Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] net: Introduce read_sock_cmsg proto_ops for control message delivery
Alistair Francis <[email protected]> Sat, 28 Feb 2026 21:09:12 +1000
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.kernel-tls-handshake |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAKmqyKOjbNkbAGY1bTp1cH2kwAPbViVA6UEv0uSdY=J2vRAk9A@mail.gmail.com> |
On Thu, Feb 19, 2026 at 6:10 PM Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 2/18/26 17:12, Chuck Lever wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, Feb 18, 2026, at 10:52 AM, Hannes Reinecke wrote: > >> On 2/18/26 15:33, Chuck Lever wrote: > >>> On 2/18/26 2:29 AM, Hannes Reinecke wrote: > > > >>>> The way I see it, ->read_sock() has an advantage when you can work > >>>> with skbuffs (ie network packets) directly. Then it has the benefit > >>>> of being paced with the packets arriving as they do on the network. > >>>> > >>>> But for TLS this is no longer true; the TLS skbuffs are synthesized > >>>> on top of the TCP stream, and the boundary of a TLS skbuff is completely > >>>> decoupled from the TCP skbuff (in theory, at least). > >>>> > >>>> This can result in TLS skbuff stalls when waiting for the remainder > >>>> of the TCP data stream to arrive. > >>> > >>> An entire TLS Record has to be present before it can be decrypted and > >>> passed to the socket consumer. Is that what you mean? > >>> > >> Yes. And that makes ->read_sock() a bit pointless (from my POV); looking > >> at the network stack the skbuffs are assembled/decoded by the TLS layer, > >> only to be converted into skbuffs again for ->read_sock(). > >> Which seems a bit pointless. > > > > Is this true only of the software kTLS implementation? For > > offload, I'd think the decrypted records are placed directly > > in the skbs that are handed to consumers. > > > > > >> But the main point with ->read_sock() is that we can only process > >> skbuffs, ie we have to wait for the TLS layer to assemble the entire > >> record. > >> With recvmsg() we at least have a theoretical choice of returning > >> a short read, allowing the code to do something clever in the meantime. > > > > Do you mean that read_sock is always synchronous? Perhaps > > judicious construction of the consumer can help there; but > > I expect that plain TCP has similar pathologies during, for > > instance, a network partition. > > > > > >> Mind you, that is all conjecture. Might well be that ->read_sock() > >> is beneficial for TLS, too. Or, at least, doesn't do any harm. > >> It's just that I don't trust the author of the TLS read_sock() > >> implementation; his network stack knowledge isn't _that_ great. > > > > Time to get out our measuring sticks, I suppose. > > > > > >> (Problem is that my performance measurements always ran into > >> some obnoxious occasional stall, rendering the entire measurement > >> pretty worthless. So I couldn't tell whether the recvmsg() > >> implementation delivers a benefit or not) > > > > Generally speaking (ie, hand-wave mode) that kind of stall arises > > because the consumer expects it will get another data_ready and the > > network layer does not conform with the implementer's expectations. > > > Naa. Tested that one. I've seen stalls affecting _all_ queues at > the same time, in regular intervals spaced with the power of 2. > Current reasoning is HW-based LLDP frames handling. > > > So I like the read_sock_cmsg design here because with recvmsg, > > the CMSG payload can appear in the consumer's data buffer. For > > direct I/O, that's bad. We also really don't want to place the > > TLS Alerts in page cache pages. With read_sock_cmsg, the CMSG > > payload can be efficiently directed to an independent buffer > > that is never visible to user space. > > > > And I prefer having a single receive path for both non-TLS and > > TLS processing. That's so much less code to deal with. > > > > This approach seems to me to be more architecturally sound. > > We just have to get over the implementation bumps IMO. I think > > we can certainly examine ->read_sock with software kTLS to see > > if there's room for improvement. > > > And that, I guess, is the real argument. We've seen with the > recent TLS alert CVE that posting TLS messages in the recvmsg > payload is a _bad_ idea, as this puts far too many restrictions > on the format of the message. > > So you see me convinced. I'll give it a go to convert nvme-tcp. Just a quick update that I have done this for nvme-tcp with KeyUpdate. Just chasing down one last issue. Hopefully I can send some patches in the next week or two. Alistair > > Cheers, > > Hannes > -- > Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect > [email protected] +49 911 74053 688 > SUSE Software Solutions GmbH, Frankenstr. 146, 90461 Nürnberg > HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: I. Totev, A. McDonald, W. Knoblich >