv->fw_busy_work, se_fw_busy_work); + init_completion(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.done); init_completion(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.done); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&priv->dev_ctx_list); ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, se_if_probe_cleanup, pdev); if (ret) @@ -460,7 +962,7 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) load_fw->imem_mgmt = true; } - ret = init_misc_device_context(priv, 0, &priv->priv_dev_ctx); + ret = init_misc_device_context(priv, 0, &priv->priv_dev_ctx, &se_if_fops); if (ret) return dev_err_probe(dev, ret, "Failed[0x%x] to create device contexts.", @@ -472,12 +974,1147 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return dev_err_probe(dev, ret, "Failed to fetch SoC Info."); } + /* + * All probe-time initialization is complete; expose the + * interface to userspace last so that an open()/ioctl cannot + * race against a not-yet-initialized device. + */ + ret = se_if_misc_register(priv); + if (ret) + return ret; + dev_info(dev, "i.MX secure-enclave: %s0 interface to firmware, configured.", get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type)); return ret; } +/* + * Expose the interface to userspace. Deferred until the end of probe so + * the device node only becomes openable after SoC info has been fetched + * and, on SoCs with IMEM management, the encrypted-IMEM buffer has been + * allocated. This prevents userspace from opening the node and issuing + * commands against a partially initialized interface. + */ +static int se_if_misc_register(struct se_if_priv *priv) +{ + int ret; + + ret = misc_register(priv->priv_dev_ctx->miscdev); + if (ret) + return dev_err_probe(priv->dev, ret, + "Failed to register misc device."); + + priv->open_gate->registered = true; + + return 0; +} + +static void se_if_priv_release(struct kref *kref) +{ + struct se_if_priv *priv = container_of(kref, struct se_if_priv, refcount); + + /* Free priv_dev_ctx if it exists */ + if (priv->priv_dev_ctx) { + /* + * miscdev storage belongs to open_gate, not directly to + * priv_dev_ctx. The gate should already have been detached + * from priv during teardown. + * + * Reclaim the internal context's shared memory directly here + * instead of through cleanup_dev_ctx(). Teardown already set + * cleanup_done on priv_dev_ctx, so cleanup_dev_ctx() would + * short-circuit and leak the host descriptors and the coherent + * buffer. By this point the device is fully unbound; if this + * context ever armed the firmware-busy breaker, se_clear_fw_busy() + * has already run with reclaim=false and freed the host + * descriptors, emptied the pool list and cleared + * non_secure_mem.ptr. A reclaim=true pass here is therefore both + * safe and idempotent: it releases the buffers for a normal + * context and is a no-op for the abandoned firmware-busy one. + */ + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->priv_dev_ctx->fops_lock) + cleanup_se_shared_mem(priv->priv_dev_ctx, true); + + kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx->devname); + kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx); + priv->priv_dev_ctx = NULL; + } + /* + * No need to check, if reserved memory is allocated + * before calling for its release. Or clearing the + * un-set bit. + */ + of_reserved_mem_device_release(priv->dev); + + /* + * Be defensive: if teardown did not already drop the device-owned + * gate reference for some reason, release it here. + */ + if (priv->open_gate) { + se_if_open_gate_put(priv->open_gate); + priv->open_gate = NULL; + } + + /* + * Drop the reference on priv->dev taken in se_if_probe(). The device was + * pinned so that a file descriptor closed after device unbind can still + * safely pass priv->dev to dma_free_coherent()/dev_warn(). + */ + put_device(priv->dev); + + /* Free any remaining resources that weren't devm-managed */ + kfree(priv); +} + +static void se_if_dev_ctx_release(struct kref *kref) +{ + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = + container_of(kref, struct se_if_device_ctx, refcount); + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + + kfree(dev_ctx); + + /* drop the priv reference owned by this device context */ + kref_put(&priv->refcount, se_if_priv_release); +} + +static void se_clear_fw_busy(struct se_if_priv *priv) +{ + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = NULL; + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags); + dev_ctx = priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx; + priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx = NULL; + atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 0); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags); + + if (!dev_ctx) + return; + + /* + * The circuit breaker is cleared from two places, which need opposite + * memory-reclaim policies: + * + * 1. se_fw_busy_work(): a late firmware response actually arrived. + * going_away is not set and the enclave has finished with the + * buffer, so a full reclaim (reclaim=true) is safe. Only do this + * once the owning fd has been closed (cleanup_done); while the fd + * is still open the buffer belongs to that context and is released + * on its normal close path. + * + * 2. se_if_probe_cleanup(): teardown. going_away is set and no + * response has been confirmed, so the enclave may still be + * DMA-writing into the shared buffer. Freeing it here would be a + * DMA-after-free. Pass reclaim=false so cleanup_se_shared_mem() + * frees only the host-side descriptors and deliberately leaks the + * DMA buffer that the enclave might still touch. + */ + scoped_guard(mutex, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) { + if (atomic_read(&priv->going_away)) { + /* + * Fatal, but deliberately non-panic: the enclave is + * unresponsive at unbind with a transaction still in + * flight. Both the coherent staging buffer and any + * gen_pool buffers this context owns are abandoned + * (host descriptors freed, DMA-visible memory leaked) + * to avoid a DMA-after-free while the enclave may still + * be writing. Emit one headline error here rather than + * per-buffer so the count of faulted contexts is clear. + * Do not use WARN/BUG: this path is recoverable and + * panic_on_warn kernels must not be brought down by it. + */ + dev_err(priv->dev, + "%s: FATAL: enclave stuck at unbind, DMA leaked.\n", + dev_ctx->devname); + cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx, false); + } else if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done) { + cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx, true); + } + } + + kref_put(&dev_ctx->refcount, se_if_dev_ctx_release); +} + +void unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx) +{ + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + struct se_api_msg *old_rx_msg = NULL; + struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl; + unsigned long flags; + + lockdep_assert_held(&priv->modify_lock); + + se_clbk_hdl = &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl; + + if (se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx == dev_ctx) { + spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); + old_rx_msg = se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg; + se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx = NULL; + se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL; + se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz = 0; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); + + kfree(old_rx_msg); + complete_all(&se_clbk_hdl->done); + } +} + +int set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx) +{ + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + struct se_api_msg *new_rx_msg = NULL; + struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl; + unsigned long flags; + + se_clbk_hdl = &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl; + guard(mutex)(&priv->modify_lock); + if (se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx == dev_ctx) + return 0; + + if (se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx) + return -EBUSY; + + if (!se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) { + new_rx_msg = kzalloc(MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new_rx_msg) + return -ENOMEM; + } + spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); + if (new_rx_msg) + se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = new_rx_msg; + reinit_completion(&se_clbk_hdl->done); + se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz = MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN; + se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx = dev_ctx; + dev_ctx->rcv_msg_timeout_jiffies = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags); + + return 0; +} + +static void dlink_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx) +{ + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + + unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(dev_ctx); + + if (!list_empty(&dev_ctx->link)) { + list_del_init(&dev_ctx->link); + priv->active_devctx_count--; + } +} + +bool se_is_fw_busy_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx) +{ + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + unsigned long flags; + bool match; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags); + match = priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx == dev_ctx; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags); + + return match; +} + +static void cleanup_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool is_fclose) +{ + bool already_done; + + scoped_guard(mutex, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) { + already_done = dev_ctx->cleanup_done; + if (!already_done) { + /* + * Ask FW to drop this context's session and storage so + * the kernel and FW stay in sync. Done here, under this + * context's fops_lock only (not the global modify_lock), + * because both close requests block on a firmware + * round-trip; issuing them while modify_lock was held + * would stall every other context for the FW timeout. + * + * Skip the round-trips once the FW path is marked busy. + * fw_busy is armed when a synchronous transaction times + * out; while it is set ele_msg_send_rcv() rejects further + * commands with -EBUSY without waiting. It is only cleared + * by se_clear_fw_busy(), which during unbind runs once + * after this loop (or earlier from fw_busy_work only if a + * genuine late FW response arrives). On a hung FW no late + * response comes, so the breaker stays set for the rest of + * the loop and the remaining closes would just return + * -EBUSY and log spurious "failed to close" errors. Skip + * them and emit a single warning instead. + */ + if (atomic_read(&dev_ctx->priv->fw_busy)) { + if (dev_ctx->strg_hdl || dev_ctx->sess_hdl) + dev_warn(dev_ctx->priv->dev, + "%s: skipping session/storage close, FW is busy\n", + dev_ctx->devname); + } else { + /* + * Pick the context that carries the close messages. + * + * fclose (is_fclose): a userspace close() may race + * driver unbind. Send on the caller's own dev_ctx so + * ele_msg_send_rcv()'s going_away check rejects the + * transmission with -ENODEV if unbind has begun (and + * may have freed priv->tx_chan), instead of touching a + * freed mailbox channel. + * + * Teardown (!is_fclose): going_away is already set, but + * priv->tx_chan is still live at this point in + * se_if_probe_cleanup(). Send on priv_dev_ctx, the only + * context ele_msg_send_rcv() lets through going_away for + * teardown-close messages, so the kernel can still + * resynchronise session/storage state with FW. + */ + struct se_if_device_ctx *tx_ctx = is_fclose ? dev_ctx : + dev_ctx->priv->priv_dev_ctx; + + if (dev_ctx->strg_hdl && se_close_storage(tx_ctx, + dev_ctx->strg_hdl)) + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "failed to close storage.\n"); + if (dev_ctx->sess_hdl && se_close_session(tx_ctx, + dev_ctx->sess_hdl)) + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "failed to close session.\n"); + } + /* + * fw_busy is caused by one timed-out synchronous transaction. + * Only that transaction's dev_ctx may still have coherent + * memory referenced by FW. Do not skip cleanup for unrelated + * contexts while fw_busy is set. + */ + if (se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx)) + dev_warn(dev_ctx->priv->dev, + "%s: deferring shared memory cleanup while FW is busy\n", + dev_ctx->devname); + else + cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx, true); + + kfree(dev_ctx->devname); + dev_ctx->devname = NULL; + dev_ctx->cleanup_done = true; + } + } + + if (is_fclose) + kref_put(&dev_ctx->refcount, se_if_dev_ctx_release); +} + +static void dlink_n_cleanup_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool is_fclose) +{ + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + + if (is_fclose) { + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) + dlink_dev_ctx(dev_ctx); + } + + cleanup_dev_ctx(dev_ctx, is_fclose); +} + +static int init_device_context(struct se_if_priv *priv, int ch_id, + struct se_if_device_ctx **new_dev_ctx) +{ + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx; + int ret = 0; + + dev_ctx = kzalloc_obj(*dev_ctx, GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!dev_ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + dev_ctx->devname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s0_ch%d", + get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type), + ch_id); + if (!dev_ctx->devname) { + kfree(dev_ctx); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + mutex_init(&dev_ctx->fops_lock); + kref_init(&dev_ctx->refcount); + dev_ctx->priv = priv; + dev_ctx->cleanup_done = false; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_ctx->link); + set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(dev_ctx, SE_RCV_MSG_LONG_TIMEOUT_MS); + *new_dev_ctx = dev_ctx; + + ret = init_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx); + if (ret < 0) { + kfree(dev_ctx->devname); + kfree(dev_ctx); + *new_dev_ctx = NULL; + + return ret; + } + + /* Take a reference to priv for this device context */ + kref_get(&priv->refcount); + + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) { + list_add_tail(&dev_ctx->link, &priv->dev_ctx_list); + priv->active_devctx_count++; + } + + return ret; +} + +static int se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void __user *uarg, + struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info *cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info) +{ + /* shared memory is allocated before this IOCTL */ + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx); + + if (cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info->rx_buf_sz && + copy_to_user(uarg, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info, sizeof(*cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info))) { + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info to user.", + dev_ctx->devname); + return -EFAULT; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_handler(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, + void __user *uarg) +{ + struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info = {0}; + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + int rsp_status_err = 0; + int cleanup_err = 0; + int err = 0; + + if (copy_from_user(&cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info, uarg, + sizeof(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info))) { + dev_err(priv->dev, + "%s: Failed to copy cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info from user.", + dev_ctx->devname); + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info); + return -EFAULT; + } + + if (cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz < SE_MU_HDR_SZ || + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz > MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: User buffer too small/large(%d < %d)", + dev_ctx->devname, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz, + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz < SE_MU_HDR_SZ ? SE_MU_HDR_SZ : + MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ); + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info); + return -ENOSPC; + } + + struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) = + memdup_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf), + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz); + if (IS_ERR(tx_msg)) { + err = PTR_ERR(tx_msg); + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info); + return err; + } + + err = se_chk_tx_msg_hdr(dev_ctx, &tx_msg->header, + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz); + if (err) { + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info); + return err; + } + + if (cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz < SE_MU_HDR_SZ || + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz > MAX_ALLOWED_RX_MSG_SZ) { + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (tx_msg->header.tag != priv->if_defs->cmd_tag) { + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (tx_msg->header.ver == priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver && + get_load_fw_instance(priv)->is_fw_tobe_loaded) { + err = se_load_firmware(priv); + if (err) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "Could not send msg as FW is not loaded."); + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info); + return -EPERM; + } + } + + struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) = + kzalloc(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rx_msg) { + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + err = ele_msg_send_rcv(dev_ctx, tx_msg, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz, + rx_msg, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz); + if (err < 0) { + /* + * -ERESTARTSYS here means the wait was interrupted by a signal + * after the command had already been handed to - and executed + * by - the firmware, with its response delivered into rx_msg + * (ele_msg_send_rcv() converts only a positive, i.e. successfully + * received, result to -ERESTARTSYS). If that response carried a + * freshly allocated session/storage handle, record it now via + * fw_api_specific_ops(): the handle is already live in firmware, + * so leaving it untracked would stop cleanup_dev_ctx() from ever + * closing it and leak the firmware resource. Validate the + * delivered response first, using its own declared length bounded + * by the caller's buffer, so a truncated or malformed reply is + * not acted upon. + */ + if (err == -ERESTARTSYS) { + u32 rsp_sz = rx_msg->header.size << 2; + + if (rsp_sz && rsp_sz <= cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz && + !se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv, rx_msg, + tx_msg->header.command, rsp_sz, + tx_msg->header.ver == + priv->if_defs->base_api_ver)) { + se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(dev_ctx); + fw_api_specific_ops(dev_ctx, rx_msg); + } + /* + * Returning -ERESTARTSYS would let the VFS transparently restart + * the ioctl, which would re-run the command with the just + * cleaned-up (zeroed) shared input buffers. Report -EINTR instead + * so the syscall is not auto-restarted; userspace enters its + * signal handler and can decide whether to reissue the command. + */ + err = -EINTR; + } + + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info); + + return err; + } + + /* + * ele_msg_send_rcv() returns a positive received-message size on + * success. Returning that raw size as the ioctl result would make a + * successful transaction look like a positive (non-zero) return value + * to userspace. Record the actual received size in rx_buf_sz for the + * response copied back to userspace, then normalise err to 0 so the + * ioctl reports plain success; the firmware status is conveyed to + * userspace inside the response buffer itself. + */ + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz = err; + err = 0; + + dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: %s %s.", dev_ctx->devname, __func__, + "message received, start transmit to user"); + + rsp_status_err = + se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv, rx_msg, tx_msg->header.command, + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz, + tx_msg->header.ver == priv->if_defs->base_api_ver); + + if (!rsp_status_err) { + /* + * The response is well formed and fully fits the caller's + * buffer, so any FW-allocated session/storage handle it carries + * (data[1]) has been delivered. Record it now, before the + * copy-out steps below. The FW has already committed the handle; + * running fw_api_specific_ops() only after a successful + * se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data()/copy_to_user() would leave the + * handle untracked - and so never closed on teardown, leaking it + * in FW - whenever the caller supplied a bad output pointer. + */ + fw_api_specific_ops(dev_ctx, rx_msg); + + err = se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(dev_ctx); + if (err < 0) { + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info); + return err; + } + } + + /* Copy data from the buffer */ + print_hex_dump_debug("to user ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 4, 4, rx_msg, + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz, false); + + if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf), rx_msg, + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz)) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy to user.", dev_ctx->devname); + err = -EFAULT; + } + + cleanup_err = se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info); + + if (cleanup_err && !err) + err = cleanup_err; + + return err; +} + +static int se_ioctl_get_mu_info(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, + void __user *uarg) +{ + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + struct se_ioctl_get_if_info if_info; + struct se_if_node *if_node; + int err = 0; + + if_node = container_of(priv->if_defs, typeof(*if_node), if_defs); + + if_info.se_if_id = 0; + if_info.interrupt_idx = 0; + if_info.tz = 0; + if_info.did = 0; + if_info.cmd_tag = priv->if_defs->cmd_tag; + if_info.rsp_tag = priv->if_defs->rsp_tag; + if_info.success_tag = priv->if_defs->success_tag; + if_info.base_api_ver = priv->if_defs->base_api_ver; + if_info.fw_api_ver = priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver; + + dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: info [se_if_id: %d, irq_idx: %d, tz: 0x%x, did: 0x%x].", + dev_ctx->devname, if_info.se_if_id, if_info.interrupt_idx, if_info.tz, + if_info.did); + + if (copy_to_user(uarg, &if_info, sizeof(if_info))) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy mu info to user.", + dev_ctx->devname); + err = -EFAULT; + } + + return err; +} + +static void rollback_shared_mem_pos(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 length) +{ + struct se_shared_mem *shared_mem = NULL; + + shared_mem = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt.non_secure_mem; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(length > shared_mem->pos)) { + shared_mem->pos = 0; + return; + } + + shared_mem->pos -= length; +} + +int get_shared_mem_slot(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, + u32 *length, dma_addr_t *ele_dma_addr, void **ptr) +{ + struct se_shared_mem *shared_mem = NULL; + bool is_fw_busy_dev_ctx; + size_t aligned_len = 0; + u32 pos; + + /* + * If this context is the one that caused a firmware timeout the shared + * DMA buffers may still be actively read/written by the firmware. + */ + is_fw_busy_dev_ctx = se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx); + if (is_fw_busy_dev_ctx) + return -EBUSY; + + aligned_len = round_up((size_t)*length, 8); + if (aligned_len < *length) { + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Invalid buffer length.", + dev_ctx->devname); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* No specific requirement for this buffer. */ + shared_mem = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt.non_secure_mem; + + /* Check there is enough space in the shared memory. */ + dev_dbg(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: req_size = %zd, max_size= %d, curr_pos = %d", + dev_ctx->devname, aligned_len, shared_mem->size, + shared_mem->pos); + + if (shared_mem->size < shared_mem->pos || + aligned_len > (shared_mem->size - shared_mem->pos)) { + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Not enough space in shared memory.", + dev_ctx->devname); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + /* Allocate space in shared memory. 8 bytes aligned. */ + pos = shared_mem->pos; + shared_mem->pos += aligned_len; + *ele_dma_addr = (u64)shared_mem->dma_addr + pos; + *ptr = shared_mem->ptr + pos; + *length = aligned_len; + + memset(shared_mem->ptr + pos, 0, aligned_len); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Copy a buffer of data to/from the user and return the address to use in + * messages + */ +static int se_ioctl_setup_iobuf_handler(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, + void __user *uarg) +{ + struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf io = {0}; + struct se_buf_desc *b_desc = NULL; + void *dma_buf_ptr = NULL; + dma_addr_t ele_dma_addr; + u32 aligned_len = 0; + int err = 0; + + if (copy_from_user(&io, uarg, sizeof(io))) { + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed copy iobuf config from user.", + dev_ctx->devname); + return -EFAULT; + } + + dev_dbg(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: io [buf: %p(%d) flag: %x].", dev_ctx->devname, + u64_to_user_ptr(io.user_buf), io.length, io.flags); + + if (io.length == 0 || !io.user_buf) { + /* + * Accept NULL pointers since some buffers are optional + * in FW commands. In this case we should return 0 as + * pointer to be embedded into the message. + * Skip all data copy part of code below. + */ + io.ele_addr = 0; + goto copy; + } + + aligned_len = io.length; + err = get_shared_mem_slot(dev_ctx, &aligned_len, &ele_dma_addr, &dma_buf_ptr); + if (err) + return err; + + io.ele_addr = ele_dma_addr; + if ((io.flags & SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_INPUT) || + (io.flags & SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_IN_OUT)) { + /* + * buffer is input: + * copy data from user space to this allocated buffer. + */ + if (copy_from_user(dma_buf_ptr, u64_to_user_ptr(io.user_buf), + io.length)) { + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, + "%s: Failed copy data to shared memory.", + dev_ctx->devname); + err = -EFAULT; + goto rollback; + } + } + + b_desc = add_b_desc_to_pending_list(dma_buf_ptr, &io, dev_ctx); + if (IS_ERR(b_desc)) { + err = PTR_ERR(b_desc); + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to allocate/link b_desc.", + dev_ctx->devname); + goto rollback; + } + +copy: + /* Provide the EdgeLock Enclave address to user space only if success.*/ + if (copy_to_user(uarg, &io, sizeof(io))) { + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy iobuff setup to user.", + dev_ctx->devname); + err = -EFAULT; + goto rollback; + } + return err; + +rollback: + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(b_desc)) { + list_del(&b_desc->link); + kfree(b_desc); + } + + if (dma_buf_ptr && aligned_len) { + memset(dma_buf_ptr, 0, aligned_len); + rollback_shared_mem_pos(dev_ctx, aligned_len); + } + + return err; +} + +/* IOCTL to provide SoC information */ +static int se_ioctl_get_se_soc_info_handler(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, + void __user *uarg) +{ + struct se_ioctl_get_soc_info soc_info; + int err = -EINVAL; + + soc_info.soc_id = get_se_soc_id(dev_ctx->priv); + soc_info.soc_rev = var_se_info.soc_rev; + + err = copy_to_user(uarg, (u8 *)(&soc_info), sizeof(soc_info)); + if (err) { + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy soc info to user.", + dev_ctx->devname); + err = -EFAULT; + } + + return err; +} + +/* + * File operations for user-space + */ + +/* Write a message to the MU. */ +static ssize_t se_if_fops_write(struct file *fp, const char __user *buf, + size_t size, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data; + struct se_if_priv *priv; + int err; + + scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTSYS, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) { + if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done) + return -ENODEV; + + priv = dev_ctx->priv; + + dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: write from buf (%p)%zu, ppos=%lld.", dev_ctx->devname, + buf, size, ((ppos) ? *ppos : 0)); + + if (dev_ctx != priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx) { + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (size < SE_MU_HDR_SZ || size > MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: User buffer too small/large(%zu < %d)", + dev_ctx->devname, size, + size < SE_MU_HDR_SZ ? SE_MU_HDR_SZ : + MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ); + return -ENOSPC; + } + + struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) = memdup_user(buf, size); + if (IS_ERR(tx_msg)) + return PTR_ERR(tx_msg); + + err = se_chk_tx_msg_hdr(dev_ctx, &tx_msg->header, size); + if (err) + return err; + + print_hex_dump_debug("from user ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 4, 4, + tx_msg, size, false); + + err = ele_msg_send(dev_ctx, tx_msg, size); + + return err; + } +} + +/* + * Read a message from the MU. + * Blocking until a message is available. + */ +static ssize_t se_if_fops_read(struct file *fp, char __user *buf, size_t size, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data; + u8 rx_msg_snap[MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN]; + struct se_if_priv *priv; + unsigned long flags; + size_t copy_len; + int err; + + scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTSYS, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) { + priv = dev_ctx->priv; + + if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done) + return -ENODEV; + + dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: read to buf %p(%zu), ppos=%lld.", dev_ctx->devname, + buf, size, ((ppos) ? *ppos : 0)); + + mutex_lock(&priv->modify_lock); + if (dev_ctx != priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx) { + mutex_unlock(&priv->modify_lock); + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx); + return -EINVAL; + } + mutex_unlock(&priv->modify_lock); + } + + err = ele_msg_rcv(dev_ctx, &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl); + if (err < 0) { + if (err != -ERESTARTSYS) + dev_err(priv->dev, + "%s: Er[0x%x]: Signal Interrupted. Current act-dev-ctx count: %d.", + dev_ctx->devname, err, dev_ctx->priv->active_devctx_count); + return err; + } + + /* + * Reacquire fops_lock before touching any dev_ctx state (pending lists, + * rx_msg) after the blocking wait. fops_lock was dropped before calling + * ele_msg_rcv(). If cleanup_dev_ctx() ran concurrently it could have + * freed the DMA buffers and the pending lists, leading to UAF and list + * corruption. Re-checking cleanup_done under fops_lock prevents that. + */ + mutex_lock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock); + + if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done) { + mutex_unlock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock); + return -ENODEV; + } + + /* + * Snapshot rx_msg pointer under clbk_rx_lock before releasing it. + * unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver() can acquire the lock, NULL out + * rx_msg, and free the buffer at any time after the unlock; using a + * stale pointer from the shared field after the unlock is a UAF. + */ + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) { + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags); + if (priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx != dev_ctx || + !priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg || + !priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags); + mutex_unlock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock); + return -ENODEV; + } + /* Taking snapshot is enough for the one common pre-allocated buffer. */ + copy_len = min(size, priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz); + memcpy(rx_msg_snap, priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg, copy_len); + priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz = 0; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags); + + /* We may need to copy the output data to user before + * delivering the completion message. + */ + err = se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(dev_ctx); + if (err < 0) { + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx); + mutex_unlock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock); + return err; + } + /* Copy data from the buffer using the snapshot taken under the lock. */ + print_hex_dump_debug("to user ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 4, 4, + rx_msg_snap, copy_len, false); + + fw_api_specific_ops(dev_ctx, (struct se_api_msg *)rx_msg_snap); + err = copy_len; + if (copy_to_user(buf, rx_msg_snap, copy_len)) + err = -EFAULT; + + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx); + mutex_unlock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock); + } + + return err; +} + +/* Open a character device. */ +static int se_if_fops_open(struct inode *nd, struct file *fp) +{ + struct miscdevice *miscdev = fp->private_data; + struct se_if_open_gate *gate; + struct se_if_device_ctx *misc_dev_ctx; + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx; + struct se_if_priv *priv; + int err = 0; + + gate = container_of(miscdev, struct se_if_open_gate, miscdev); + + if (!se_if_open_gate_get(gate)) + return -ENODEV; + + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&gate->lock)) { + se_if_open_gate_put(gate); + return -ERESTARTSYS; + } + + if (gate->dying || !gate->priv || + !kref_get_unless_zero(&gate->priv->refcount)) { + err = -ENODEV; + goto out_unlock_gate; + } + + priv = gate->priv; + mutex_unlock(&gate->lock); + + misc_dev_ctx = priv->priv_dev_ctx; + + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&misc_dev_ctx->fops_lock)) { + err = -ERESTARTSYS; + goto out_put_priv; + } + + if (misc_dev_ctx->cleanup_done) { + err = -ENODEV; + goto out_unlock_misc; + } + + priv->dev_ctx_mono_count++; + err = init_device_context(priv, priv->dev_ctx_mono_count, &dev_ctx); + if (err) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed[0x%x] to create dev-ctx.", err); + goto out_unlock_misc; + } + + fp->private_data = dev_ctx; + +out_unlock_misc: + mutex_unlock(&misc_dev_ctx->fops_lock); +out_put_priv: + kref_put(&priv->refcount, se_if_priv_release); + se_if_open_gate_put(gate); + return err; +out_unlock_gate: + mutex_unlock(&gate->lock); + se_if_open_gate_put(gate); + return err; +} + +/* Close a character device. */ +static int se_if_fops_close(struct inode *nd, struct file *fp) +{ + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data; + + dlink_n_cleanup_dev_ctx(dev_ctx, true); + + return 0; +} + +/* IOCTL entry point of a character device */ +static long se_ioctl(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) +{ + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data; + struct se_if_priv *priv; + void __user *uarg = (void __user *)arg; + long err; + + /* Prevent race during change of device context */ + scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTSYS, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) { + if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done) + return -ENODEV; + + priv = dev_ctx->priv; + + switch (cmd) { + case SE_IOCTL_ENABLE_CMD_RCV: { + err = set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(dev_ctx); + if (err) + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to register %s as CMD-Receiver: %ld\n", + dev_ctx->devname, err); + break; + } + case SE_IOCTL_GET_MU_INFO: + err = se_ioctl_get_mu_info(dev_ctx, uarg); + break; + case SE_IOCTL_SETUP_IOBUF: + err = se_ioctl_setup_iobuf_handler(dev_ctx, uarg); + break; + case SE_IOCTL_GET_SOC_INFO: + err = se_ioctl_get_se_soc_info_handler(dev_ctx, uarg); + break; + case SE_IOCTL_CMD_SEND_RCV_RSP: + err = se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_handler(dev_ctx, uarg); + break; + default: + err = -ENOTTY; + dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: IOCTL %.8x not supported.", + dev_ctx->devname, cmd); + } + } + + return err; +} + +/* Char driver setup */ +static const struct file_operations se_if_fops = { + .open = se_if_fops_open, + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .release = se_if_fops_close, + .unlocked_ioctl = se_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, + .read = se_if_fops_read, + .write = se_if_fops_write, +}; + +int se_get_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void **buf, + dma_addr_t *daddr, u32 len) +{ + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt; + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + struct se_buf_desc *b_desc = NULL; + + lockdep_assert_held(&dev_ctx->fops_lock); + + if (se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx)) + return -EBUSY; + + b_desc = kzalloc_obj(*b_desc, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!b_desc) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * gen_pool is internally thread-safe, so contexts may allocate + * concurrently. The buffer is tracked on this context's own + * mem_pool_buf_list and released on its cleanup path. + */ + *buf = gen_pool_dma_alloc(priv->mem_pool, len, daddr); + if (!*buf) { + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to alloc from gen_pool.\n"); + kfree(b_desc); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + /* gen_pool_dma_alloc() does not zero the buffer. */ + memset(*buf, 0, len); + b_desc->shared_buf_ptr = *buf; + b_desc->size = len; + + list_add_tail(&b_desc->link, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->mem_pool_buf_list); + + return 0; +} + +void se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool reclaim) +{ + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt; + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv; + struct se_buf_desc *b_desc, *temp; + + /* + * Free only the buffers this context allocated. A context that never + * used the pool has an empty list, so this is a no-op for it. + * + * Unlike the coherent staging buffer, the pool path needs no + * "nothing staged" (pos) gate on the reclaim=false leg. Pool buffers + * are ephemeral, per-transaction allocations: se_get_mem_pool_buf() + * refuses to allocate once the context is fw_busy, ele_msg_send_rcv() + * refuses to start a new command while fw_busy, and the success path + * frees the whole list via se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(reclaim=true) + * before returning. se_if_cmd_lock serialises synchronous commands, so + * at most one transaction is outstanding. The only way to reach here + * with reclaim=false and a non-empty list is the single fw_busy + * context still owning the buffer(s) from the one timed-out + * transaction. Those buffers are exactly the in-flight ones the + * enclave may still be DMA-ing into, so leaving them on the list (no + * gen_pool_free) deliberately leaks them to avoid a DMA-after-free - + * there are no already-consumed pool buffers to reclaim on this leg. + */ + list_for_each_entry_safe(b_desc, temp, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->mem_pool_buf_list, link) { + if (reclaim) + gen_pool_free(priv->mem_pool, + (unsigned long)b_desc->shared_buf_ptr, + b_desc->size); + list_del(&b_desc->link); + kfree(b_desc); + } +} + +static void se_fw_busy_work(struct work_struct *work) +{ + struct se_if_priv *priv = + container_of(work, struct se_if_priv, fw_busy_work); + + se_clear_fw_busy(priv); +} + static int se_suspend(struct device *dev) { struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h index dd4a1ea7e35a..35389095ed1c 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h @@ -10,20 +10,40 @@ #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/mailbox_client.h> #include <linux/semaphore.h> +#include <linux/workqueue.h> #define MAX_FW_LOAD_RETRIES 50 #define SE_MSG_WORD_SZ 0x4 #define RES_STATUS(x) FIELD_GET(0x000000ff, x) +#define MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER (128 * 1024) #define MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN (256) #define MESSAGING_VERSION_6 0x6 #define MESSAGING_VERSION_7 0x7 +struct se_if_open_gate { + struct miscdevice miscdev; + struct se_if_priv *priv; + /* to lock to update the structure */ + struct mutex lock; + struct kref refcount; + bool dying; + /* set once misc_register() has succeeded (deferred to probe end) */ + bool registered; +}; + struct se_clbk_handle { struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx; struct completion done; bool signal_rcvd; + /* + * Set under clbk_rx_lock once a real response is copied into rx_msg, + * cleared when a new transaction is armed. Lets ele_msg_rcv() tell a + * genuine response from a teardown-forced complete_all() with no data. + */ + bool rx_delivered; u32 rx_msg_sz; + /* * Assignment of the rx_msg buffer to held till the * received content as part callback function, is copied. @@ -45,10 +65,46 @@ struct se_imem_buf { u32 state; }; +struct se_buf_desc { + u8 *shared_buf_ptr; + void __user *usr_buf_ptr; + u32 size; + struct list_head link; +}; + +struct se_shared_mem { + dma_addr_t dma_addr; + u32 size; + u32 pos; + u8 *ptr; +}; + +struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info { + struct list_head mem_pool_buf_list; + struct list_head pending_in; + struct list_head pending_out; + + struct se_shared_mem non_secure_mem; +}; + /* Private struct for each char device instance. */ struct se_if_device_ctx { struct se_if_priv *priv; + struct miscdevice *miscdev; const char *devname; + u32 sess_hdl; + u32 strg_hdl; + bool cleanup_done; + unsigned long rcv_msg_timeout_jiffies; + + /* process one file operation at a time. */ + struct mutex fops_lock; + + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info se_shared_mem_mgmt; + struct list_head link; + + /* Add reference counting */ + struct kref refcount; }; /* Header of the messages exchange with the EdgeLock Enclave */ @@ -113,9 +169,43 @@ struct se_if_priv { struct se_fw_load_info load_fw; atomic_t fw_busy; + /* + * Set once teardown begins. New synchronous transactions are rejected + * and a teardown-forced completion is not mistaken for a real firmware + * response. + */ + atomic_t going_away; + /* + * Serialise the fw_busy_dev_ctx and fw_busy state updates between the + * timeout path, late-response callback/work, and teardown. + */ + spinlock_t fw_busy_lock; + struct se_if_device_ctx *fw_busy_dev_ctx; + struct work_struct fw_busy_work; struct se_if_device_ctx *priv_dev_ctx; + struct list_head dev_ctx_list; + + /* prevent modifying priv member variable in parallel. */ + struct mutex modify_lock; + u32 active_devctx_count; + u32 dev_ctx_mono_count; + + /* Add reference counting */ + struct kref refcount; + + /* stable gate used by .open() */ + struct se_if_open_gate *open_gate; }; char *get_se_if_name(u8 se_if_id); +void unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx); +int set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx); +bool se_is_fw_busy_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx); +void se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx); +int get_shared_mem_slot(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, + u32 *length, dma_addr_t *ele_dma_addr, void **ptr); +int se_get_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void **buf, + dma_addr_t *daddr, u32 len); +void se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool reclaim); #endif diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6302ff66034f --- /dev/null +++ b/include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause*/ +/* + * Copyright 2025 NXP + */ + +#ifndef SE_IOCTL_H +#define SE_IOCTL_H + +#include <linux/types.h> + +#define SE_TYPE_STR_DBG "dbg" +#define SE_TYPE_STR_HSM "hsm" +#define SE_TYPE_ID_UNKWN 0x0 +#define SE_TYPE_ID_DBG 0x1 +#define SE_TYPE_ID_HSM 0x2 +/* IOCTL definitions. */ + +struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf { + __u64 user_buf; + __u32 length; + __u32 flags; + __u64 ele_addr; +}; + +struct se_ioctl_shared_mem_cfg { + __u32 base_offset; + __u32 size; +}; + +struct se_ioctl_get_if_info { + __u8 se_if_id; + __u8 interrupt_idx; + __u8 tz; + __u8 did; + __u8 cmd_tag; + __u8 rsp_tag; + __u8 success_tag; + __u8 base_api_ver; + __u8 fw_api_ver; +}; + +struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info { + __u64 tx_buf; + __u64 rx_buf; + __u32 tx_buf_sz; + __u32 rx_buf_sz; +}; + +struct se_ioctl_get_soc_info { + __u16 soc_id; + __u16 soc_rev; +}; + +/* IO Buffer Flags */ +#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_OUTPUT (0x00u) +#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_INPUT (0x01u) +#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_USE_SEC_MEM (0x02u) +#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_USE_SHORT_ADDR (0x04u) +#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_IN_OUT (0x10u) + +/* IOCTLS */ +#define SE_IOCTL 0x0A /* like MISC_MAJOR. */ + +/* + * ioctl to designated the current fd as logical-reciever. + * This is ioctl is send when the nvm-daemon, a slave to the + * firmware is started by the user. + */ +#define SE_IOCTL_ENABLE_CMD_RCV _IO(SE_IOCTL, 0x01) + +/* + * ioctl to get the buffer allocated from the memory, which is shared + * between kernel and FW. + * Post allocation, the kernel tagged the allocated memory with: + * Output + * Input + * Input-Output + * Short address + * Secure-memory + */ +#define SE_IOCTL_SETUP_IOBUF _IOWR(SE_IOCTL, 0x03, struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf) + +/* + * ioctl to get the mu information, that is used to exchange message + * with FW, from user-spaced. + */ +#define SE_IOCTL_GET_MU_INFO _IOR(SE_IOCTL, 0x04, struct se_ioctl_get_if_info) +/* + * ioctl to get SoC Info from user-space. + */ +#define SE_IOCTL_GET_SOC_INFO _IOR(SE_IOCTL, 0x06, struct se_ioctl_get_soc_info) + +/* + * ioctl to send command and receive response from user-space. + */ +#define SE_IOCTL_CMD_SEND_RCV_RSP _IOWR(SE_IOCTL, 0x07, struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info) +#endif -- 2.43.0