Wifi certifcation failed test cases
Bryce Johnson <[email protected]> Tue, 3 Feb 2026 14:52:28 -0700
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.iwd |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CADXxVSKVt4-4VYzSFOW_5-H9sDi3X-3esEBMg4+HUXU4_iGvBQ@mail.gmail.com> |
Hi All, In addition to manually forcing the security protocol from the previous message. I gave him a workaround for that but in the meantime I was told we had failed a few more test cases. A couple years ago when we tried to get wifi certified with IWD the PKMSA was the only issue and you guys had fixed that (thanks!), so I was hoping for it to go easier this time. But I think there was more stuff added. This was with IWD 3.10 and CC3301 TI wifi. Any guidance would be appreciated, thanks! Here were the failed cases. I'm looking through the logs now to make sense of them, I basically have a large log dump for each one. I don't think I can share the full test plan on the public list, but I can give snippets to see if any of these are configuration issues on my part. CT_Security_RSN_STA_CapabilitiesVerification-ReservedBits-31_10603_1: CT_Security_RSN_STA_CapabilitiesVerification-ReservedBits-Extra_10605_1: CT_Security_RSN_STA_CapabilitiesVerification-ReservedBits-SAE-PK_10604_1: This test verifies that the STAUT successfully associates, authenticates and passes data traffic when reserved bits in the RSN Capabilities and Extended RSN Capabilities fields are set to one instead of zero, and when the RSNXE is extended. This test also verifies that the STAUT does not set optional feature bits to one in the RSN Capabilities and Extended RSN Capabilities fields on transmission when unsupported and ignores them on reception CT_Security_WPA2Personal_STA_4wayHandshakeVulnerability-SameANonce_10006_3: This test verifies that the STAUT is not vulnerable to PTK key reinstallation during the 4-way handshake using the same ANonce when the AP uses Temporal PTK construction. CT_Security_WPA2Personal_STA_RSNCapabilitiesVerification-OptionalBits_10486_2: CT_Security_WPA2Personal_STA_RSNCapabilitiesVerification OptionalBits_10486_3: This test verifies that the STAUT does not set optional feature bits to one in the RSN Capabilities field on transmission when unsupported and ignores them on reception CT_Security_WPA2Personal_STA_RSNEBoundsVerification-MultiAKM_10278_1: CT_Security_WPA2Personal_STA_RSNEBoundsVerification-UndefElem_10277_1: This test verifies that the STAUT correctly performs bounds verification on the received RSNE from the test bed AP in Beacon and/or Probe Response frames. Bryce