Re: current landlock limitations and what it means for sandboxer
Jay Freyensee <[email protected]> Wed, 31 Aug 2022 08:48:12 -0700
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.landlock |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 8/31/22 6:31 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > On 31/08/2022 02:22, Jeff Xu wrote: >> Hello, Mickaël > > Hello Jeff, > > Thanks for these interesting questions. > >> >> I would like to dig into the limitation of landlock, to understand >> more about the design approach of using landlock for sandboxing user >> space applications. This has spurred a long standing curiosity with meon landlock. Can landlock quarrantine a bad-acting binary discovered during machine operation? The way I've understood landlock is it can be used to restrict a set of unprivileged processes to sandboxes known on say, machine boot up. But what if during normal operation an anti-malware program flags a suspect binary running on a system, but it isn't 100% sure that binary is malicious? Could landlock "lock away" and sandbox the suspect-binary for analysis by an admin to determine that suspect binary is in fact malicious and should be deleted from the system? And if the suspect binary is determined to be harmless can it be unsandboxed/put-back? Thanks, Jay