Re: self protect process with landlock to getting killed
Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]> Wed, 28 Jun 2023 19:38:19 +0200
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.landlock |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 28/06/2023 17:20, Jay Freyensee wrote: > > >> >>> >>> What about is there a way to protect the directory the landlock process >>> sits in from being tampered/written-to by a non-landlock process? >> >> The same principle applies: this is not possible with Landlock itself. >> The potential malicious processes should be sandboxed. >> >> > Thanks for the response Mickael. In this case, this would kind of be > like a zero-day use case, that we wouldn't know all the malicious > processes tampering with that process's directory up-front, we just know > that we wouldn't want any non-landlocked process (known and unknown) > tampering with the directory the landlocked process sits in. If you cannot sandbox the "other" processes, then I guess all/most processes are potentially malicious. In this case you're indeed looking to reverse the protection: restrict all/most processes from tampering with well-defined resources. You then need to rely on a system-wide access control that can be put in place with different UID/GID, or other LSMs: SELinux, AppArmor, Smack or Tomoyo. Regards, Mickaël > > Thanks, > > Jay > >