Re: [PATCH] fuse: mark DAX VMA page protections as decrypted

>>> In confidential computing guest environments (such as AMD SEV-SNP or
>>> Intel TDX), direct memory access (DAX) mappings between the guest kernel
>>> and host-backed FUSE/virtiofs shared memory regions must be accessed
>>> using shared (decrypted) page protections.
>>>
>>> Modify fuse_dax_mmap() to apply pgprot_decrypted() to vma->vm_page_prot
>>> when establishing FUSE DAX memory mappings. This ensures guest page
>>> table entries for shared DAX buffers are explicitly marked as decrypted,
>>> preventing memory encryption faults when accessing host-shared DAX memory.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Punit Salian <[email protected]>
>>> ---
>>>   fs/fuse/dax.c | 1 +
>>>   1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/fuse/dax.c b/fs/fuse/dax.c
>>> index a15c464c8d19..00e316a7f805 100644
>>> --- a/fs/fuse/dax.c
>>> +++ b/fs/fuse/dax.c
>>> @@ -826,6 +826,7 @@ int fuse_dax_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>>>          file_accessed(file);
>>>          vma->vm_ops = &fuse_dax_vm_ops;
>>>          vm_flags_set(vma, VM_MIXEDMAP | VM_HUGEPAGE);
>>> +       vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_decrypted(vma->vm_page_prot);

For virtio-pmem on host with SEV support we addressed similar issue by 
marking FS DAX device memory decrypted in memremap_pages()

(commit 867400af90f1, "mm/memremap.c: map FS_DAX device memory as 
decrypted"), since the device memory

is mapped though the kernel address space there. For virtio-fs DAX we 
don't seem to have such a central location so

VMA level handling seems reasonable fix to me.

That said, I'm not entirely certain about all of the security 
implications in a CoCo environment, given that the host is generally 
considered untrusted

and virtio-fs involves sharing host-backed memory with the guest. Till 
we get some mechanism to access this memory as encrypted, we can have 
this support

with existing security practices for virtio-fs:

Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>